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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis investigates the approach to non-disclosure as a form of misrepresentation in 
South African law. The primary focus is the question of liability, and whether parties should be 
able to claim relief based on non-disclosure.  In order to determine this, attention is also paid 
to the standards which have traditionally been employed in cases of non-disclosure, and it is 
questioned whether a general test can be formulated which could be used in all such 
instances. 
The point of departure in this discussion is a general historical and comparative overview of 
the law relating to non-disclosure. This overview places the position in modern South African 
law in context, and highlights some of the similarities between our current position regarding 
non-disclosure and the position in other jurisdictions. The overview also sets out the 
provisions relating to non-disclosure in international legal instruments, which could be of use 
in interpreting concepts used in our law. 
The study then shifts to an exploration of the specific situations, such as the conclusion of 
insurance agreements, or agreements of sale involving latent defects, where South African 
law automatically imposes a duty of disclosure. These instances are the exception to the 
general rule against imposing duties of disclosure on contracting parties. The study reveals 
that certain principles are applied in more than one of these exceptional cases, and attention 
is paid to each in order to determine which principles are most prevalent. It is suggested that 
the nature of the relationship between the parties is the underlying reason for always 
imposing duties of disclosure in these circumstances. 
Attention is then paid to the judicial development of the law relating to non-disclosure, 
specifically in those cases which fall outside the recognised special cases referred to above. 
The remedies available to a party when they have been wronged by another’s non-disclosure 
are identified and investigated here, namely rescission and damages. A distinction is drawn 
between the treatment of non-disclosure in the contractual sphere and the approach taken in 
the law of delict. The different requirements for each remedy are explored and evaluated. 
A detailed examination of the key judgments relating to non-disclosure shows us that the 
judiciary apply similar principles to those identified in the discussion of the exceptional 
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instances when deciding to impose liability based on non-disclosure. Reliance is also placed 
on the standards set out in the earlier historical and comparative discussion. The most 
prevalent of these standards are the nature of the relationship between the parties and the 
good faith principle.  
It is then considered whether all of these principles and elements could be used in order to 
distill one general standard that could be used to determine whether non-disclosure could 
give rise to relief. The conclusion is drawn that it may not be advisable to adopt such a 
standard, and that the seemingly fragmented treatment of non-disclosure in South African law 
thus far has enabled its development and will continue to do so. A number of key 
considerations have been identified as possible standards, and these considerations can be 
applied by the judiciary on a case by case basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   v	  
OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie tesis ondersoek wanvoorstelling deur stilswye in die Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg. 
Die primêre fokus is op wanneer stilswye aanleiding gee tot aanspreeklikheid, en watter 
remedies daaruit voortvloei. Om dit vas te stel, word aandag geskenk aan die standaarde wat 
tradisioneel gebruik word in gevalle van stilswye, en word veral bevraagteken of 'n algemene 
toets formuleer kan word wat in al sulke gevalle toepassing sou kon vind. 
Die ondersoek begin met ‘n algemene historiese en regsvergelykende oorsig, wat die konteks 
verskaf vir die analise van die posisie in die moderne Suid-Afrikaanse reg, en ooreenkomste 
tussen hierdie posisie en die benadering in ander jurisdiksies na vore bring. Die bepalings 
van sekere internasionale regsinstrumente wat spesifiek met stilswye handel, word ook 
ondersoek om te bepaal hulle van nut kan wees by die uitleg van konsepte wat in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg gebruik word.   
Die fokus van die studie verskuif dan na spesifieke, uitsonderlike gevalle waar die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg outomaties ‘n openbaringsplig tussen partye erken. Prominente voorbeelde is 
versekeringskontrakte en koopkontrakte waar die merx ‘n verborge gebrek het. Hierdie 
gevalle is uitsonderings op die algemene reël dat kontrakspartye nie  openbaringspligte het 
nie. Dit kom voor dat sekere gemeenskaplike beginsels van toepassing is in sekere van die 
uitsonderingsgevalle, en dit word ondersoek hoekom hierdie beginsels gereeld na vore tree. 
Dit word ook voorgestel dat die aard van die verhouding tussen die partye die onderliggende 
rede is waarom ons reg openbaringspligte in hierdie spesifieke omstandighede oplê. 
Aandag word dan geskenk aan die regterlike ontwikkeling van die regsposisie ten opsigte van 
stilswye in gevalle wat nie by een van die bogenoemde erkende uitsonderings tuisgebring kan 
word nie. Die remedies beskikbaar aan partye wanneer hulle deur ‘n ander se stilswye 
benadeel is, word hier geïdentifiseer en ondersoek. Hierdie remedies is die kontraktuele 
remedie van aanvegting (moontlik gevolg deur teruggawe) en die deliktuele remedie van 
skadevergoeding. ‘n Onderskeid word ook getref tussen die hantering van stilswye in die 
kontraktereg en die benadering wat in die deliktereg gevolg word. Aan die hand van hierdie 
onderskeid word die vereistes vir albei remedies bepreek. 
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Die belangrikste uitsprake van die howe in gevalle wat nie by die spesifieke, uitsonderlike 
kategorieë tuisgebring kan word nie, word dan oorweeg. Dit is duidelik dat die howe in die 
konteks van hierdie residuele gevalle soortgelyke beginsels geïdentifiseer het as dié wat 
voorgekom het by gevalle soos versekering en koop. Uit hierdie uitsprake blyk dit ook duidelik 
dat die howe ag slaan op soortgelyke standaarde as dié wat in die historiese en vergelykende 
oorsig na vore getree het. In dié verband is die aard van die partye se verhouding en die 
goeie trou beginsel veral prominent.  
Ten slotte word oorweeg of die beginsels en elemente wat hierbo geïdentifiseer is, gebruik 
kan word om ‘n algemene standaard te ontwikkel wat gebruik sal kan word om te bepaal of ŉ 
openbaringsplig ontstaan. Die gevolgtrekking word bereik dat so ‘n algemene standaard nie 
noodwendig die beste oplossing is nie. Die oënskynlik gefragmenteerde hantering van 
stilswye in die Suid-Afrikaanse het tot dusver tog regsontwikkeling bevorder, en sal 
waarskynlik ook voortgaan om dit te doen. ŉ Aantal kernoorwegings kan wel geïdentifiseer 
word, wat dan sou kon dien as moontlike standaarde wat regsontwikkeling verder sou kon 
bevorder, en wat deur die howe toegepas sou kon word na gelang van die spesifieke 
omstandighede van elke saak. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the requirements for a valid contract is that there must be consensus, or a proper 
meeting of the minds, between the contracting parties.1 The expressions of will which are 
essential for establishing consensus can be influenced by various factors, which are in some 
cases so serious that they affect the validity of a contract. One such factor is 
misrepresentation.2  
 
Misrepresentation occurs when a contracting party’s decision to enter into a specific contract 
is influenced by a false representation.3 Traditionally, the law of contract has regarded such a 
misrepresentation as a ground for the innocent party to rescind the contract and claim 
restitution, as well as to claim damages. The question posed in this thesis is when non-
disclosure, as opposed to making some positive representation, can constitute a 
misrepresentation and entitle a party to these remedies. As in many other systems, non-
disclosure has traditionally been a problematic area of the South African law of contract, and 
it is unclear which situations would require that the parties incur liability for their silence. 
 
The general rule in South African law is that there is no inherent duty on a contracting party to 
disclose any information concerning a proposed contract which he might have.4 This rule is 
derived from the idea that knowledge is power when parties enter into contracts, and that 
parties should at times have the right not to disclose certain information if the disclosure 
thereof would cause the other party to question whether to enter into the transaction, or enter 
into it on specific terms. An example which illustrates the application of this rule is the 
situation where one party buys a house from another, unaware that a murder had been 
committed in the house a few years prior to the purchase.5 It would clearly be unpleasant for 
the buyer to live in a place with such a history, and the question is whether the seller should 
have disclosed this information to the buyer. This information does not relate to the structural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  S	  Van	  der	  Merwe,	  LF	  Van	  Huyssteen,	  MFB	  Reinecke	  &	  GF	  Lubbe	  	  Contract:	  General	  Principles	  4th	  ed	  (2012)	  90;	  Bourbon-­‐
Leftley	  v	  WPK	  (Landbou)	  Bpk	  1999	  1	  SA	  902	  (C).	  
2	  George	  v	  Fairmead	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1958	  2	  SA	  468;	  Du	  Toit	  v	  Atkinson's	  Motors	  Bpk	  1985	  2	  SA	  893	  (A).	  
3	  George	  v	  Fairmead	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1958	  2	  SA	  468;	  Du	  Toit	  v	  Atkinson's	  Motors	  Bpk	  1985	  2	  SA	  893	  (A);	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  et	  al	  
Contract:	  General	  Principles	  93.	  
4	  “There	  is	  in	  our	  law	  no	  general	  duty	  upon	  contracting	  parties	  to	  disclose	  to	  each	  other	  any	  facts	  and	  circumstances	  
known	  to	  them	  which	  may	  influence	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  other	  party	  in	  deciding	  whether	  to	  conclude	  the	  contract”	  (Speight	  v	  
Glass	  1961	  1	  SA	  778	  (D);	  further	  see	  3	  1	  below).	  
5	  Sykes	  v	  Taylor-­‐Rose	  [2004]	  2	  P	  &	  CR	  30.	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quality of the house, but it is likely to make the buyer entertain doubts about entering into the 
contract. In this instance, the seller’s non-disclosure is a means of protecting his interests, 
albeit at the expense of the buyer’s interests. This could lead to the buyer being 
disadvantaged, since he might never have entered into the contract if he had been privy to 
the same information as the seller. There is no obvious answer, though, to the question 
whether the buyers’ interest in not being disadvantaged in this manner should weigh more 
strongly than the seller’s interest in withholding information. The courts do at times impose 
duties to disclose, but there is no general criterion that can be used to determine when 
someone should be liable for an omission to disclose, or when it is unlawful, and each case is 
decided on its particular facts. 
 
Historically, the problem of imposing liability for non-disclosure arose as early as Roman law. 
In his De Officiis,6 Cicero described the problem of a merchant who wanted to import grain to 
a famine-stricken country. As a result of the shortage of grain in the country, he could 
potentially sell his grain at a high price. However, he discovers that the market will soon be 
saturated with grain as other ships carrying the same cargo are due to arrive shortly, 
consequently reducing the price of grain. Assuming that he would want to act in good faith, 
would he be bound to disclose this information to prospective buyers?  Would there be a legal 
obligation to disclose in this instance, or would it only be morally reprehensible to keep silent? 
Throughout the ages, legal systems have had to contend with problems like these. In modern 
South African law it has been suggested that there should be a standard test to determine 
when such duty will arise.7 The proposed formulation of this test differs greatly. It has been 
suggested that because bona fides forms the basis of the contract, the parties to a contract 
are bound to act according to the dictates of good faith, and failure to do so should be 
actionable.8 Christie proposes that the test should be that “if, in the circumstances, it would be 
wrong to keep silent, then silence amounts to misrepresentation.”9 Hutchison’s enquiry is 
whether the non-disclosure was “lawful”.10 However, these tests still leave it very unclear how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  3.12.50.	  
7	  MA	  Millner	  “Fraudulent	  Non-­‐Disclosure"	  (1957)	  76	  SALJ	  177;	  RH	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  6th	  ed	  
(2011)	  279.	  
8	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W)	  802A-­‐B	  per	  Jansen	  J.	  
9	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  279.	  
10	  “In	  principle,	  therefore,	  a	  party	  who	  has	  been	  induced	  to	  contract	  by	  the	  unlawful	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  material	  
information	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  same	  remedies	  as	  the	  victim	  of	  any	  other	  misrepresentation.	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  to	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we can determine whether or not non-disclosure is actionable in any given circumstance. This 
lack of a fixed standard is still a problem for which no suitable solution has yet been found.   
  
Linked to this problem is the question whether such a duty to disclose arises only when 
dealing with certain contracts such as insurance contracts, or other contracts previously 
designated uberrimae fidei, where a higher duty of care inter partes has traditionally been 
required. Does the increased risk in these types of contracts necessitate a higher duty of 
care? Are there other elements of these contracts that could indicate when a duty to disclose 
arises between parties? Can these elements be identified in other types of contracts outside 
the specified exceptions?    
 
Millner, in his famous article dealing with fraudulent non-disclosure, was of the opinion that 
the duty to disclose could indeed be identified in contracts falling outside the category of 
uberrimae fidei, saying that:  
 
“The same relationship, and therefore the same duty of disclosure, can arise in any 
other negotiations which, in the particular case, are characterised by the involuntary 
reliance of the one party on the other for information material to his decision.”11  
 
The use of the “involuntary reliance” test as a possible standard for determining the existence 
of a duty to disclose has often enjoyed support in South African law, both from academic 
writers and the judiciary.12 However, the basis, justification and practical application of this 
standard remain unclear and must be investigated, together with the other possible 
standards.  
 
The problem of determining when a duty to disclose arises is a global phenomenon. 
Unsurprisingly, a number of international legal instruments specifically make provision for 
imposing such a duty. The potential exists that an exploration of the most important of these 
provisions may aid South African law in determining when such a duty to disclose arises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
establish	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  speak	  was	  unlawful	  in	  the	  circumstances.”	  D	  Hutchison	  &	  CJ	  Pretorius	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  of	  
Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  (2012)	  134.	  
11	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	  	  
12	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  177;	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  280;	  Pretorius	  and	  Another	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  
(under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W);	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W)	  797C;	  
Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W)	  718C.	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between parties. These instruments could also be useful in giving meaning to our own 
Consumer Protection Act,13 which is aimed at “levelling the playing field” between consumers 
and suppliers, and empowering consumers. These international instruments, the Consumer 
Protection Act and other statutory instruments will be explored insofar as they address issues 
of non-disclosure in the modern commercial world. The relevant question is why the 
legislature chose to expressly create duties of disclosure in statute, and what their importance 
is in aiding the development of a general test for the duty to disclose. 
 
This work will begin to address the problems mentioned here by considering the historical 
development of the law relating to non-disclosure, as well as approaches adopted in some 
foreign systems and international instruments in chapter two. After exploring these 
approaches, the focus in chapter three will shift to the specific contracts in which parties may 
be awarded a claim based on non-disclosure. These contract types will be explored in order 
to see whether there are any basic principles common to them which could be distilled into a 
test to use in residual cases of non-disclosure. Finally, in chapter four, attention will be paid to 
judgments dealing with these residual cases in order to explore their approach to each 
circumstance. The discussions in chapter three and four may aid us in identifying any 
similarities between the principles applied in the specific cases and those applied by the 
judiciary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  68	  of	  2008.	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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LAW RELATING 
TO MISREPRESENTATION BY NON-DISCLOSURE 
 
2 1 Misrepresentation by non-disclosure under Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
 
2 1 1 Non-disclosure, dolus and bona fides 
 
2 1 1 1  Roman Law 
 
In Roman law it was crucial to identify the appropriate action governing a given situation. In 
the case of fraud, it recognised the following remedy according to D.4.3.1.1. 
 
“The following are the terms of the Edict: ‘Where anything is said to have been done 
with fraudulent intent and no other action is applicable in the matter, I will grant an 
action if there seems to be good ground for it.” 
 
The appropriate action would have been the actio de dolo, which was aimed at providing 
recourse in the event that a contracting party’s actions constituted dolus malus.14 This remedy 
was originally narrow in scope and could only be applied in cases of actual deception, if one 
of the parties to a contract purposefully created an impression that was different to his true 
intention.15  
 
This interpretation of dolus malus was supported by both Servius Sulpicius and Gaius, and 
was referred to as aliud simulare, aliud agere.16 It has been suggested that a more lenient 
interpretation of this construction would have allowed for dolus being recognised as “the 
frustration of a justified expectation by the person responsible for it.”17 However, it does not 
appear that the early jurists extended their application of aliud simulare, aliud actum that far. 
The problem with using such a narrow interpretation of dolus malus was that it did not provide 
for the situation where somebody intends to deceive another and does this without committing 
a positive act, using concealment to induce the other into entering into a specific contract. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  R	   Zimmermann	   The	   Law	   of	  Obligations:	   Roman	   Foundations	   of	   the	   Civilian	   Tradition	   (1990)	   665-­‐667;	   C	   Lewis	   “The	  
demise	  of	  the	  exceptio	  doli:	  Is	  there	  another	  route	  to	  contractual	  equity?”	  (1990)	  107	  SALJ	  26	  31.	  
15	  Referred	  to	  as	  “simulation”	  by	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  665.	  
16	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  665;	  A	  Watson	  “Actio	  de	  dolo	  and	  actiones	  in	  factum”	  (1961)	  78	  ZSS	  392	  392.	  
17	  G	  McCormack	  “Aliud	  simulatum,	  aliud	  actum”	  (1978)	  104	  ZSS	  639	  646.	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This construction of aliud simulare, aliud agere was thus too narrow to accommodate non-
disclosure as an actionable offence, as provision was only made for liability for positive acts.  
However, if it were possible to construe non-disclosure as a type of fraud, it may have been 
brought within the scope of the actio de dolo. The inclusion of non-disclosure as a type of 
fraud (thereby making it actionable) thus “depended…to a large extent on the interpretation of 
the words dolus malus”.18  
 
In due course, the definition was indeed extended in order for the law to accommodate 
instances where the ‘wrongdoing’ took the form of non-disclosure. This extension began 
during the early classical period, when the jurist Labeo developed a broader definition of 
dolus malus. The definition is found in D.4.3.1.2, which states that 
 
“Servius defines ‘fraudulent intent’ to be a scheme for the purpose of deceiving another 
party, where one thing is pretended and another is done. Labeo, however, states that it 
is possible for this to be accomplished, without pretence, for the overreaching of 
another; and it is possible for one thing to be done without deceit, and another 
pretended; just as persons act who protect ether their own interests or those of others, 
by the employment of this kind of dissimilation. Thus he gives a definition of fraudulent 
intent as being: ‘An artifice, deception, or machination, employed for the purpose of 
circumventing, duping, or cheating, another.’ The definition of Labeo is the correct 
one.”19   
 
As this text reflects, Labeo defined dolus malus (translated here as ‘fraudulent intent) widely 
enough to accommodate any “artifice, deception or machination” aimed at “circumventing, 
duping, or cheating another”. The focus in this definition was thus on the purpose of the action 
(or possibly omission), instead of the type of action required. In the previously accepted aliud 
simulare, aliud actum construction, a party had to have actually created an impression and 
then acted contrary to such impression in order to incur liability for dolus malus. Labeo’s 
definition, confirmed as the correct one,20 allows for a wider range of ways in which a 
contracting party can incur liability, including the possibility of someone being held liable for a 
non-disclosure. The concealment of information in order to induce another to enter into a 
contract which he would not otherwise have done is arguably a type of deception aimed at 
duping another, as the definition provides.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  664.	  
19	  D.4.3.1.2.	  
20	  D.4.3.1.2.	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Millner provides a different translation of D.4.3.1.2, saying that Labeo’s famous definition of 
dolus malus includes “any craft, deceit or contrivance (calliditas, fallacia, machinatio) 
employed with a view to circumvent, deceive or ensnare other persons”.21 In his discussion, 
Millner states that “deceitfulness is clearly the central element in dolus – deceitfulness on the 
part of the guilty party, and not the mere fact of deception of the innocent party, for that might 
have been innocently brought about.”22 For this reason, as stated above, the question of what 
constituted dolus malus was not to be answered by looking at the specific type of action 
committed by a contracting party, but rather by considering whether or not he had intended to 
disadvantage the other party by his conduct (or possibly omission). Bigelow goes so far as to 
suggest that “all forms of real fraud are, it is apprehended, actually or virtually covered by the 
definition.”23 He further states that it would theoretically then be possible for someone to 
attempt to deceive somebody else by their “passive conduct” (which would be inaction), and 
for such passive conduct to be classified as fraud.24 In these situations: 
 
“’Some special duty’ may be enjoined by law, requiring a party to speak, as where two 
persons are negotiating in the presence and with the knowledge of another for the 
purchase of property belonging in reality to the latter, but not to the knowledge of the 
buyer. No duty indeed to speak is created by the mere fact that one man may be 
aware that someone else, he knows not who, may act to his own prejudice if the true 
state of things is not disclosed…Cases like this, where there is a duty to speak, may 
properly be deemed to fall within the definition, for they are cases of misleading 
silence.”25 
 
According to Watson,26 Labeo extended the definition of dolus malus in two ways. The first 
extension was to include situations where the parties had negotiated prior to concluding the 
contract, but no express representations were made between them. Dolus malus was also 
extended to find application where there was no direct relationship between the parties.27 This 
extension is further evidenced by Ulpian’s writing, which provides that: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  MA	  Millner	   “Fraudulent	   non-­‐disclosure”	   (1957)	  SALJ	   177	   193.	   The	   same	  definition	   is	   used	   in	   JW	  Wessels	  The	   Law	  of	  
Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  2nd	  ed	  (1951)	  327.	  The	  words	  “calliditas”	  and	  “fallacia”	  also	  appear	  in	  D.2.14.7.9.	  	  
22	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  193-­‐194.	  Confirmed	  in	  MM	  Bigelow	  “Definition	  of	  fraud”	  (1887)	  3	  LQR	  	  419	  419.	  	  
23	  Bigelow	  (1887)	  LQR	  419.	  	  
24	  Bigelow	  (1887)	  LQR	  427.	  
25	  Bigelow	  (1887)	  LQR	  427.	  
26	  Watson	  (1961)	  ZSS	  392.	  
27	  See	   further	  D.4.3.18.3.,	  and	  Watson’s	  discussion	  of	   the	  matter	  at	   (1961)	  ZSS	  393,	   in	  which	  he	  acknowledges	   that	   this	  
second	  extension	  was	  not	  completely	  accepted	  by	  Labeo’s	  contemporaries,	  citing	  D.4.3.7.7.	  as	  authority.	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   8	  
“Where an animal belonging to you does some damage to me through the malice of a 
third party, the question arises whether I am entitled to an action for malice against 
him?  I agree with the opinion of Labeo, that where the owner of an animal is insolvent, 
an action based upon malice should be granted; although if there was a surrender of 
the animal by way of reparation, I do not think it should be granted, even for the 
excess.”28  
 
In practice, however, this wider definition of dolus proposed by Labeo was just as problematic 
as the initial narrow definition, despite the fact that it accommodated situations where non-
disclosure by a contracting party had led to loss.  
 
As Roman law developed further, it became evident that the construction of dolus set out 
above was inadequate.  This was due to the fact that there were “many cases…where the 
actual misconduct of the plaintiff fell short of deceit or trickery in terms of the Labeonic 
definition.”29 This definition made specific provision for cases of intentional concealment and 
dishonesty, and excluded situations where a contracting party’s conduct fell short of such 
concealment and dishonesty. A strict adherence to the Labeonic definition would lead to an 
inequitable result, as a party who was wronged by the conduct or omission of another that 
was not actual “deceit or trickery” would have no recourse. This was not in keeping with the 
Roman ideal of bona fides, which became important in deciding whether a contracting party’s 
conduct became actionable. The law developed to such an extent that even if the defendant’s 
conduct fell short of actual dishonesty or misconduct, action could be taken against him. This 
was possible due to the principle of bona fides, which dictated that “the plaintiff was not 
supposed to turn a situation to his advantage against the precepts of natural equity”.30  
 
For this reason, several cases where the party’s conduct fell short of any actual wrongful 
intention or conscious concealment were dealt with in terms of the exceptio doli generalis.31 
This remedy was used to deal with any cases where the conduct of one of the parties 
constituted bad faith, and the principles of fairness, reasonableness and bona fides required 
that such conduct be actionable,32 “wherever, in other words, the very act of commencing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  D.4.3.7.6.	  
29	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  668.	  
30	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  668.	  
31	  D	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  the	  South	  African	  law	  of	  contract”	  in	  R	  Brownsword,	  NJ	  Hird	  &	  GG	  Howells	  (eds)	  Good	  Faith	  
in	  Contract:	  Concept	  and	  Context	  (1999)	  213	  215-­‐217.	  
32	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  216.	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suit constitutes a deliberate violation of the requirements of bona fides.”33 Due, perhaps, to 
this broad field of application of the exceptio doli generalis, it has been stated that the concept 
of dolus malus functioned as a direct opposite to bona fides in Roman law.34 As Zimmermann 
put it, “the crucial dividing line appears to have been drawn between bona fides on the one 
hand and dolus on the other”.35 
 
2 1 1 2  Roman-Dutch law 
 
Roman-Dutch writers retained most of the Roman law principles of the law of obligations. The 
main difference in approach to the law of obligations, specifically concerning the roles of the 
parties and their duties inter se, was the disappearance of the distinction between contracts 
bonae fidei and contracts stricti iuris.36 In contracts stricti iuris “a judge had to decide the case 
according to the strict rules of the old law, and this could be inequitable in effect”.37 By 
contrast, the judge was not bound to the specific wording of the contract between the parties 
in negotia bonae fidei, but could take into consideration the real intention of the parties and 
any other surrounding circumstances that would aid in his making an equitable decision.38 
However, Roman-Dutch authorities recognised a general theory of contract, in which all 
contracts were governed by the dictates of good faith, and any agreement entered into with 
the requisite intent constituted a contract.39  According to Hutchison, “by the eighteenth 
century, if not earlier…the concept of contract had come to be generalised, with the gradual 
acceptance of the fundamental principle that any serious and deliberate promises should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  JC	  Ledlie	   (translator)	  Sohm’s	  The	   Institutes:	  A	   text-­‐book	  of	   the	  history	  and	  system	  of	  Roman	  private	   law	  2nd	  ed	   (1901)	  
280,	  Lewis	  (1990)	  SALJ	  31.	  
34	  595F.	   Joubert	   JA	   refers	   to	   Botha’s	   unpublished	   doctoral	   thesis	  Die	   Exceptio	  Doli	   Generalis	   in	   die	   Suid-­‐Afrikaanse	   Reg	  
(University	  of	  the	  OFS	  1981),	  where	  he	  states	  that	  it	  was	  “…correctly	  accepted	  (by	  Botha)	  that	  according	  to	  the	  formulary	  
procedure	  of	  classical	  Roman	  law	  the	  exceptio	  doli	  generalis	  was	  not	  founded	  on	  equity	  but	  mala	  fides	  (dolus	  malus)	  which	  
was	  in	  conflict	  with	  bona	  fides	  in	  an	  objective	  sense.”.	  
35	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  668.	  The	  line	  between	  bona	  fides	  and	  dolus	  has	  also	  been	  described	  as	  a	  “strong	  
inverse	   relationship”	   by	   JE	   du	   Plessis	   “Art	   3.8	   (Fraud)”	   in	   S	   Vogenauer	  &	   J	   Kleinheisterkamp	   (eds)	  Commentary	   on	   the	  
UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  PICC	  (2009)	  438.	  
36Joubert	  JA	  in	  Bank	  of	  Lisbon	  and	  South	  Africa	  Ltd	  v	  De	  Ornelas	  and	  Another	  1988	  3	  SA	  580	  (A)	  597F-­‐H;	  Cod	  4.10.4.	  
37	  Van	  Warmelo	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  Roman	  Law	  393-­‐394.	  
38	  Joubert	   JA	   in	  Bank	  of	  Lisbon	  and	  South	  Africa	  Ltd	  v	  De	  Ornelas	  and	  Another	  1988	  3	  SA	  580	   (A)	  596F-­‐H.	  Van	  Warmelo	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  Roman	  Law	  393-­‐394.	  
39	  JW	  Wessels	  History	  of	  the	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  Law	  (1908)	  579.	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treated as binding, provided it was not illegal.”40 This had the effect of casting all contracts 
into the category of bona fides, which was now treated as an overarching principle.41  
 
It was also accepted that all obligations had to comply with two requirements, namely that 
each party contracted on the strength of a free exercise of will, and that nobody could be 
bound to any contract that was “impossible or unlawful for all men in general or for himself in 
particular.” (own emphasis).42  Grotius expands on the requirement that there be a free 
exercise of will when contracting, saying that this requirement means that a person cannot be 
considered to be bound “when misled by fraud”.43 It is not expressly stated in this work 
whether silence would be included in this concept of fraud. The acknowledgement that fraud 
would impact on the conclusion of a valid contract is based on the Roman law definition of 
fraud.44  As we have seen, these provisions generally defined fraud (dolus) as positive 
conduct, but that there are indications that in due course Roman law may have developed to 
include the situation where misrepresentation occurred by way of omission.45 Grotius relies on 
the definition of fraud contained in D.4.3, which includes Labeo’s statement that “(a)n artifice, 
deception, or machination, employed for the purpose of circumventing, duping, or cheating, 
another” is fraud. D.4.3.1.2 also contains Ulpian’s endorsement of this definition, and it can 
thus be argued that Grotius provides implicit recognition that someone may incur liability for 
silence, if such silence was aimed at cheating the other contracting party. 
 
The extension of the field of application of the exceptio doli generalis resulted in all contracts 
being governed by the principle of good faith. The use of such a broad principle to govern all 
contracts meant that courts could judge all contracts according to the dictates of justice and 
equity, and had the power to impute liability to contracting parties for any conduct that they 
felt to be contrary to bona fides. This was a very broad power and had the positive effect of 
allowing for inequity to be corrected, but also had the danger of being too broad, and relying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  216.	  
41	  M	  Lambiris	  in	  “The	  exceptio	  doli	  generalis:	  an	  obituary”	  (1988)	  105	  SALJ	  644	  644	  is	  wary	  of	  overstating	  the	  influence	  that	  
bona	  fides	  as	  an	  overarching	  principle	  has	  on	  contractual	  relationships,	  saying	  that	  although	  “the	  law	  derives	  certain	  rules	  
from	  the	  concept	  of	  good	  faith	  which	  apply	  to	  and	  govern	  contractual	  relationships,	  and	  which	  give	  rise	  to	  certain	   legal	  
obligations	  which,	  if	  broken,	  may	  be	  enforced.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  good	  faith	  underlies	  
contractual	   relationships	   to	   the	   extent	   that,	   whatever	   the	   parties	   may	   actually	   agree,	   the	   resultant	   obligations	   are	  
enforceable	  only	  if	  they	  do	  not	  contravene	  general	  notions	  of	  good	  faith.”	  
42	  AFS	  Maasdorp	  (translator)	  The	  Introduction	  to	  Dutch	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Hugo	  Grotius	  (1878)	  Book	  3	  Ch	  1,	  n19,	  295-­‐296.	  
43	  Maasdorp	  (translator)	  The	  Introduction	  to	  Dutch	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Hugo	  Grotius	  295.	  
44	  D	  4.3,	  C	  2.20.	  
45	  See	  the	  discussion	  concerning	  the	  Labeonic	  definition	  of	  dolus	  malus	  at	  2	  1	  1	  1	  above.	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solely on judicial discretion to determine which situations would demand that non-disclosure 
be actionable. It must be remembered that “the exceptio doli generalis was originally 
available, not on the basis of a generalized notion of equity overriding valid legal obligations, 
but on the existence of mala fides on the plaintiff’s part in attempting to enforce legal rights in 
specific situations.”46 
 
The development of the exceptio doli generalis in Roman law, and the question of its 
continued relevance in Roman-Dutch law, and subsequently in modern South African law is 
discussed at length by Joubert JA in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas.47 To 
follow his argument, we need to return briefly to Roman law. Joubert JA suggests that the 
exceptio doli, after its inception, became the most important defence in Roman law, and was 
initially only used to defend a claim based on a negotium stricti iuris, which could often have 
harsh consequences, due to the iudex having to adhere to the precise terms of the contract 
as signed by the parties.48  
 
“The object of the exceptio doli generalis was equitable, viz to ameliorate the 
harshness of a plaintiff’s claim based on a negotium stricti iuris such as a stipulation or 
a mutuum.”49  
 
Later, during post-classical Roman law, the exceptio doli generalis “ceased to function as a 
praetorian procedural remedy”.50 However, the terminology was still used in both the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis51 and the Digest,52 which led to some confusion in application. It became accepted 
that a defendant wanting to raise the exceptio doli generalis as a defence would have to plead 
it on the facts, instead of adhering to the strict formula previously required when using the 
remedy. The exceptio doli generalis became an appropriate remedy to use in situations where 
actual fraud was not proved, but the facts pleaded were such that would require an action, 
focusing on the plaintiff’s mala fides.53  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Lambiris	  (1988)	  SALJ	  648-­‐649.	  
47	  1988	  3	  SA	  580	  (A).	  	  
48	  592I-­‐593J.	  
49	  595D.	  
50	  597A.	  
51	  The	  best	  example	  of	  this	  is	  found	  in	  Inst	  4	  tit	  13,	  which	  preserves	  Gaius’	  writing	  (IV	  115-­‐24)	  on	  the	  exceptiones.	  
52	  This	  is	  largely	  found	  in	  book	  44	  of	  the	  Digest,	  most	  specifically	  in	  D.44.4.1.1.	  
53	  Lambiris	  (1988)	  SALJ	  646.	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The question was then whether or not this adapted version of the exceptio doli generalis was 
retained by the Roman-Dutch jurists, as “there does not appear to be authority in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law for the proposition that an exceptio doli generalis was available whenever it 
appeared that to enforce the performance of a legal obligation was ‘unconscionable’ or 
contrary to generalized notions of good faith and fair dealing.”54 
 
Joubert JA answers this question in the negative, contending that although the Roman law of 
Justinian was received in the Netherlands during the 15th century, it was not necessarily true 
that it was received in its entirety.55 Regarding the issue of the exceptio doli generalis, Joubert 
JA examined the writings of Roman-Dutch jurists closely, but could not find any references to 
the remedy. Voet56 does indeed refer to the exception, but by means of quoting Papinian’s 
statements on the matter. Joubert JA suggests that Voet’s commentary regarding the 
application of the exceptio doli generalis in Roman law in no way suggests that the remedy 
has formed part of Dutch law, and thus we cannot simply accept that it did.57  
 
Following the court’s exploration of Roman-Dutch authorities, as well as Botha’s contention 
that there is no reference to the exceptio doli generalis in Roman-Dutch law,58 the court 
reached the conclusion that “…the exceptio doli generalis…was never part of Roman-Dutch 
law.”59  
 
Although it would be possible to conclude the discussion of Roman-Dutch law at this point, it 
may be useful to consider briefly the implications of the De Ornelas decision for modern 
South African law, especially as regards the relevance of bona fides in the law of contract. We 
will return to this point in later chapters that specifically deal with the relationship between 
bona fides and non-disclosure.”60  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Lambiris	  (1988)	  SALJ	  646.	  
55	  601D-­‐F.	  
56	  D.44.4.1.	  
57	  602G-­‐I.	  
58	  This	  was	  stated	  in	  Botha’s	  unpublished	  doctoral	  thesis	  Die	  Exceptio	  Doli	  Generalis	  in	  die	  Suid-­‐Afrikaanse	  Reg	  (University	  
of	  the	  OFS	  1981).	  
59	  605H.	  
60	  See	  5	  2	  1	  below.	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In essence, the majority judgment in Bank of Lisbon put an end to the use of the exceptio doli 
generalis in South African law. According to Joubert JA: 
 
“All things considered, the time has now arrived, in my judgment, once and for all, to 
bury the exceptio doli generalis as a superfluous, defunct anachronism. Requiescat in 
pace.”61 
 
But this was not the end of the matter.  
 
Joubert JA’s judgement was severely criticised for being too academic,62 and the argument 
has been made that, despite the official remedy of exceptio doli no longer being recognised in 
South African law, “the underlying factors responsible for its development in the first place will 
of course always be present; namely, the need for a measure of substantive fairness in 
contractual dealings…”.63 The Bank of Lisbon decision has led to debate about the possible 
role of good faith as a means of limiting unfairness in contractual relationships.64 Hutchison 
states that “(w)ithin the judiciary too there are now welcome signs of a desire to reintroduce 
considerations of good faith and equity through the medium of the public policy rule in 
contract.”65 Of particular interest in the present context is the notion that although good faith 
may not be a “free-floating” principle, providing courts with an equitable discretion, it could 
fulfil the function of facilitating new rules to promote contractual equity.66 To the potential for 
good faith fulfilling this role in the context of the law of non-disclosure we will return later on.67 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  607A-­‐B.	  
62	  See	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  676-­‐677.	  
63	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  221;	  also	  see	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  677.	  This	  
possibility	  of	  adopting	  a	  more	  general	  defence	  in	  modern	  South	  African	  law	  founded	  on	  standards	  of	  good	  faith	  and	  equity	  
has	  also	  been	  discussed	  in	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  188;	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  240.	  See	  
also	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	   (C),	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	   (Pty)	  Ltd	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	   (O),	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  
Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	   (W),	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	   (W);	   Janse	  van	  
Rensburg	  v	  Grieve	  Trust	  CC	  2000	  1	  SA	  315	  (C)	  325;	  McCann	  v	  Goodall	  Group	  Operations	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C).	  
64	  S	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  &	  G	  Lubbe	  “Bona	  fides	  and	  public	  policy	  in	  contract”	  (1991)	  2	  Stell	  LR	  91	  96;	  G	  Lubbe	  'Bona	  fides,	  
Billikheid	  en	  die	  Openbare	  Belang	  in	  die	  Suid-­‐Afrikaanse	  Kontraktereg'	  (1990)	  1	  Stell	  LR	  7	  19-­‐20.	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  
contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  221.	  
65	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  215.	  This	  statement	  is	  made	  regarding	  the	  apparent	  shift	  in	  
the	  way	   in	  which	   good	   faith	   is	   perceived	   and	   applied	   in	   the	   law	   of	   contract,	   and	   the	   potential	   use	   of	   good	   faith	   as	   a	  
measure	  of	  contracting	  partys’	  conduct.	  
66	  Brisley	  v	  Drotsky	  2002	  4	  SA	  1	  (SCA)	  para	  22;	  Afrox	  Healthcare	  Bpk	  v	  Strydom	  2002	  6	  SA	  21	  (SCA)	  para	  32;	  South	  African	  
Forestry	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  York	  Timbers	  Ltd	  2005	  3	  SA	  323	  (SCA)	  para	  27;	  Barkhuizen	  v	  Napier	  2007	  5	  SA	  323	  (CC)	  para	  82;	  Potgieter	  
v	  Potgieter	  NO	  2012	  1	  SA	  637	  (SCA)	  para	  32;	  R	  Zimmermann	  “Good	  faith	  and	  equity”	  in	  R	  Zimmermann	  &	  D	  Visser	  
Southern	  Cross:	  Civil	  and	  Common	  Law	  in	  South	  Africa	  (1996)	  217	  246-­‐249.	  
67	  See	  5	  2	  1	  below.	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2 1 2  The duty to disclose in contracts of sale 
 
In order to investigate the role of non-disclosure in our law more closely, and identify 
principles that could guide us when deciding to impose liability for non-disclosure it is 
necessary to focus on the treatment of non-disclosure in the Roman and Roman-Dutch 
contract of sale. According to Stein, the contract of sale was the most important in the Roman 
commercial practice, and as such, there were many provisions in the Roman law of sale that 
dealt with the duty to disclose and liability for non-disclosure. 68  Although there is the 
possibility of both the seller and the buyer incurring liability for non-disclosure, the focus of 
this discussion will be on the seller’s liability, as it was more prevalent than that of the buyer, 
and may be more useful in discovering general legal principles.  
 
The contract of sale, like the majority of contracts in Roman law, was governed by the 
standard of bona fides,69 and it was therefore “fraudulent for the seller to refrain deliberately 
from disclosing a material matter known to him and unknown to the other party with the 
intention thereby of inducing a sale.” 70  The liability of the seller in such a case was 
acknowledged in Roman law, as is apparent from the following text:  
 
“Julianus, in the Fifteenth Book, makes a distinction with reference to rendering a 
decision in an action on purchase between a person who knowingly sold the property, 
and one who ignorantly did so; for he says that anyone who sold a flock which is 
diseased, or a defective beam, and did so ignorantly, must make the claim good in an 
action on purchase, to the extent that the buyer would have paid less if he had been 
aware of said defects. If, however, he was aware of them, and kept silent, and 
deceived the purchaser, he will be obliged to make good all loss which the purchaser 
sustained from said sale. Therefore, if a building should fall down on account of the 
defect in the price of timber aforesaid, its entire value must be estimated in assessing 
damages; or if the flock should die through the contagion of the disease, the purchaser 
must be indemnified to the extent of the interest he had in the sale of the property in 
good condition.”71 
 
“If you sell me a vessel of any kind, and state that it is of a certain capacity, or of a 
certain weight, if it is deficient in either respect, I can bring an action on sale against 
you. But if you sell a vase to me, and guarantee it to be perfect, and it should prove not 
to be so, you must make good to me any loss which I may have sustained on that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  P	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  in	  Roman	  Law	  and	  Scots	  Law	  (1958)	  5.	  
69	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  180.	  
70	  D.19.1.1.1.	  
71	  D.19.1.13.	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account; but if it is not understood that you guarantee it to be perfect, you may be liable 
for fraud. Labeo is of a different opinion, and thinks it should only be held that the party 
must guarantee that the vase is perfect, where the contrary has not been agreed upon; 
and this opinion is correct. Minicius states that that Sabinus gave it as his opinion that 
a similar guarantee should be understood to be made where casks are hired.”72 
 
From these extracts it is evident that there was a possibility of the buyer bringing an action 
against a seller in the case of latent defects, if the seller knew or was supposed to know about 
these defects. In a discussion of these texts, it is asserted that “(a)ccording to Roman law, 
this knowledge in the pre-contractual stage would have resulted in full contractual liability 
(under the actio empti), that means for all damages, including consequential losses.”73 Most 
discussions on liability for latent defects focus on such liability as it arises from the Aedilitian 
remedies, but, as shown by the above extracts, there was also a possibility of relying on the 
actio empti to do so. From this, it is clear that Roman law was prepared to hold a seller liable 
for any hidden defects in merchandise. The question is thus whether the seller was liable for 
his silence on any other matters.  
 
One option would be to draw a distinction between “permissible reticence” and “guilty 
concealment”.74 Presumably, “permissible reticence” refers to situations where the seller 
would have a moral duty to speak, but no harmful consequences would ensue from his 
silence. By contrast, “guilty concealment” would refer to those situations where the seller 
knowingly conceals important information from the buyer in order to induce him to enter into 
the contract. The implication of this distinction is that in situations amounting to “permissible 
reticence” silence would not be reprehensible, whereas cases where there was an intention to 
hide specific information should be actionable, an opinion argued by Diogenes.75 This type of 
distinction does not provide for cases of so-called “innocent misrepresentation”, where one 
party’s silence (not intended to mislead the other) still leads to a disadvantage for the other.  
 
Another method of determining a seller’s liability for non-disclosure is to distinguish between 
situations where the seller’s silence concerns an intrinsic defect or an extrinsic defect in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  D.19.1.6.4.	  
73	  W	  Decock	  &	  J	  Hallebeek	  “Pre-­‐contractual	  duties	  to	  inform	  in	  early	  modern	  Scholasticism”	  (2010)	  78	  LHR	  89	  93.	  
74	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  6;	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  179.	  	  
75	  Millner	   (1957)	   SALJ	   185.	   Millner	   suggests	   that	   “guilty	   concealment”	   should	   be	   dealt	   with	   as	   a	   form	   of	   positive	  
misrepresentation,	  as	  the	  fraudulent	  nature	  of	  such	  an	  action	  is	  obvious.	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merx.76 An intrinsic defect refers to a defect in the merchandise itself which would affect the 
price thereof,77 for example, defects in quality, substance or quantity. Extrinsic defects refer to 
the conditions surrounding the sale contract, such as current market prices,78 and availability 
of the merx. In their work, Decock and Hallebeek focus on defects in quality when discussing 
the seller’s liability for intrinsic defects. In Roman law, D.21.1.14.10 draws a distinction 
between latent and patent defects. 
 
“Where the existence of a blemish was not expressly mentioned by the vendor, but it 
was of such a character that it would be apparent to everyone; for example, if the slave 
was blind, or had a manifest and dangerous scar on his head, or on some other part of 
his body, Caecilius says that the vendor will not be liable on this account, any more 
than if he had expressly mentioned the defect, for it is held that the Edict of the Aediles 
has only reference to such diseases and defects as the purchaser was or could be 
ignorant of.”79 
 
According to Decock and Hallebeek,80 medieval scholars such as Aquinas and Biel have 
taken this extract to mean that where there are visible defects in the merx, the seller is under 
no obligation to disclose them to the buyer as long as the sale price reflects that the merx is 
flawed. With regard to latent defects there would be a duty to disclose, but only if the defects 
would cause harm (damnum) or risk (periculum). 
 
“I reply that it is always illicit to cause harm or risk to another person, although it is not 
necessary always for a human being always to provide his fellow man with help and 
advice to the latter’s advantage. That is only necessary in some specific situations, for 
example when the other is submitted to his care, or when there is no other person who 
can help him. Now, the seller who offers something for sale, causes the buyer harm or 
risk by the mere fact that he offers him something defective, if that defect can result in 
harm or danger. The seller causes harm when the thing offered for sale actually needs 
to be priced much lower on account of its defect, but he does not reduce the price. The 
seller causes risk if on account of its defect the use of a thing is impossible or 
dangerous, for example when someone sells a lame horse as if it were fleet of foot, or 
a dilapidated house as if it were solid, or contaminated food as if it were good. So 
whenever such defects are latent and the seller does not disclose them, the sale will 
be illicit and fraudulent, and he will be obliged to pay damages. If, however, a defect is 
apparent, for instance when a horse has only one eye, or a thing is still likely to be 
useful to other persons though it is not any longer to the seller himself, no duty of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Decock	  &	  Hallebeek	  (2010)	  LHR	  90.	  
77	  Decock	  &	  Hallebeek	  (2010)	  LHR	  97.	  
78	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Cicero’s	  “	  De	  Officiis	  3.12.50.	  
79	  D.21.1.14.10.	  
80	  Decock	  &	  Hallebeek	  (2010)	  LHR	  97.	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disclosure exists provided that the seller reduces the price in accordance with the 
seriousness of the defect. For otherwise the buyer would wish to reduce the price 
further than is necessary. Consequently it is allowed for a seller to secure his own 
protection by not disclosing the defect in his merchandise.”81 
 
A good example of problems relating to extrinsic defects can be found in the writings of 
Cicero,	  whose work is used as the point of departure in many discussions on actionable non-
disclosure.82 In his De Officiis, Cicero uses the example of a merchant who seeks to sell grain 
in a time of famine in order to discuss the question of when silence should be actionable.83  In 
this example, a merchant from a famine-ravaged country imports a large cargo of grain. Due 
to the scarcity of grain, he stands to make a large profit. However, he receives word that other 
ships carrying the same cargo are also bound for his country, which would reduce the grain 
prices. Is he bound to disclose this information to prospective buyers before selling his cargo 
at the inflated famine price, assuming that he seeks to act within the bounds of good faith? 
 
In order to decide this, Cicero considers the opposing viewpoints of two Stoic philosophers, 
Diogenes and Antipater.84 Antipater proposes that, in the situation sketched above, all the 
facts known to the merchant should be disclosed, in order for him and the buyer to be on an 
equal footing. Diogenes provides a different opinion, stating that the merchant in this case 
would only be bound to disclose defects in his wares. Any other information can be kept to 
himself, if it enables him to sell his goods as advantageously as possible without resorting to 
any misrepresentation.85 In his translation of Cicero’s text, Miller sets out the position of 
Diogenes’ merchant as follows: 
 
“‘I have imported my stock,’ Diogenes’ merchant will say; ‘I have offered it for sale; I 
sell at a price no higher than my competitors – perhaps even lower, when the market is 
overstocked. Who is wronged?’”86 
 
This is a decidedly business-oriented view, which prioritises the tradesman’s need to make a 
living, and allows the merchant  to conceal the fact that the market will soon be saturated with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Aquinas	  Summa	  Theologiae,	  IIaIIae,	  quaest.	  77,	  art.	  3,	  concl.,	  p.152.	  
82	  See	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  6;	  MJ	  Schermaier	  “Mistake,	  misrepresentation	  and	  precontractual	  duties	  to	  
inform:	   the	   civil	   law	   tradition”	   in	   R	   Sefton-­‐Green	   (ed)	  Mistake,	   Fraud	   and	   Duties	   to	   Inform	   in	   European	   Contract	   Law	  
(2004)	  39	  44.	  
83	  3	  12.50.	  
84	  3.12.51;	  3.12.52;	  3.12.53.	  
85	  Miller	  Cicero	  De	  Officiis	  321.	  
86	  3.12.51.	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grain in order to sell his goods at the best possible price. As mentioned above, Antipater 
takes the opposite stance, saying that all facts known to the seller which would influence the 
buyer should be disclosed. 87  His reasoning was grounded in the Stoic belief that an 
individual’s interests should also serve the interests of the community. Diogenes countered 
this,88 drawing a distinction between silence and concealment and saying that the former did 
not necessarily lead to the latter. In his view, silence should not be punishable unless it would 
result in a direct disadvantage to the other party (as in the case of latent defects in the merx). 
Millner, in his article on fraudulent non-disclosure, accepts Diogenes’ view, saying  
 
“In our system of society, paternalism is not a characteristic of the common relations of 
men or the common law which mirrors those relations…the rule is that each must pit 
his skill, enterprise, acumen and energy against those of his neighbour.”89  
 
Another important point to consider is the position regarding “insider information”, which is 
similar to the problem of the Merchant of Rhodes. An example of such a problem is where the 
seller of a certain type of product is familiar with the administration regulating such a product, 
and through his connection learns of a future regulation that will lower the price of his goods.90 
Is he bound to share this information with prospective buyers? The post-glossator Bartolus de 
Saxoferrato, in his commentary on D.19.1.39,91 is of the opinion that the seller would be 
bound to disclose such information, as non-disclosure would amount to circumventio (fraud).92 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  3.12.52;	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  6.	  
88	  3.12.53	   “It	   is	   one	   thing	   to	   conceal…not	   to	   reveal	   is	   quite	   a	   different	   thing…But	   I	   am	   under	   no	   obligation	   to	   tell	   you	  
everything	  that	  it	  may	  be	  to	  your	  interest	  to	  be	  told.”	  
89	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  183.	  Stein	  expresses	  the	  same	  opinion	  in	  his	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  6,	  saying	  “there	  is	  no	  
universal	  obligation	  to	  teach	  one’s	  fellow	  men	  all	  that	  it	  is	  of	  advantage	  to	  them	  to	  know.	  
90	  Decock	  &	  Hallebeek	  (2010)	  LHR	  101.	  
91	  “I	   ask	   if	   anyone	   should	   sell	   a	   tract	   of	   land	   under	   the	   condition	   that	   all	   should	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   sold	   which	   he	  
possessed	  within	  certain	  boundaries,	  and	   the	  vendor,	  nevertheless,	  well	  knew	  that	  he	  did	  not	  possess	  a	  certain	  part	  of	  
said	  land,	  and	  did	  not	  notify	  the	  purchaser	  of	  the	  fact;	  would	  he	  be	  liable	  to	  an	  action	  of	  sale,	  since	  this	  general	  rule	  ought	  
not	  to	  apply	  to	  those	  portions	  of	  land	  which	  the	  party	  who	  sold	  them	  knew	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  him,	  and	  yet	  did	  not	  except	  
them?	   Otherwise,	   the	   purchaser	   would	   be	   taken	   advantage	   of,	   who	   if	   he	   had	   known	   this,	   would	   perhaps	   not	   have	  
purchased	  the	  property	  at	  all;	  or	  would	  have	  bought	  it	  at	  a	  lower	  price	  if	  he	  had	  been	  notified	  with	  reference	  to	  its	  true	  
amount;	  as	  this	  point	  has	  been	  settled	  by	  the	  ancient	  authorities,	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  person	  who	  made	  an	  exception,	  in	  the	  
following	   terms,	   ‘Any	  servitudes	   that	  are	  due	  shall	   remain	  due.’	   For	  persons	   learned	   in	   the	   law	  gave	   it	  as	   their	  opinion	  
that,	  if	  a	  vendor,	  knowing	  that	  servitudes	  were	  due	  to	  certain	  persons,	  did	  not	  notify	  the	  purchaser,	  he	  would	  be	  liable	  to	  
an	  action	  on	  purchase;	  for	  this	  general	  exception	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  matters	  which	  the	  vendor	  was	  aware	  of,	  and	  which	  he	  
could	  and	  should	  expressly	  except,	  but	  to	  things	  of	  which	  he	  was	  ignorant,	  and	  concerning	  which	  he	  could	  not	  notify	  the	  
purchaser.	  Herennius	  Modestinus	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  if	  the	  vendor	  in	  the	  case	  stated	  did	  anything	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
deceiving	  the	  purchaser,	  he	  could	  be	  sued	  in	  an	  action	  on	  purchase.”	  	  
92	  Bartolus	  a	  Saxoferrato	  In	  secundam	  Digesti	  veteris	  partem,	  ad	  D.19.1.39,	  Venetiis	  1570.	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Following this discussion about the merchant’s liability, Cicero mentions another example 
where the extent of a vendor’s duty is under debate.93 In this situation, an “honest man” has 
put his house up for sale due to flaws in the building of which only he is aware. Cicero lists a 
number of possible faults, including that the house is unsanitary (despite having a reputation 
for cleanliness), overrun with vermin and likely to collapse due to an unsound structure. The 
question in this case is whether it would be “unjust or dishonourable” for the seller to withhold 
this information from the buyer and sell the house for more money that he would have 
obtained had the defects in the house been public knowledge.94 Antipater, following the same 
reasoning used in the grain merchant example, is of the opinion that silence in this case 
would be reprehensible, and amounts to “deliberately leading a man astray”.95 Diogenes once 
again takes the opposing view, saying that the seller in this scenario in no way compelled the 
buyer to purchase the house. The seller merely advertised something in a way that the buyer 
found attractive and acted upon. In cases like this, Diogenes suggests that the question 
should be “…where the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be 
on the part of the vendor?”96 The overriding consideration, again, seems to be the demands 
of business and what would be considered good or acceptable business practice. The 
impression created by Diogenes’ arguments in both examples mentioned above is that it is 
only an inexperienced or unintelligent seller who would lay bare all faults in the object that he 
is selling, and a shrewd seller should not be punished for presenting his wares to the best of 
his ability.  
 
Cicero then offers his own decision on these two cases, saying that he agrees with Antipater’s 
opinion and that full disclosure would be required in each instance.97  In his words, as 
translated by Miller: 
 
“The fact is that merely holding one’s peace about a thing does not constitute 
concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from 
finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it.”98  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  3.13.54.	  
94	  3.13.54.	  
95	  3.13.55.	  
96	  3.13.55.	  
97	  3.12.56;	  3.13.57.	  	  
98	  3.12.57.	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This decision of Cicero’s is strongly rooted in the Stoics’ moral convictions, and the idea that 
the individual’s interest should also serve the public interests. For purposes of this discussion, 
however, moral reprehensibility should be separated from legal responsibility, as it is 
important to remember that the former does not necessarily constitute the latter. It is 
submitted that, for purposes of legal certainty, Diogenes’ view would be more practical to 
implement, as it sets clear parameters for when the seller should be liable. Undoubtedly, this 
viewpoint would also be problematic, in that it could lead to inequitable results. However, if 
any morally questionable non-disclosure by the seller could be punished, it would lead to an 
extremely wide liability, and would discourage the conclusion of new contracts of sale. The 
underlying rationale behind Diogenes’ approach seems to be the maxim caveat emptor, which 
was the traditional point of departure in South African law until the recent introduction of the 
Consumer Protection Act.99 The provisions of this Act are specifically designed to provide the 
buyer with more protection than has traditionally been available, and aims at preventing any 
exploitation of the buyer’s weaker position by the seller. As will be indicated later on, these 
stricter provisions will have a significant impact on the way in which we approach the duties of 
buyer and seller in a contract of sale, and may well place a heavier duty of care on the seller 
than what is traditionally accepted.100 
 
The extension of the liability for non-disclosure to cases of so-called “mere silence” mentioned 
above arises specifically in Cicero's discussion of contracts for the sale of immovable 
property.  
 
"In the laws pertaining to the sale of real property it is stipulated in our civil code that 
when a transfer of any real estate is made, all its defects shall be declared as far as 
they are known to the vendor. According to the laws of the Twelve Tables it used to be 
sufficient that such faults as had been expressly declared should be made good and 
that for any flaws which the vendor expressly denied, when questioned, he should be 
assessed double damages. A like penalty for failure to make such declaration also has 
now been secured by our jurisconsults: they have decided that any defect in a piece of 
real estate, if known to the vendor but not expressly stated, must be made good by 
him".101 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  68	  of	  2008.	  
100See	  3	  5	  4	  below.	  
101	  3.16.65.	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This rule that all defects in immovable property had to be made known to the vendor prior to 
sale is contained in the Twelve Tables, and jurists such as Cato applied it in such a way that 
rooted this rule in the principle of bona fides. In one of Cato’s judgments, he confirmed that it 
was central to the concept of good faith that any defect known to the seller should be 
disclosed to the buyer. 102  This judgment and many after it contributed to the gradual 
interpretation of bona fides, which occurred through the constant application of the bona fides 
concept in judgments of that time. These judgments served as precedents, and proved to be 
of great assistance in deciding subsequent similar cases.  
 
The first impression gained from the above extract is that the seller appears to be liable for 
any defect in the immovable property that he knew about and did not disclose to the buyer. 
Stein submits that such an impression would be incorrect, and would be too wide in imputing 
liability.103 He suggests, as do other writers,104 that this extract only imposes liability for non-
disclosure of legal defects in the land, such as title disputes and servitudes. This opinion is 
grounded on the use of the words “jure…praediorum” in the description of the seller’s liability, 
which refers to the “legal condition” of the land rather than its physical status.  
 
Although there are few case examples available to support this interpretation, Cicero cites a 
case where the sellers sold their house to the buyer, knowing that the house had been 
marked for demolition.105 The buyer then successfully sued the seller, a decision which, in 
Cicero’s opinion, was based largely on the dictates of good faith. However, he did not agree 
that the requirements of good faith should extend so far as to impose liability on the seller for 
every non-disclosure of material facts. As Stein says,  
 
“the restriction [of liability for non-disclosure to legal defects] can be justified rationally, 
because such defects as the existence of a demolition order or of some servitudes 
cannot be discovered on inspection, whereas material defects, such as the verminous 
condition of the premises, are usually evident on a diligent inspection.”106 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  3.16.66.	  
103	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  8.	  
104	  G	  Beseler	  “De	  Jure	  Civili	  Tullio	  duce	  at	  naturam	  revocando”	  (1931)	  B.I.D.R.	  324	  324-­‐329.	  
105	  3.16.67.	  
106	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  9.	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The distinction drawn above is important, as it gives us some insight into the reasoning 
followed by jurists when deciding whether or not non-disclosure should be actionable in any 
given situation. In the extract, a line seems to be drawn between information that the buyer 
could access if he wished to, and information that could not be obtained through a reasonable 
inspection. The underlying principle seems to be that where the information withheld from the 
buyer could be readily obtained by him following a diligent inspection, the seller should not be 
liable for any non-disclosure.107 The rationale for this is that the buyer would have had access 
to the information if he had troubled himself to find it out. By contrast, defects relating to the 
legal aspects of the property (such as the examples mentioned by Stein) are not as easily 
discovered, even if there was a thorough investigation. The seller would then have a duty to 
inform the buyer of such defects.  
 
By the end of the Republic, the accepted legal position was that the seller of immovable 
property could be sued for non-disclosure of any legal defects in the property that he knew of, 
and which were unknown to the buyer.108 No liability could be incurred for non-disclosure of 
material defects (defects in the property itself), as these were generally deemed to be 
ascertainable by the buyer if he conducted a diligent inspection. This position continued into 
the classical period, and was applied as an absolute rule. There was an obligation on the part 
of the seller to disclose any legal burdens on the land that he had knowledge of, and this 
obligation could never be circumvented by including an exemption from liability in the 
contract.109 This obligation was absolute, except in situations where there was no question of 
fraud and the seller had made no representations on the subject. In such cases, the buyer 
would have no recourse against the seller if there were later found to be legal burdens on the 
land.  
 
Having established that there was indeed a duty on the seller to disclose any legal defects in 
the land that he knew of, the question remains whether a similar liability existed in classical 
law for non-disclosure of material defects.  Stein answers this in the negative, by referring to 
certain extracts from the Digest110 which he uses as grounds for his submission that “there is 
no justification in the sources for holding that in classical law the seller of land was under a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  D.18.6.9,	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  14.	  
108	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  10.	  
109	  D.	  19.1.13.6.;	  D.19.1.1.1.	  
110	  D.18.1.59.;	  D.18.1.35.8.;	  D.18.6.9.	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general liability to disclose material defects of which he was aware.”111 Thus, in cases where 
the buyer wished to impose liability for non-disclosure of a material defect in immovable 
property, he only had two options. He could either compel the seller to make a representation 
about the property and later attempt to prove that representation false, or he had to conduct 
his own investigation into the quality of the land.112  
 
In respect of contracts for the sale of movable property, buyers were protected under the 
Aedilitian Edicts, which specifically regulated the sale of slaves and cattle. The Aedilitian 
Edicts provided buyers with a choice of actions if a defect was discovered in the merx, namely 
the actio redhibitoria or the actio quanti minoris. The actio redhibitoria was used to completely 
reverse the effects of a contract of sale, whereas the actio quanti minoris was used in order to 
claim a reduction in the purchase price of a defective merx. These actions both stipulated that 
the seller would always be liable for any defect in the merx that he did not disclose, which 
includes any latent defects that he might not have been aware of.113 This rule posed a 
problem for the seller, as strict compliance with it would result in someone incurring liability for 
their ignorance. The buyer would find this requirement to his advantage, as there was always 
a chance of recouping losses, no matter what the nature of the defect.  
 
The provisions of the Aedilitian Edicts mainly concerned physical defects in the slaves, and 
made no mention of mental or character flaws. Despite this, it became common practice for 
sellers of slaves to declare these “vitia animi” (defects in spirit), even though it was not a strict 
legal requirement.114 Even though the declaration of vitia animi was recognised as common 
practice, the buyer could not expect the seller to disclose every single defect in the slave, 
whether physical or otherwise. Under the Aedilitian Edicts, liability was dependent on the 
seller’s “knowledge and dishonest silence”.115  From this it is clear that there was never any 
absolute duty under classical law for the seller to inform the buyer about all defects in the 
merx.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  14.	  
112	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contract	  14.	  
113	  Schermaier	  “Mistake,	  misrepresentation	  and	  precontractual	  duties	  to	   inform”	  in	  Mistake,	  Fraud	  and	  Duties	  to	   Inform	  
43.	  
114	  Grotius	  De	  Jure	  Belli	  ac	  Pacis,	  ii.12.9.	  
115	  Stein	  Fault	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contracts	  17.	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There was, however, a means available by which a buyer could sue the seller for latent 
defects. It was known as the doctrine of laesio enormis. Codex 4.44.2 originally provided that  
 
“If either you or your father should sell property for less than it is worth, and you refund 
the price to the purchasers, it is only just that you should recover the land which was 
sold by judicial authority; or, if the purchaser should prefer to do so, you should receive 
what is lacking of a fair price. A lower price is understood to be one which does not 
amount to half of the true value of the property.” 
 
This provision served to protect the seller from any disadvantage. However, in the Middle 
Ages, this rule came to be applied more generally, and was used in cases where either the 
seller or buyer was deceived by the other.116 Even in situations where the buyer could not 
justify recission by using C.4.44.2, the civilians recognised that the buyer would be able to 
sue the seller for latent defects, provided that the seller knew or had a duty to know about 
said defects.117 This remedy was derived from D.19.1.13 and D.19.1.6.4, which provide the 
seller’s liability for latent defects.118 From this we see that any knowledge of the defect on the 
part of the seller would make him fully liable for all damages (including consequential loss) 
under the actio empti.119  
 
The prevailing view in Roman law, as discussed above, was that liability was dependent on 
dolus or fraud on the part of the seller. But, as mentioned several times in the above 
discussion, this stance does not provide any indication of precisely what types of non-
disclosure would lead to liability. Specifically in the context of sale, there was still no generally 
accepted test to use to determine whether any given situation imposed a positive duty of 
disclosure on the seller. Various authors have suggested different options that could perhaps 
be used as a test. Buckland proposes that non-disclosure of “important” defects known to the 
seller would lead to liability,120 but this standard is too vague, as people’s interpretations of 
“important” will differ. Stein submits that it would be incorrect to impose a general liability for 
non-disclosure whenever the seller had knowledge of any defect, no matter what it is.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Decock	  &	  Hallebeek	  (2010)	  LHR	  93.	  
117	  Decock	  &	  Hallebeek	  (2010)	  LHR	  93.	  
118	  D.19.1.13.	  and	  D.19.1.6.4	  are	  discussed	  above.	  
119	  Decock	  &	  Hallebeek	  (2010)	  LHR	  93.	  
120	  WW	  Buckland	  A	  Text-­‐book	  of	  Roman	  Law	  from	  Augustus	  to	  Justinian	  3rd	  ed	  (1968)	  489.	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   25	  
It is clear from this discussion that, in the Roman law of sale, the seller would be liable for his 
non-disclosure if he knew of a defect in the merx and failed to disclose it to the buyer. The 
buyer would then be able to claim not only the Aedilitian remedies, but also compensatory 
damages, given that the seller consciously remained silent.121 This was the extent of the duty 
of disclosure as it was imposed in the context of liability for latent defects and this position 
was echoed in the writing of Roman-Dutch jurists.122  
 
This concludes our overview of the important aspects of the development of the civil law 
relating to non-disclosure. The focus has been on whether non-disclosure could constitute a 
type of fraud that could give rise to relief in different types of contracts, as well as the specific 
rules governing non-disclosure in the context of sale. This focus now shifts to the treatment of 
non-disclosure in modern law, paying specific attention to those systems which are based on 
similar foundations to those on which modern South African law rests. 
 
2 2  A comparative perspective on the duty to disclose 
 
2 2 1   Introduction 
 
The problem of determining when a duty to disclose arises is universally recognised. Here the 
approaches of the common law and civil law systems will be examined, focusing on the law of 
England as an example of the common law system, and the law of Germany as an example 
of the European civilian law, which is more similar to the modern South African law. A number 
of international legal instruments specifically provide for situations where there has been 
misrepresentation by non-disclosure, and an examination of the most influential and widely 
recognised of these instruments could enable us to identify various situations where the duty 
to disclose arises in international contract law, and highlight any differences or similarities 
between them.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  194.	  
122	  Voet	  Commentarius	  ad	  Pandectus	  21.1.10;	  Grotius	  Inleidinge	  3.15.7.	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2 2 2   Modern common law systems  
 
2 2 2 1 Introduction 
 
According to Cartwright, the contrast between English law and European civil law systems 
when it comes to the treatment of non-disclosure is marked.123 This is reflected by the narrow 
view that English law takes regarding pre-contractual liability and the unwillingness to impose 
a duty to disclose on contracting parties. This stands in opposition to the European civil law 
approach, which recognises that parties have a duty to negotiate in good faith, and makes 
allowance for the possibility of parties incurring liability for acting ‘contrary to good faith’ in the 
pre-contractual negotiation stage. The English law approach to contractual non-disclosure will 
be discussed in the following sections, with special attention paid to the similarities and 
differences that it has in relation to Roman and Roman-Dutch law as discussed above.  
 
2 2 2 2  General rule 
 
The point of departure in English law is the general rule that there is no duty on a person 
entering into a contract to disclose any material facts to the other party 124  and 
misrepresentation can only arise out of a “positive assertion of fact”.125 The rationale for 
adopting this rule appears to be the difficulty that arises in determining the extent of the 
information that should be disclosed in any given case, if the situation even gives rise to a 
duty of disclosure.126 This reticence to recognise the duty of disclosure in English law has 
been described as “no more than an application of the more general disinclination on the part 
of the common law to recognise a duty to negotiate in good faith”.127  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  J	  Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	  Mistake	  and	  Non-­‐disclosure	  (2007)	  536.	  Also	  see	  Legrand’s	  comparison	  of	  English	  and	  
French	  law	  in	  P	  Legrand	  “Pre-­‐contractual	  disclosure	  and	  information:	  English	  and	  French	  law	  compared”	  (1986)	  6	  OJLS	  322	  
322.	  
124	  E	  Peel	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  12th	  ed	  (2007)	  424,	  Zimmermann	  &	  Whittaker	  (eds)	  Good	  Faith	  in	  European	  Contract	  Law	  
(2000)	  656,	  Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	  Mistake	  and	  Non-­‐disclosure	  535,	  Smith	  v	  Hughes	  (1867)	  L.R.	  6	  Q.B.	  597,	  Davies	  v	  
London	  &	  Provincial	  Marine	  Insurance	  Co	   (1878)	  8	  Ch	  D	  469,	  474.	  Lord	  Atkin	  in	  Bell	  v	  Lever	  Bros	  [1932]	  A.C.161	  at	  (227)	  
provides	  a	  very	  strict	  view	  on	  this	  rule,	  saying	  “Ordinarily	  the	  failure	  to	  disclose	  a	  material	  fact	  which	  might	  affect	  the	  mind	  
of	  a	  prudent	  contractor	  does	  not	  give	  the	  right	  to	  avoid	  the	  contract.	  The	  principle	  of	  caveat	  emptor	  applies.”	  
125	  MH	  Whincup	  Contract	  Law	  and	  Practice:	  The	  English	  System	  and	  Continental	  Comparisons	  2nd	  ed	  (1992)	  217.	  
126	  Peel	   The	   Law	   of	   Contract	   424.	   P	   Giliker	   “Formation	   of	   contract	   and	   pre-­‐contractual	   information	   from	   an	   English	  
perspective”	  in	  S	  Grundmann	  &	  M	  Schauer	  (eds)	  The	  Architecture	  of	  European	  Codes	  and	  Contract	  Law	  (2006)	  301	  302.	  	  
127	  R	  Halson	  Contract	  Law	  (2001)	  31.	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This view seems to be confirmed by the decision in Sykes v Taylor-Rose,128 where the court 
continued to apply the strict general rule, despite the fact that the information not disclosed 
had a negative effect on the buyers of a property, leading to financial loss for them. Sykes v 
Taylor-Rose129 concerned the sale of a house, which the appellants had bought from the 
respondents in ignorance of the fact that a gruesome murder had taken place there. Once 
they discovered this fact, they wanted to sell the property and move out. The property sold at 
less than the market value, due to the fact that they “could not in conscience dispose of the 
property without disclosing what they had found out.”130 The argument before the court was 
that the appellants had suffered damage due to the respondents’ silence, in that they had to 
sell their house for less than they originally paid, which would not have happened if the 
Taylor-Roses had been forthcoming with the information regarding the murder. The question 
was thus whether or not the respondents had any duty to disclose this information to the 
appellants. If such a duty was found to exist, it had to be determined whether the respondents 
breached that duty and incurred liability for their non-disclosure. 
 
The appeal court considered the facts, and revisited the judgment in the court a quo, where 
the presiding officer had dealt fully with the issue of disclosure. The point of departure was 
that English law does not recognise a general duty on a vendor to disclose any information, 
regardless of whether it pertains to defects in the quality, expected enjoyment or even value 
of the land. The appellants’ counsel contended that in cases where the defect was of such a 
nature that no reasonably prudent buyer would be able to discover the defect without being 
informed thereof (as seen here), the seller should be obliged to disclose the information. It 
was further argued that the caveat emptor principle was reaching the end of its life, and was 
no longer suited to modern sale contracts. Despite this argument, as well as the extraordinary 
nature of the defect in the property, the court a quo was unwilling to impose a duty to disclose 
in this situation. The appeal court confirmed this decision, upholding the rule against imposing 
a duty of disclosure.     
 
However, it has been recognised that such a strict application of this rule has the potential to 
yield harsh and inequitable results, seen especially in cases where the seller has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  [2004]	  2	  P	  &	  CR	  30.	  
129	  [2004]	  2	  P	  &	  CR	  30.	  
130	  Sykes	  v	  Taylor-­‐Rose	  [2004]	  2	  P	  &	  CR	  30,	  n12.	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allowed to conceal certain information concerning the merx from the buyer.131 It has also been 
suggested that this is a special danger in cases where there is an unequal balance of power 
between the parties, and that courts should begin to develop the law concerning non-
disclosure in order to protect the more vulnerable parties to a contract.132   
 
For this reason, English law has developed to make provision for certain exceptions to this 
general rule against imposing a duty to disclose. These exceptions will be discussed in an 
attempt to identify the underlying principles that have led to courts recognising them as 
instances where contracting partys have a duty to disclose.   
 
2 2 2 3  Instances where a duty to disclose is recognised 
 
English law writers appear to have isolated certain exceptional circumstances where the 
courts would be willing to impose a duty to disclose between the parties. However, each 
author has grouped these exceptions differently, recognising a different number in their 
respective works.133 In Giliker’s article, she identifies all of these exceptions and groups them 
into six broad categories.134 These categories are special types of contract (uberrimae fidei), 
contractual warranties, misrepresentation, custom, tort law and statute.135 Regarding statute, 
the focus here will be on the position regarding contracts for the sale of property, which has 
been affected by recent reforms in UK consumer law. When discussing the recognised 
exceptions to the general rule, it must be noted that the duty to disclose in these cases is 
limited to those facts that the contracting party had actual knowledge of or had access to.136 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  See	  further	  Keates	  v	  Cadogan	  (1851)	  10	  C.B.	  591	  and	  Fletcher	  v	  Krell	  (1872)	  42	  L.J.Q.B	  55,	  which	  provides	  that	  there	  is	  
no	  duty	  on	  a	  party	  to	  disclose	  if	  the	  other	  party	  does	  not	  ask	  about	  a	  specific	  fact.	  
132	  Giliker	  “Formation	  of	  contract	  and	  pre-­‐contractual	   information”	   in	  Architecture	  of	  European	  Codes	  and	  Contract	  Law	  
302.	  
133	  Whincup	  Contract	  Law	  and	  Practice	  218-­‐220,	  GH	  Treitel	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  11th	  ed	  (2003)	  392-­‐400,	  Peel	  The	  Law	  of	  
Contract	   424,	   Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	   Mistake	   and	   Non-­‐disclosure	   543,	   C	   Twigg-­‐Flesner	   The	   Europeanisation	   of	  
Contract	  Law	  (2008)	  135.	  
134	  Giliker	  “Formation	  of	  contract	  and	  pre-­‐contractual	   information”	   in	  Architecture	  of	  European	  Codes	  and	  Contract	  Law	  
301-­‐319.	  
135	  Giliker	  “Formation	  of	  contract	  and	  pre-­‐contractual	   information”	   in	  Architecture	  of	  European	  Codes	  and	  Contract	  Law	  
302.	   These	   categories	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   exceptional	   circumstances	   recognised	  by	   South	  African	   courts	   as	   giving	   rise	   to	  
duties	  of	  disclosure.	  The	  South	  African	  classifications	  will	  be	  investigated	  and	  evaluated	  in	  chapter	  three	  below.	  
136	  Confirmed	  in	  William	  Sindall	  Plc	  v	  Cambridgeshire	  CC	  [1994]	  1	  W.L.R.	  1016.	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As stated above, contracts uberrimae fidei are recognised as agreements that give rise to a 
duty to disclose. This designation refers to contracts where the relationship between the 
parties is governed by the “utmost good faith”. The necessity for such a designation has been 
criticised in both English law137 and modern South African law138 due to the implication that 
the designation of certain contracts as uberrimae fidei means that the law recognises varying 
standards of good faith; that different types of contracts require different levels of honesty.139 
A possible means of identifying this type of contract is that in these situations there is often an 
imbalance of power between the parties, and one party is necessarily privy to more 
information regarding the material facts. Traditionally, this type of contract has included 
insurance contracts, suretyship agreements and any contract between parties who have a 
fiduciary relationship.  
 
It is to be noted, however, that in South African law, no distinction is drawn between contracts 
uberrimae fidei and other contracts, as our law does not recognise that there are degrees of 
good faith.140 It is noted that “(t)he same relationship [of trust or influence], and therefore the 
same duty of disclosure, can arise in any other negotiations…which…are characterised by 
the involuntary reliance of one party on the other for information material to his decision.”141 
Rather, all contracts are governed by the dictates of good faith, as applied in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law. 
 
Another exception to the general rule against imposing duties of disclosure is found when 
there has been a contractual warranty between the parties. This construct serves as an 
indirect means by which parties impose a positive duty of disclosure, in that where one party 
has warranted that the object of a contract has certain attributes, he is bound to disclose any 
information to the contrary to the other party. A distinction is often drawn between express 
and implied warranty, and it is the latter which has been identified as a means of regulating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	  Mistake	  and	  Non-­‐disclosure	  544.	  
138	  See	  4	  2	  11	  below	  
139	  Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	   Mistake	   and	   Non-­‐disclosure	   544,	   Millner	   (1957)	   SALJ	   188,	   Hutchison	   “Good	   faith	   in	  
contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  238.	  
140	  See	  42	  11;	  D	  Hutchison	  &	  CJ	  Pretorius	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  2nd	  ed	  (2012)	  134.	  
141	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	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pre-contractual negotiations. 142  A good example of implied terms can be found in the 
provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.143 In each of these provisions, an indirect duty to 
disclose can be seen, in that the quality of the goods is guaranteed unless any defects are 
brought to the attention of the buyer prior to the sale. It is not only legislation that imposes a 
duty to disclose in cases of warranty. The common law also recognises contractual warranties 
as an indirect means of imposing a duty to disclose on contracting parties. The locus 
classicus in this regard is Esso Petroleum Company v Mardon.144  
 
In this case, Mardon entered into a contract of lease with Esso Petroleum, in terms of which 
he would live on the premises of and manage a petrol station on Esso Petroleum’s behalf. 
The amount of rent to be paid was determined with reference to a calculation of profitability 
done prior to Esso Petroleum purchasing the site. However, changes made to the structure of 
the petrol station by the local planning authority had the effect of substantially lowering the 
earning potential of the business, and Mardon, in executing his duties as tenant, suffered 
extensive financial loss. He then brought the matter before the court, basing his action on the 
fact that the initial profitability calculation amounted to a warranty that the business would be 
profitable.  
 
The court then embarked on a detailed exploration of the so-called “collateral warranty”, 
investigating whether or not it could give rise to a duty to disclose. The finding of Lord 
Justices Ormrod and Shaw was that, in prior cases, the English Courts, “more often than 
not…elevated the innocent misrepresentation into a collateral warranty: and thereby did 
justice - in advance of the Misrepresentation Act, 1967.”145 The judgment in this matter, 
making reference to other cases where a similar approach was followed, 146  serves as 
authority for the assertion that “…both at common law and by statute, contractual warranties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Giliker	  “Formation	  of	  contract	  and	  pre-­‐contractual	   information”	   in	  Architecture	  of	  European	  Codes	  and	  Contract	  Law	  
307,	  B	  Nicolas	  in	  D	  Harris	  &	  D	  Tallon	  (eds)	  Contract	  Law	  Today	  (1989)	  166	  170	  comments	  that	  “the	  characteristic	  Common	  
Law	  instrument	  for	  the	  judicial	  development	  of	  the	  law	  of	  contract	  is	  the	  implied	  term.”	  
143	  See	  especially	  ss	  12,13,14,15.	  
144	  [1976]	  Q.B.	  801.	  
145	  Esso	  Petroleum	  Co	  Ltd.	  v	  Mardon	  [1976]	  Q.B.	  801.	  
146	  Dick	   Bently	   Productions	   v.	   Harold	   Smith	  Motors	   (1965)	   1	  W.L.R,	   Sunday	   v.	   Keighley	   (1922)	   27	   C.	   C,	   The	   Pantanassa	  
(1958)	  2	  Lloyd.	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provide a means by which the judiciary can maintain its adherence to the doctrine of freedom 
of contract and yet indirectly provide consumer protection.”147 
 
Misrepresentation can also be a ground of liability for non-disclosure. Generally speaking, the 
law of misrepresentation only gives rise to liability when a party has committed a positive act 
in order to induce another to enter into a contract. However, in practice, the courts have been 
willing to allow that, under certain circumstances, silence may amount to a misrepresentation. 
In With v O’Flanagan,148 the court imposed liability on a contracting party for a failure to 
inform the other contracting party of a change in circumstance. In this instance, a previously 
made statement later turned out to be incorrect, and it was the opinion of the court that the 
defendant in such a matter would have a duty to inform the plaintiff of the changed state of 
affairs. In such a case, the court would enforce the duty to disclose, as it is deemed to be the 
defendant’s responsibility to correct an incorrect impression created by a statement made by 
him to the plaintiff.  
 
There are specific types of contracts that are concluded according to the customs of a 
particular trade or business, which sometimes demand that information be disclosed between 
contracting parties. In these contracts, parties could incur liability for non-disclosure, if a duty 
to disclose traditionally exists between the parties. An example of customary business 
practice being an exception to the rule against imposing a duty to disclose can be found in 
Jones v Bowden. 149  This case concerned the sale of 101 bags of pimento that were 
transported by sea. It was common practice for the seller to declare any defects in the goods 
at the time of sale, which was not done in Jones v Bowden.150 Instead, the goods were 
shipped under a clean bill of lading, and the buyer received the damaged goods. It was 
argued before the court that the seller’s silence with regard to the defects was tantamount to 
a misrepresentation, given that the seller had knowledge of the defects prior to the sale. The 
court acknowledged that the contract was one where a duty to disclose any defects in the 
goods did exist, and that the breach of such a duty would allow the plaintiffs to institute an 
action, thus establishing custom as one of the exceptions to the general rule.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Giliker	  “Formation	  of	  contract	  and	  pre-­‐contractual	   information”	   in	  Architecture	  of	  European	  Codes	  and	  Contract	  Law	  
310.	  
148	  [1936]	  Ch	  575.	  See	  further	  Davies	  v	  London	  &	  Provincial	  Marine	  Insurance	  Co	  (1878)	  8	  Ch	  D	  469,	  475.	  
149	  4	  Taunt.	  846.	  	  
150	  4	  Taunt.	  846.	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When discussing misrepresentation, it is important to note that there is often an overlap 
between misrepresentation in the law of contract and misrepresentation in the law of delict 
(referred to as tort law in the UK). Liability for non-disclosure under tort law is thus one of the 
exceptions to the general rule against recognising a duty to disclose in English law. Under tort 
law, a duty to disclose may arise where there is a relationship between the defendant and 
plaintiff that would require that the defendant bear a duty of care towards the plaintiff, 
demanding that he disclose certain types of information. The existence of such a “special 
relationship” is thus necessary to impose liability for non-disclosure,151  and English courts 
have recognised that such a relationship exists between an employer and employee,152  as 
well as between a solicitor and the beneficiaries of a will,153 although the latter has been 
criticised.154 
 
Certain statutory instruments also create a duty of disclosure in English law. With regard to 
contracts for the sale of property, the recent development of UK consumer legislation has 
taken strides in imposing a duty on the vendor to disclose certain types of information, a 
change since the decision in Sykes v Taylor-Rose.155 The most marked change in the way 
that contracts for the sale of property are concluded is the requirement that a potential seller 
provide a potential buyer with a Home Information Pack (HIP).156 The Act places a positive 
duty on the vendor to have one of these HIPs,157 and a further duty to provide a copy of the 
HIP to a seller on request.158 The contents of these packs include the terms of sale, evidence 
of title, replies to standard preliminary enquiries made by buyers, copies of planning, listed 
building and building regulations consent and approvals, copies of warranties and guarantees 
for new properties, any guarantees for work carried out on the property, replies to searches 
made of the local authority, environmental issues, as well as a Home Condition Report based 
on a professional survey of the immovable property (including an energy efficiency 
assessment). These HIPs, as well as the standard information form that vendors have to 
complete for buyers, impose a statutory duty on the vendor to disclose any pertinent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  See	  Hedley	  Byrne	  v	  Heller	  and	  Partners	  [1964]	  A.C.	  465.	  
152	  Spring	  v	  Guardian	  Assurance	  plc	  [1994]	  2	  A.C.	  296.	  
153	  White	  v	  Jones	  [1995]	  2	  A.C.	  207.	  
154	  A	  Haydon	  “Frustration	  of	  testamentary	  intentions:	  a	  remedy	  for	  the	  disappointed	  beneficiary”	  (1995)	  C.L.J.	  238,	  P	  Cane	  
Tort	  Law	  and	  Economic	  Interests	  (1996)	  182-­‐186.	  
155	  [2004]	  2	  P	  &	  CR	  30.	  
156	  This	  requirement	  is	  contained	  in	  Part	  5	  of	  the	  British	  Housing	  Act	  2004.	  
157	  s155	  Housing	  Act.	  
158	  s156	  Housing	  Act.	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information relating to the property to the buyer. The failure to disclose information as 
required by the Housing Act, and the HIP regulations, would be grounds for the seller’s 
liability. It is still unclear what the courts’ reaction would be to a case like Sykes v Taylor-
Rose159 in light of the new statutory provisions, and it would be interesting to see how they 
would treat matters concerning the non-disclosure of an immaterial quality. 
 
It has been questioned whether English law is ready to develop more generalised duties of 
disclosure, and whether this is in fact necessary.160 The possibility of having a more inclusive 
approach was raised as early as the eighteenth century, in Carter v Boehm.161 Lord Mansfield 
proposed a system based on good faith, saying that “good faith forbids either party by 
concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of 
that fact, and his believing the contrary.”162 From this statement, it would appear that there are 
circumstances in which parties may have a duty to disclose information within their 
knowledge, but identifying such circumstances continues to be a problem. Cartwright 
suggests that Lord Mansfield’s approach, focusing on the relationship between the parties 
and their respective skill and knowledge, could be of assistance in determining which 
situations would require a duty of disclosure between contracting parties.163 However, the 
English courts have yet to adopt this approach, preferring to approach the development of the 
law relating to non-disclosure with caution.164 
 
2 2 3   Modern civilian systems  
 
For purposes of this study, attention will be paid to the position regarding the duty to disclose 
in German law, which is one of the most prominent civil law jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  [2004]	  2	  P	  &	  CR	  30.	  
160	  Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	  Mistake	  and	  Non-­‐disclosure	  539.	  
161	  (1766)	  3	  Burr.1905.	  
162	  (1766)	  3	  Burr.1905,	  1909.	  
163	  Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	  Mistake	  and	  Non-­‐disclosure	  539-­‐540.	  
164	  This	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  discussion	  of	  Sykes	  v	  Taylor-­‐Rose	  above.	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2 2 3 1  Non-disclosure in German law 
 
It has been stated that, in German law, “silence only constitutes fraud if there is a duty to 
provide information”.165  This requirement that there be a duty to disclose in order to impose 
liability for an omission is the same one seen in Roman, Roman-Dutch and South African law. 
Especially during the negotiation stage, there is no obligation on contracting parties to 
disclose all information that they are privy to, as “it is the task of each party to inquire about 
the advantages and disadvantages of entering into a contract.”166 It is suggested that the 
existence of a duty to disclose can be determined by consideration of the specific 
circumstances of each matter.167  
 
Markesinis proposes that the courts will consider whether good faith and common practice 
create a duty to disclose.168 In addition to these standards, the courts will also consider the 
relationship between the parties in order to see whether the parties had a duty to disclose 
inter se. This fluid standard of determining the existence of a duty to disclose has strong roots 
in the Roman law position, which relied strongly on the “customary business standards of 
decency” test and the bona fides principle.169 
 
It is necessary when discussing liability for non-disclosure to determine whether or not the 
German civil code recognises that non-disclosure is a valid reason for rescinding a contract. 
§123(1) of the BGB deals specifically with voidability of a contract on grounds of deceit or 
duress, and provides that “a person who has been induced to make a declaration of intent by 
deceit or unlawfully by duress may avoid his declaration”.170  This is a very basic statement, 
and does not expressly include the possibility of voiding a contract based on silence alone. 
However, it has been accepted in practice that the act of keeping silent could indeed amount 
to fraud in terms of §123 of the BGB, if there was a duty to disclose.171 As stated, there is no 
general duty to disclose, but it can arise where one contracting party is relying on the skill or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  PDV	  Marsh	  Comparative	  Contract	  Law	  England,	  France,	  Germany	  (1994)	  137.	  
166	  BS	  Markesinis,	  W	   Lorenz	  &	  G	   Dannemann	   The	   German	   Law	   of	   Obligations	   The	   Law	   of	   Contracts	   and	   Restitution:	   A	  
Comparative	  Introduction	  Vol	  1	  (1997)	  209.	  
167	  Marsh	  Comparative	  Contract	  Law	  England,	  France,	  Germany	  137.	  
168	  Markesinis	  et	  al	  The	  German	  Law	  of	  Obligations	  209.	  
169	  Discussed	  at	  2	  1	  1	  2	  above.	  
170	  Langenscheidt	  Translation	  Service	  BGB	  Translation	  on	  http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐internet.de/englisch_bgb/	  last	  accessed	  
21	  May	  2011.	  	  	  
171	  O	  Lando	  Principles	  of	  European	  Contract	  Law	  Volume	  1	  &	  2	  (1994)	  256.	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   35	  
knowledge of the other contracting party or where the parties have a relationship that would 
normally be governed by good faith due to an increased level of trust between them.172  
 
The existence of a duty to disclose is most often a question when it comes to contracts of 
sale, as sale contracts are typically situations where each party uses whatever information he 
might have in order to maintain a competitive edge, often more beneficial to the seller than 
the buyer. In situations where the seller bears knowledge of a fact that he knows would 
influence the buyer’s decision to contract, and that he knows the buyer has no means of 
discovering that fact on his own, the courts are likely to find that a duty to disclose exists.173 A 
good example of this is the situation where the sellers of immovable property receive 
information that the right of way at the bottom of their garden had been varied to allow public 
motor vehicles to drive through.174 Although they receive this information just before the 
contract of sale is to be signed, they fail to inform the buyers accordingly. The contract is duly 
concluded, and the buyers then discover that the property receives a great deal of noise from 
the passing cars. Would German law allow the buyers a remedy in such a case? 
 
In such a case it would first have to be established whether or not the silence of the sellers 
would amount to fraud in terms of §123 of the BGB. It is submitted that “it must be asked 
whether the party making the mistake may have expected disclosure according to the 
principles of good faith taking into account the generally accepted standards in business.”175 
This is in keeping with §242 of the BGB, which provides that “an obligor has a duty to perform 
according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration.”176 
The standard set out in this section is reminiscent of the standards relied upon in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law when determining liability for non-disclosure, showing that these principles 
have been adapted to fit modern law, and can still be considered when determining the duty 
to disclose. Grounded on this provision, as well as §§ 433-437 of the BGB,177 which require 
that the seller inform the buyer of any material defect in the merx that he has knowledge of, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  Lando	  Principles	  of	  European	  Contract	  Law	  256.	  
173	  BGH	  (V	  ZR	  21/88)	  7	  July	  1989	  [1989]	  DB	  2426.	  
174	  Sefton-­‐Green	  (ed)	  Mistake,	  Fraud	  and	  Duties	  to	  Inform	  in	  European	  Contract	  Law	  (2004)	  193.	  
175	  Sefton-­‐Green	  (ed)	  Mistake,	  Fraud	  and	  Duties	  to	  Inform	  in	  European	  Contract	  Law	  206.	  	  
176	  Langenscheidt	  Translation	  Service	  BGB	  Translation	  on	  http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐internet.de/englisch_bgb/	  last	  accessed	  
21	  May	  2011.	  	  	  
177	  Langenscheidt	  Translation	  Service	  BGB	  Translation	  on	  http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐internet.de/englisch_bgb/	  last	  accessed	  
21	  May	  2011.	  	  These	  provisions	  set	  out	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  buyer	  and	  seller	  in	  relation	  to	  material	  defects	  in	  the	  object	  of	  a	  
contract.	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the sellers in the example were bound to inform the buyers of the right of way of vehicles over 
their property. As a result, the sellers’ silence in this matter may amount to fraud as defined in 
§123 of the BGB, given that the buyers of the property were induced to enter into the contract 
by the concealment of information regarding a material aspect of the property.  
 
2 2 4  Modern international instruments 
 
2 2 4 1 General provisions on good faith 
 
One of the most widely recognised international documents dealing specifically with 
commercial contracting is the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(PICC). These Principles were specifically developed to regulate the operation of international 
commercial contracts, which is pivotal to the smooth execution of international trade 
transactions. The Principles serve as a guideline for contracting parties who interact across 
international borders, and could possibly assist in providing a “general standard” by which 
these interactions are measured. As such, they are fairly comprehensive in scope, and 
include provisions governing each stage of the contract, both before and after conclusion 
thereof.  
 
Chapter 1 of these Principles provides the general values and ethics that govern international 
contracting.  Article 1.7 of Chapter 1 requires that each party to an international trade contract 
is bound to act in accordance with the tenets of good faith and fair dealing, and cannot 
exclude or limit this obligation by any means.178 This standard of good faith and fair dealing 
can also be found in Article 1:102 of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).179 The 
PECL, despite being an instrument devoted to governing contract law in Europe, can also 
serve as a useful tool for us when applying contract law in South Africa, as it draws from the 
civil law systems used in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands as well as the 
common law system, as followed in the United Kingdom. The combination of principles from 
both of these systems can aid the development of South African law, which is a mixed 
system, having been influenced by both Roman law and English law in the past. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  Article	  1.7	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  (2010)	  17.	  
179	  Principles	  of	  European	  Contract	  Law	  (2000)	  99.	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There are a number of provisions throughout the PICC and PECL that directly or indirectly 
incorporate this requirement that parties act in accordance with the standards of good faith 
and fair dealing.180 These ideals of good faith and fair dealing are underlying principles which 
must always be kept in mind when applying and interpreting the provisions of the UNIDROIT 
principles. The inclusion of this article at the beginning of the PICC and the general language 
used suggests that the parties have to uphold these principles throughout the contracting 
process. The wording of Art. 1.7(2) makes the upholding of the standards of good faith 
mandatory, saying that parties may not exclude their duties to act in good faith and comply 
with the requirements of fair dealing. This has the effect of setting good faith and fair dealing 
as the absolute minimum standard of behaviour between parties to an international contract. 
Parties have the option of providing for a higher standard of behaviour in their contract, but 
can never act in a manner that does not comply with the minimum requirements of good faith 
and fair dealing as set out in Art. 1.7.  
 
In Art 1:102 of the PECL the concept of parties adhering to the standards of good faith and 
fair dealing in the contracting process is stated more generally, forming part of the principle of 
freedom of contract. The inclusion of these principles indicates a willingness on the part of the 
drafters to provide an overarching standard of behaviour for contracting parties to abide by, 
but at the same time, it appears that there is a reluctance to accept good faith and fair dealing 
as a specific test for the liability of contracting parties. This is evidenced by Art 1:102(2), 
which provides that “The parties may exclude the application of any of the Principles or 
derogate from or vary their effects, except as otherwise provided by these Principles.”181 The 
effect of this section is that the parties may choose to exclude or lessen their duty to act in 
good faith and in line with the principle of fair dealing. This is confirmed by the inclusion of Art 
1: 106(1) of the PECL, which provides that “…regard should be had to the need to promote 
good faith and fair dealing, certainty in contractual relationships and uniformity of 
application.”182 The inclusion of the words “regard should be had” shows that the parties may 
choose to disregard the standards of good faith and fair dealing, making it a less effective 
standard by which to measure contracting partys’ behaviour.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  These	  include	  Art	  1.8,	  Art	  1.9(2),	  Art	  2.1.15,	  Art	  2.1.16,	  Art	  3.5,	  and	  Art	  3.8	  (which	  will	  be	  discussed	  more	  fully	  below)	  of	  
the	  PICC	  and	  Art	  1:106,	  Art	  2:104	  and	  Art	  4:109	  of	  the	  PECL,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  
181	  Principles	  of	  European	  Contract	  Law	  (2000)	  99.	  
182	  Principles	  of	  European	  Contract	  Law	  108.	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This is a very different approach to that seen in Art 1.7 of the PICC, which states that the 
parties are bound to act in accordance with the dictates of good faith and fair dealing, and 
cannot exclude this duty. Art 1.7 of the PICC appears to have a stronger impact on the rest of 
the PICC provisions that Art 1:102 of the PECL has on its consequent articles. From this it 
seems that there is more of a balance between the common law and civil law views on the 
elements of good faith and fair dealing in contract law in the PECL, as these standards are 
acknowledged as significant, but parties are not bound thereto. A comparison of this nature 
serves to support the contention that the PICC, when dealing with duties of disclosure, 
“…takes the lead from civil law systems…to guide the determination of when duties of 
disclosure should be disclosed.”183 This is clearly seen in the fact that the parties must act 
according to the principles of good faith and fair dealing in commercial contracting, and the 
willingness to impose liability wherever it is felt that parties have failed to comply with these 
standards. 
 
2 2 4 2 Non-disclosure and the requirements for a valid contract 
 
The PICC addresses the problem of misrepresentation by non-disclosure in chapter 3, 
dealing with the validity of contracts. The first provision to consider is Article 3(5)(1), which 
indirectly deals with the effect of non-disclosure on a contract, and the parties' duties inter se. 
This article provides that:  
 
“[a] party may only avoid the contract for mistake if, when the contract was concluded, 
the mistake was of such importance that a reasonable person in the same situation as 
the party in error would only have concluded the contract on materially different terms 
or would not have concluded it at all if the true state of affairs had been known, and the 
other party made the same mistake, or caused the mistake, or knew or ought to have 
known of the mistake and it was contrary to reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing to leave the mistaken party in error…”184 (own emphasis). 
 
The wording of the italicised phrase in the above extract appears to make provision for the 
existence of a duty to disclose in certain situations. This is clearly reflected by imposing 
liability on a party who bears knowledge of a fact that would influence the other contracting 
party’s decision to contract and fails to inform the latter of such fact. The article further states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183	  Vogenauer	  &	  Kleinheisterkamp	  Commentary	  on	  the	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  437-­‐438.	  
184	  Article	  3.5(1)	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  (1994)	  98.	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that the duty to disclose in this case would only arise if it would be “contrary to reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing to leave the mistaken party in error”.185 This reference to 
“fair dealing” emphasises the fact that the principles established in Chapter 1 of the PICC 
underscore all of the guidelines set out in the subsequent chapters, and must be adhered to 
when applying the provisions of the PICC. 
 
The official commentary accompanying the main text of the PICC supports the supposition 
that Art 3.5(1) makes provision for the possibility of misrepresentation occurring in the form of 
non-disclosure. It is clearly stated in this commentary that “(e)ven silence can cause an 
error”.186 It is also stated that the party having the advantage of knowing what the other party 
does not should incur liability if the other party makes an error, and such error can be linked 
to his conduct (or lack of action where action was required).187  Article 3.5(1) therefore reveals 
that liability can be imposed for misrepresentation by non-disclosure but that there is also 
uncertainty on the circumstances that would give rise to a duty to disclose. 
 
The duty to disclose is directly discussed in Article 3.8 of the PICC which specifies actions 
that would constitute fraud in international contract law. Article 3.8 states that a party may 
avoid the contract if he was led to conclude it by the other party’s fraudulent representation. 
Such fraudulent representation can take a number of forms, including “…fraudulent non-
disclosure of circumstances which, according to reasonable standards of fair dealing, the 
latter party should have disclosed.”188  
 
A link can be discerned between fraud and certain types of mistake, as seen in the wording 
and commentary of Article 3.5(1).189 This link is apparent from the fact that both fraud and 
mistake (as described in Article 3.5(1)) “may involve either representations, express or 
implied, of false facts, or non-disclosure of true facts”190 (own emphasis). The inclusion of this 
comment in the PICC confirms that liability for non-disclosure can be imposed on parties to 
international contracts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  Article	  3.5(1)	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  98.	  
186	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  100.	  
187	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  100.	  
188	  Article	  3.8	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  104.	  
189	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  104.	  
190	  Comment	  1,	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  104.	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The construction of Art 3.8, specifically the choice to include the phrase “reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing”, indicates that the rules of civil law systems have had a 
strong influence on the content of the PICC. It is in civil law systems that one would find a 
reliance on general standards of behaviour, such as bona fides and customary business 
practices,191 in order to determine how parties to a contract should conduct themselves. The 
problems relating to the use of this standard would arguably be the same in any system that 
aims to use it as a test for determining the existence of a duty to disclose. According to Du 
Plessis, “…the danger exists that radically different interpretations of the meaning of good 
faith could undermine the purpose of unification”.192 It is submitted in the same commentary 
that there is thus a need to isolate specific instances where these reasonable commercial 
practices and standards demand that there be liability for non-disclosure, and use these 
cases to develop an internationally practical standard for determining the existence of a duty 
to disclose.193  
 
Throughout the discussion of the international legal instruments governing contract law, 
emphasis has been placed on the importance of the standards of good faith and fair dealing 
in commercial contracting. The inclusion of these standards in both the PICC and PECL 
proves that they are still widely regarded as the underlying principles of modern contract law, 
and would be useful in determining which situations would lead to liability of parties to a 
contract. However, the fluidity of these standards makes them difficult to use as a set method 
of determining liability, and the same problems faced when applying them in the past are sure 
to arise in modern law.194  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191	  Discussed	  more	  fully	  in	  2	  1	  1	  2	  and	  2	  1	  2	  above.	  
192	  Vogenhauer	  &	  Kleinheisterkamp	  Commentary	  on	  the	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  438.	  
193	  This	  statement	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  chapter	  four	  below,	  which	  contains	  a	  thorough	  exploration	  of	  the	  specific	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  legal	  systems	  always	  recognise	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose.	  
194	  It	  is	  of	  interest	  that	  Art	  49	  of	  the	  recently-­‐drafted	  Common	  European	  Sales	  Law	  (CESL)	  aims	  to	  provide	  more	  certainty	  
be	  “fleshing	  out”	  this	  general	  standard.	  It	  maintains	  that	  in	  determining	  whether	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose	  could	  arise	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  good	  faith	  and	  fair	  dealing,	  regard	  should	  be	  had	  to	  all	  the	  circumstances.	  These	  circumstances	  include	  
(a)	  whether	  the	  party	  had	  special	  expertise;	  
(b)	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  party	  of	  acquiring	  the	  relevant	  information;	  
(c)	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  the	  other	  party	  could	  have	  acquired	  the	  information	  by	  
other	  means;	  
(d)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  information;	  
(e)	  the	  apparent	  importance	  of	  the	  information	  to	  the	  other	  party;	  and	  
(f)	  in	  contracts	  between	  traders	  good	  commercial	  practice	  in	  the	  situation	  concerned	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The question remains whether or not these more general principles can be distilled into a 
practical test for when non-disclosure is actionable in any given situation. To this question we 
return later.195   
 
2 3 Conclusion 
 
The Roman law of contract provides a number of guidelines for interpreting our own law. The 
influence of the jurists of the Republic as well as the classical jurists is still felt in modern 
South African law, seen especially in the way that we approach issues regarding liability for 
non-disclosure. The development of Roman law to include cases where the parties’ conduct 
did not amount to dolus has also had a great impact on modern law, creating room for the 
acknowledgment of non-disclosure as a form of misrepresentation.  
 
However, there is still difficulty in deciding which situations would give rise to a duty to 
disclose on parties, making any non-disclosure actionable. In this regard we have seen that 
international instruments, in contrast with the common law, expressly provide for good faith 
being a general standard for ascertaining whether or not a party’s behaviour is actionable. 
However, South African law does not make such overt and direct reference to this standard. It 
is also still not evident, whether it should do so. We will return to this question when dealing 
with the modern South African law.196 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  See	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  5	  below.	  
196	  See	  the	  discussion	  at	  4	  3	  below.	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CHAPTER 3: SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
The general rule in South African law is that there is no inherent duty on one contracting party 
to disclose information within his or her knowledge to the other party. However, the judiciary 
and academic commentators alike have identified that, despite this general rule, there are 
exceptional circumstances in which parties to certain types of contract have a duty to disclose 
information, resulting in any non-disclosure being actionable.197  
 
These exceptional circumstances have been identified by various writers, and the 
classifications differ. The most commonly recognised exceptions are contracts of insurance, 
agency and suretyship, as well as contracts of sale, specifically the position regarding latent 
defects.198 Hutchison further identifies as exceptions contracts where there is a fiduciary 
relationship between the parties, statutory duties of disclosure, the situation where 
unrehabilitated insolvents apply for credit and situations where a party’s prior conduct makes 
any subsequent silence misleading.199 For purposes of this discussion, these exceptions will 
be used as the point of departure, since it is the most extensive classification to date. 
 
In the past, some of these “exceptional” contracts have been designated contracts uberrimae 
fidei.200 This term refers to contracts where parties are bound to act with the “highest good 
faith”.201 The term ‘uberrimae fidei’ is the Latin equivalent of ‘utmost good faith’. It is uncertain 
what the exact origin of the phrase is, but it seems to have appeared in English law from 1850 
onwards.202 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this designation has been criticised in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  According	  to	  D	  Hutchison	  &	  CJ	  Pretorius	  (eds),	  “the	  rule	  has	  always	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  number	  of	  exceptions,	  and	  as	  the	  
policy	  considerations	  underlying	  these	  exceptions	  have	  become	  more	  apparent,	  the	  courts	  have	  synthesised	  them	  into	  a	  
general	  test	  for	  liability.”	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  2nd	  ed	  (2012)	  134.	  	  
198	  RH	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  6th	  ed	  (2011)	  277;	  Hutchison	  &	  Pretorius	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  134-­‐135.	  
199	  Hutchison	  &	  Pretorius	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  134-­‐135.	  
200	  Christie	   The	   Law	   of	   Contract	   277.	   This	   is	   especially	   seen	   in	   some	   of	   the	   earlier	   judgments	   discussed	   at	   4	   2	   in	   the	  
following	  chapter,	  and	  was	  an	  accepted	  concept	  in	  South	  African	  law	  until	  the	  judgment	  in	  Mutual	  and	  Federal	  Insurance	  
Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A).	  
201	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  277.	  
202	  Mutual	   and	   Federal	   Insurance	   Co	   Ltd	   v	   Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	   1985	   1	   SA	   419	   (A).	   An	   example	   of	   this	   is	   found	   in	  
section	   17	   of	   the	   English	  Marine	   Insurance	  Act	   1906,	  which	   states	   that	   “(a)	   contract	   of	  marine	   insurance	   is	   a	   contract	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South African law, as it seems to imply that there are degrees of good faith.203 The strongest 
criticism is found in Joubert JA’s majority judgment in Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v 
Oudtshoorn Municipality,204 where he states that: 
 
“there is no magic in the expression uberrima fides. There are no degrees of good 
faith. It is entirely inconceivable that there could be a little, more or most (utmost) good 
faith. The distinction is between good faith or bad faith. There is no room for uberrima 
fides as a third category in our law…Uberrima fides is not a juristic term with a precise 
connotation. It cannot be used as a yardstick with a precise legal meaning…In my 
opinion, uberrima fides is an alien, vague, useless expression without any particular 
meaning in law…Our law of insurance has no need for uberrima fides and the time has 
come to jettison it.”. This decision confirms the statement made in Iscor Pension Fund 
v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1961 1 SA 178 (T) that “the label placed on the 
undertaking is not of importance and the claim that uberrima fides is a necessary 
concomitant of insurance is misleading.”  
 
This view is confirmed in Silent Pond Investments CC v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd.205 Following 
the exploration of the historical development in the preceding chapter, it is evident that 
Roman law did not make reference to degrees of good faith, and as such, the court in Mutual 
and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality206 was correct in its judgment, 
effectively ending the application of the “alien, vague, useless expression without any 
particular meaning” in South African law. This rejection of the construct of uberrimae fidei 
leads us to question on what basis the special rights and duties attaching to this type of 
contract have been recognised. In this chapter we will explore some of the most notable 
exceptions with the aim of discovering the reasons why these specific types of contracts 
always impose a duty of disclosure on the parties.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
based	  upon	   the	  utmost	   good	   faith,	   and	   if	   the	  utmost	   good	   faith	  be	  not	  observed	  by	  either	  party,	   the	   contract	  may	  be	  
avoided	  by	  the	  other	  party.”	  
203	  As	  Christie	   states,	   “All	   contracts	   in	  our	   law	  are	  bonae	   fidei,	   and	   there	   is	   no	   room	   for	   a	   higher	   category	  of	  uberrima	  
fides”	  (The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  277).	  The	  court	  in	  Iscor	  Pension	  Fund	  v	  Marine	  and	  Trade	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  1961	  1	  SA	  178	  (T)	  
relied	  on	  Spencer-­‐Bower’s	  view	  that	  “The	  Roman	  Law	  distinguishes	  between	  actions	  bonae	  fidei…and	  actions	  which	  are	  
not.	  It	  does	  not	  erect	  into	  a	  third	  and	  superlative	  class,	  with	  a	  special	  name,	  such	  transactions	  and	  relations	  which	  English	  
law	  designates	  uberrimae	  fidei.”	  	  	  
204	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A)	  433C-­‐D.	  
205	  2011	  6	  SA	  343	  (D)	  357-­‐360.	  
206	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A).	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3 2 Contracts of insurance  
 
It is an accepted principle of modern South African law that an insured is under a duty to 
volunteer certain facts to prospective insurers at the time of seeking insurance.207  It is 
submitted that the scope of the insured’s duty to disclose in South African law is limited by a 
number of factors.208 First, the insured’s duty to disclose is a pre-contractual duty, as it 
concerns information that must be disclosed in order for parties to contract. It thus follows that 
such a duty would terminate upon contract conclusion.209 The duty only exists in respect of 
material facts. Materiality is determined by using an objective test of the reasonable person, 
specifically the reasonable person in the position of the insured.210 The facts in question must 
actually be known to the insured. It has been debated whether ‘constructive knowledge’ (the 
fact that the insurer ought to have known something) would be sufficient to establish a duty to 
speak.211 The prevailing opinion of our courts and academic writers seems to be that the 
insured’s duty of disclosure does not extend to facts that the insurer already knows or can be 
presumed to know.  
 
In practice, insurers usually only allege the breach of a duty of disclosure when the insured 
institutes a claim on his insurance contract. Typically this is used in instances where the 
insurer suspects that the insured acted fraudulently but is unable to prove it. In such a case, 
the breach of a duty of disclosure provides extensive protection for insurers, whilst being 
extremely onerous on the insured. The basis of this extensive protection, the reasons for 
imposing a duty of disclosure of the insured and the nature and scope of this duty can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  MFB	   Reinecke,	   S	   van	   der	  Merwe,	   JP	   van	  Niekerk	  &	   P	   Havenga	  General	   Principles	   of	   Insurance	   Law	   (2002)	   192-­‐196;	  
Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  277;	  JP	  van	  Niekerk	  “Goodbye	  to	  the	  duty	  of	  disclosure	  in	  insurance	  law:	  reasons	  to	  rethink,	  
restrict,	  reform	  or	  repeal	  the	  duty	  (part	  1)”	  (2005)	  17	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  150	  169.	  
208	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  150.	  
209	  Confirmed	  in	  G	  Gordon	  &	  WS	  Getz	  The	  South	  African	  Law	  of	   Insurance	  2nd	  ed	  (1969)	  112;	  RW	  Lee	  &	  AM	  Honorè	  The	  
South	   African	   Law	   of	   Obligations	   (1978)	   590;	   Pereira	   v	   Marine	   and	   Trade	   Insurance	   Co	   Ltd	   1975	   4	   SA	   745	   (A)	   756A;	  
Reinecke	  et	  al	  General	  Principles	  of	  Insurance	  Law	  130.	  
210	  See	  further	  Pereira	  v	  Marine	  and	  Trade	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  1975	  4	  SA	  745	  (A)	  756;	  Mutual	  &	  Federal	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  
Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A);	  President	  Versekeringsmaatskappy	  Bpk	  v	  Trust	  Bank	  van	  Afrika	  Bpk	  1989	  1	  SA	  
208	  (A);	  Reinecke	  et	  al	  General	  Principles	  of	  Insurance	  Law	  131.	  
211	  According	  to	  Reinecke	  et	  al,	  “South	  African	  case	   law	  appears	   to	   favour	  the	  view	  that	   the	  duty	  to	  disclose	   is	  simply	  a	  
duty	  to	  disclose	  material	  facts	  within	  one’s	  actual	  knowledge.	  This	  means	  that	  no	  duty	  of	  disclosure	  exists	  regarding	  facts	  
which	   do	   not	   lie	   within	   a	   party’s	   actual	   knowledge	   but	   of	   which	   he	   could	   have	   obtained	   knowledge	   had	   he	   taken	  
reasonable	  steps.”	  (footnotes	  omitted)	  General	  Principles	  of	  Insurance	  Law	  128;	  Universal	  Stores	  Ltd	  v	  OK	  Bazaars	  (1929)	  
Ltd	  1973	  4	  SA	  747	  (A)	  762.	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better understood in light of a brief discussion on the history of the duty to disclose in 
insurance law. 
 
3 2 1 Historical treatment of the duty to disclose in insurance contracts 
 
The recognition in South African law that insurance contracts always create a duty of 
disclosure between the parties has its roots in Roman-Dutch and English law.  
 
In Roman-Dutch law, the duty of disclosure in insurance law was regulated by statute.212 The 
insurance legislation at the time prescribed which matters had to be mentioned in insurance 
policies.213 Any failure to disclose the required information would result in the contract being 
void, or in reduced liability for the insurer.214 The reason for requiring such a duty on the part 
of the insured was that the information required concerned matters of which the insured had 
knowledge, as well as matters that the insured would not otherwise voluntarily disclose to the 
insurer.215 It was also common practice at the time for individuals to draft their own insurance 
policies and then search for people to underwrite their risks.216 Thus it was possible for these 
individuals to determine the contractual terms unilaterally, which could be detrimental to 
potential underwriters. The duty to disclose was very limited in that parties were only bound to 
disclose information by means of including it in the written insurance policy. This meant that 
there was no such duty in the absence of a written insurance contract.217 Significantly, the 
statutory duty to disclose in Roman-Dutch insurance law could not be abolished or limited, or 
conversely, extended. There was thus a very narrow duty on the insured to disclose specific 
information to the insurer.218 
 
Initially in English law, a similarly narrow duty of disclosure was imposed on parties to 
insurance contracts. In terms of this duty, an insured was only bound to disclose “special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  17	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  323	  323.	  Also	  see	  JP	  Van	  Niekerk	  The	  Development	  of	  the	  Principles	  of	  Insurance	  Law	  
in	  the	  Netherlands	  from	  1500-­‐1800	  (1998).	  
213	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  323.	  
214	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  323.	  
215	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  323-­‐324.	  
216	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  324.	  
217	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  325.	  
218	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  326-­‐329.	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facts...in the knowledge of the insured only”.219 This narrow duty was countered by a duty on 
the part of the insurer to enquire about facts that he had reason to believe were important 
when considering the potential risk.220 However, this narrow scope of the duty to disclose later 
developed in such a way that, by the 19th century, it was accepted law that the insured had a 
general duty to disclose all material facts to the insurer. The duty was no longer limited to 
those material facts which the insured had private knowledge of and that the insurer could not 
possibly know. The law developed further so that the insurer’s reciprocal duty to enquire also 
fell away, which is especially seen in the decision in Bates v Hewitt.221 By the 20th century, it 
was “apparent that in English law insurance contracts generally were no longer merely ones 
of good faith like all other contracts, but had indisputably become exceptional ones of the 
utmost good faith”.222 This ‘utmost good faith’ thus became the basis of the recognition of the 
duty to disclose in insurance contracts, and it was this basis which was later accepted into 
South African law and used as a standard for imposing duties of disclosure in certain types of 
contract. 
 
3 2 2 The duty to disclose in South African insurance law 
 
This duty of disclosure first arose in South African insurance law during the late 19th century, 
and arose in courts where English law was accorded great persuasive force.223 As indicated 
in the preceding paragraph, English law at that time imposed a general duty on the insured to 
disclose all material facts to the insurer. This position was adopted by South African courts, 
who used English cases as authority for recognition that certain contracts were uberrimae 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219	  Carter	  v	  Boehm	  (1766)	  3	  Burr	  1905,	  1909.	  
220	  Confirmed	  in	  Carter	  v	  Boehm	  (1766)	  3	  Burr	  1905;	  Planche	  &	  Another	  v	  Fletcher	  (1779)	  1	  Dougl	  251,	  99	  ER	  164;	  Noble	  &	  
Another	  v	  Kennoway	   (1780)	  2	  Dougl	  510,	  99	  ER	  326;	  Court	  v	  Martineau	   (1782)	  3	  Dougl	  161,	  99	  ER	  591;	  Mayne	  v	  Walter	  
(1787).	  
221	  (1867)	  LR	  2	  QB	  595.	  In	  this	  case	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  insured	  was	  bound	  to	  disclose	  “everything	  within	  his	  knowledge	  
which	   is	  of	   a	  nature	   to	   increase	   the	   risk	  which	   the	  underwriter	   is	   asked	   to	  undertake”	   (611),	  No	  mention	   is	  made	  of	   a	  
reciprocal	   duty	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   underwriter,	   and	   at	   610-­‐611	   of	   the	   judgment,	   the	   court	   states	   that	   even	   if	   the	  
underwriter	  could	  have	  discovered	  certain	  information	  for	  himself,	  there	  is	  no	  obligation	  on	  him	  to	  do	  so.	  
222	  	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  162.	  
223	  Van	  Niekerk	   (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  329.	  This	   is	  evidenced	  by	  the	   judgments	   in	  Malcher	  &	  Malcomess	  v	  Kingwilliamstown	  
Fire	   &	  Marine	   Insurance	  &	   Trust	   Co	   (1883)	   3	   EDC	   271;	   Spencer	   v	   London	  &	   Lancashire	   Insurance	   Co	   (1884)	   5	   NLR	   37;	  
Drysdale	  v	  Union	  Fire	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  (1890)	  8	  SC	  63.	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fidei, and that insurance contracts fell into this category, and would thus require “perfect or the 
utmost good faith from the insured.”224  
 
This concept of utmost good faith appears to have been the basis of imposing an 
exceptionally broad duty of disclosure on the insured in the earlier cases regarding the duty to 
disclose in insurance law. The courts went so far as to say that:  
 
“It is well settled law that insurance policies are contracts uberrima fidei and 
consequently there is a greater duty cast upon an insured regarding the disclosure of 
facts than in an ordinary contract.”225 
 
From this statement we see that the insured traditionally bears a greater burden of disclosure 
in a contract of insurance. No mention is made of the reciprocal duty of the insurer to enquire 
about the risk as seen in earlier English law. There is, however, provision for the limitation of 
the insured’s duty. First, he is only bound to disclose matters that are material, secondly he 
had to have private knowledge of these matters, and thirdly the insurer must have had no way 
of knowing them.226 This broadened duty of disclosure has been firmly established in South 
African law,227 and continues to be applied by modern courts, despite being criticised for 
being too onerous on the insured.228 
 
These provisions which serve to limit the insured’s duty to disclose require further attention, 
and bear a similarity to the factors identified by the judiciary when dealing with cases of non-
disclosure, which will be properly investigated in the following chapter. For the moment it is 
necessary to consider the aspects of materiality and private knowledge, and their importance 
in the law of insurance.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  330.	  Authority	  for	  the	  principles	  applicable	  to	  insurance	  contracts	  in	  early	  South	  African	  
law	  is	  found	  in	  Malcher	  &	  Malcomess	  v	  Kingwilliamstown	  Fire	  &	  Marine	  Insurance	  &	  Trust	  Co	  (1883)	  3	  EDC	  271.	  
225	  Fine	  v	  The	  General	  Accident,	  Fire	  and	  Life	  Assurance	  Corp	  Ltd	  1915	  AD	  213	  218.	  This	  view	   is	  confirmed	   in	   later	  cases	  
such	  as	  Pereira	  v	  Marine	  and	  Trade	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  1975	  4	  SA	  745	  (A).	  	  
226	  Pereira	  v	  Marine	  and	  Trade	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  1975	  4	  SA	  745	  (A)	  755F.	  
227	  The	   scope	   of	   this	   duty	   has	   not	   been	   challenged	   in	   subsequent	   cases,	   although	   the	   designation	  uberrimae	   fidei	  was	  
criticised	  and	  effectively	  struck	  down	  by	  the	  court	  in	  Mutual	  &	  Federal	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  1985	  1	  
SA	  419	  (A).	  Reform	  has,	  however,	  been	  proposed.	  In	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2005)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  335-­‐339,	  the	  author	  explores	  possible	  
methods	  in	  which	  the	  insured’s	  duty	  to	  disclose	  can	  be	  reformed	  in	  order	  to	  place	  parties	  to	  an	  insurance	  contract	  on	  a	  
more	  equal	  footing.	  
228	  Bruwer	  v	  Nova	  Risk	  Partners	  Ltd	  2011	  1	  SA	  234	  (GSJ).	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It has been stated above that the insured is only bound to disclose material facts. It is 
important that, in insurance law, the insured’s own view of the materiality of facts is irrelevant, 
and the contract will be void if he fails to disclose material facts in the belief that they are not 
so.229 This view is problematic because it raises the question as to how one would determine 
whether facts are objectively material. 
 
The test for materiality has been discussed in case law, and the most common approach 
appears to be the “reasonable man” test.230 The court does not consider the position of the 
reasonable insurer or the reasonable insured, but favours the standard of the “average 
prudent person or reasonable man”.231 It has been suggested that this is due to the fact that 
this test treats both parties equally, as it does not give preference to either the insurer or 
insured.232 
 
Another important factor is whether the insured had private knowledge of the material facts. 
This is important, as it is generally accepted in insurance contracts that those facts necessary 
to compute the potential risk are only known to the insured, and thus he would bear the 
burden of informing the insurer.233 
 
From this discussion, it is apparent that materiality of the facts concerned and whether the 
insured had exclusive knowledge thereof are significant factors underlying the imposition of 
an absolute duty of disclosure in insurance law.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229	  Malcher	  &	  Malcomess	  v	  Kingwilliamstown	  Fire	  &	  Marine	  Insurance	  &	  Trust	  Co	  (1883)	  3	  EDC	  271	  289.	  
230	  This	   standard	   is	   applied	   in	   Fine	   v	   The	  General	   Accident,	   Fire	   and	   Life	   Assurance	   Corp	   Ltd	   1915	   AD	   213	  220-­‐221	   and	  
approved	   in	   Mutual	   &	   Federal	   Insurance	   Co	   Ltd	   v	   Oudtshoorn	   Municipality	   1985	   1	   SA	   419	   (A);	   President	  
Versekeringsmaatskappy	  Bpk	  v	  Trust	  Bank	  van	  Afrika	  Bpk	  1989	  1	  SA	  208	  (A).	  Also	  see	  Van	  Niekerk	  (1999)	  SA	  Merc	  LJ	  182.	  
231	  This	   test	   is	  most	  commonly	  known	  as	   the	  “reasonable	  man	  test”,	  and	   is	   seen	   in	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  such	  as	  Weber	  v	  
Santam	  Versekeringsmaatskappy	  Bpk	  1983	  1	  SA	  381	  (A)	  410H-­‐411D.	  It	  is	  clearly	  set	  out	  by	  Reinecke	  et	  al	  in	  their	  General	  
Principles	   of	   Insurance	   Law	   136:	   “For	   the	   sake	  of	   clarity,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   test	   for	  materiality	   formulated	   in	  Mutual	  &	  
Federal	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  is	  best	  expressed	  as	  referring	  to	  those	  facts	  which	  are	  objectively	  and	  
reasonably	  related	  to	  a	  decision	  when	  all	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  It	  poses	  the	  question	  not	  
whether	  the	  reasonable	  person	  would	  have	  disclosed	  the	  fact	  in	  question,	  but	  whether	  the	  reasonable	  person	  would	  have	  
considered	  that	  fact	  reasonably	  relevant	  to	  the	  risk	  and	  its	  assessment	  by	  an	  insurer.”	  
232	  Mutual	   &	   Federal	   Insurance	   Co	   Ltd	   v	   Oudtshoorn	   Municipality	   1985	   1	   SA	   419	   (A)	   435G-­‐I;	   Reinecke	   et	   al	   General	  
Principles	  of	   Insurance	  Law	  136.	  On	  the	  test	   for	  whether	  positive	  misrepresentations	  by	  the	   insured	  are	  actionable,	  and	  
especially	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  Qilinqele	   case	  and	  subsequent	   legislative	  reform	  see,	  most	   recently,	  Mahadeo	  v	  Dial	  Direct	  
Insurance	  Ltd	  2008	  4	  SA	  80	  (W)	  para	  [16]	  and	  [17].	  
233	  Pereira	  v	  Marine	  and	  Trade	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  1975	  4	  SA	  745	  (A)	  755G.	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3 3 Fiduciary relationships 
 
Fiduciary relationships are another exception to the general rule in South African law that 
non-disclosure is not automatically actionable.234 A fiduciary relationship can arise in many 
contexts, including trusteeship, agency, partnership and the relationship between companies 
and their directors, amongst others. 235  There is no numerus clausus of fiduciary 
relationships,236 and the duties of parties to such a relationship vary according to their specific 
circumstances.237 A fiduciary is defined as “someone who acts on behalf of and in the 
interests of another person”,238 and the relationship between the fiduciary and the other party 
is distinguished by a high level of trust and confidence.239 In these types of relationships, it is 
the norm that one party is more vulnerable than the other, or has a position of power over the 
other.240 The nature of this relationship is best described as follows: 
 
“Where one man stands to another in a position of confidence involving a duty to 
protect the interests of that other, he is not allowed to make a secret profit at the 
other's expense or place himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty. 
The principle underlies an extensive field of legal relationship. A guardian to his ward, 
a solicitor to his client, an agent to his principal, afford examples of persons occupying 
such a position...Whether a fiduciary relationship is established will depend upon the 
circumstances of each case ...”241 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  GF	  Lubbe	  &	  CM	  Murray	  (eds)	  Farlam	  &	  Hathaway	  Contract:	  Cases,	  Materials,	  Commentary	  3rd	  ed	  (1988)	  330;	  S	  van	  der	  
Merwe,	  LF	  van	  Huyssteen,	  MFB	  Reinecke	  &	  GF	  Lubbe	  (eds)	  Contract:	  General	  Principles	  4th	  ed	  (2012)	  110-­‐111;	  Hutchison	  
&	  Pretorius	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  134.	  It	  is	  pointed	  out	  by	  the	  authors	  that	  this	  category	  of	  exceptions	  overlaps	  with	  those	  
contracts	  traditionally	  classed	  uberrimae	  fidei.	  Also	  see	  RH	  Zulman	  &	  G	  Kairinos	  (eds)	  Norman’s	  Law	  of	  Purchase	  and	  Sale	  
5th	  ed	  (2005)	  84.	  	  
235	  FHI	  Cassiem	  (ed)	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  (2011)	  465.	  
236	  Volvo	  (Southern	  Africa)(Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  Yssel	  2004	  3	  SA	  465	  (SCA)	  477H.	  
237	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  465;	  Phillips	  v	  Fieldstone	  Africa	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  2004	  3	  SA	  465	  (SCA)	  “There	  is	  no	  magic	  
in	  the	  term	   'fiduciary	  duty'.	  The	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  duty	  and	   its	  nature	  and	  extent	  are	  questions	  of	   fact	   to	  be	  adduced	  
from	   a	   thorough	   consideration	   of	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   relationship	   and	   any	   relevant	   circumstances	   which	   affect	   the	  
operation	  of	  that	  relationship.”	  
238	  MS	  Blackman,	  RD	  Jooste	  &	  GK	  Everingham	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Companies	  Act	  vol	  2	  (2002)	  8-­‐12.	  
239 	  Cassiem	   Contemporary	   Company	   Law	   465.	   Millner	   states	   that	   the	   fiduciary	   relationship	   has	   an	   “element	   of	  
dependence”	  MA	  Millner	  “Fraudulent	  non-­‐disclosure”	  (1957)	  74	  SALJ	  177	  188.	  
240	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  465.	  “In	   these	  cases,	   the	  question	   to	  ask	   is	  whether,	  given	  all	   the	  surrounding	  
circumstances,	  one	  party	   could	   reasonably	  have	  expected	   that	   the	  other	  party	  would	  act	   in	   the	   former's	  best	   interests	  
with	   respect	   to	   the	   subject-­‐matter	   at	   issue.	   Discretion,	   influence,	   vulnerability	   and	   trust	   were	   mentioned	   as	   non-­‐
exhaustive	  examples	  of	  evidential	  factors	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  making	  this	  determination.”	  Volvo	  (Southern	  Africa)(Pty)	  Ltd	  
v	  Yssel	  2004	  3	  SA	  465	  (SCA)	  536D-­‐E.	  
241	  Robinson	  v	  Randfontein	  Estates	  Gold	  Mining	  Co	  Ltd	  1921	  AD	  168	  177-­‐178.	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According to Cassiem, there are three elements in a fiduciary relationship.242 First, a fiduciary 
has a discretion or power. Second, the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise such power in a way 
that would affect the beneficiary’s interests, legal or otherwise. Finally, the beneficiary is 
“vulnerable or at the mercy of the fiduciary”.243 
 
These elements clearly indicate that one party is in a stronger position than the other, and as 
such, there are certain duties that arise in order to address this imbalance of power.244 These 
duties are imposed in order to ensure that the fiduciary does not abuse the trust and 
confidence of the relationship.245 The two main duties are that the fiduciary must act in the 
best interests of the beneficiary and the fiduciary must act in good faith. These fiduciary duties 
include a duty to disclose.246  According to the court in Meskin, NO v Anglo-American 
Corporation of SA Ltd,247 a duty to disclose is always recognised when there is a fiduciary 
relationship between the parties.    
 
An example of such a fiduciary relationship would be the relationship between a company 
director and his company.248 A director’s fiduciary duties are derived from common law. In 
common law, the director’s overarching fiduciary duty is to act in good faith.249 This duty has 
been described as the duty “from which all the other fiduciary duties flow”.250 An extension of 
this duty is the rather broad duty to avoid a conflict of interest between the company and the 
director’s own personal interests.251 One means of doing this is to require that the directors 
disclose any potential conflict to the company.252 These duties of disclosure have been 
partially codified into the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and will be discussed at 3 4 3. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  465.	  These	  elements	  are	  also	  identified	  by	  Wilson	  J	  in	  Frame	  v	  Smith	  [1987]	  2	  SCR	  
99	  (SCC)	  136.	  
243	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  465.	  “(T)he	  one	  party	  so	  trusts	  to	  the	  other	  or	  is	  so	  dominated	  by	  the	  other	  that	  
he	  does	  not	  or	  cannot	   independently	  safeguard	  his	   interests.	   It	   is	  an	  elementary	  requirement	  of	  public	  policy	   that	  such	  
trust	  or	  power	  shall	  not	  be	  abused	  and	  that	  such	  dependence	  shall	  be	  protected.”	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  188.	  
244	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	  
245	  Blackman	  et	  al	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Companies	  Act	  8-­‐34.	  
246	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W)	  718C.	  
247	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W).	  
248	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  467.	  
249	  “It	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  rule	  of	  common	  law	  that	  directors	  have	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  exercise	  their	  powers	  in	  good	  faith	  
and	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  company.”	  Da	  Silva	  v	  CH	  Chemicals	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  2008	  6	  SA	  620	  (SCA).	  
250	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  475.	  
251	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  485.	  
252	  Novick	  v	  Comair	  Holdings	  Ltd	  1979	  2	  SA	  116	  (W).	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Other types of fiduciary relationships requiring disclosure are the relationship between an 
attorney and a client,253 relationships of agency,254 partnerships and trustees, all of which 
impose a full duty to disclose on the parties.  
 
The main reason for recognising such a duty has been identified as the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. As explained above, the fiduciary relationship is 
characterised by an element of dependence, whereby one party necessarily depends on the 
other to protect his interests due to the imbalance of power in the relationship. The fact that 
there is always a duty of disclosure in these circumstances indicates that the law recognises 
the need to protect parties where there is such an “involuntary reliance”. This involuntary 
reliance test as proposed by Christie and other writers has become one of the standards used 
to determine the existence of a duty to disclose in situations which do not fall under one of the 
exceptions mentioned in this chapter. The formulation and application of this test will be 
discussed later.255 
 
3 4 The seller’s duty to disclose latent defects  
 
3 4 1  General principles 
 
In contracts of sale, the duty to disclose is relevant in the context of latent defects.256 A defect 
refers to a flaw in the merx that amounts to “an abnormal quality or attribute which destroys or 
substantially impairs the utility or effectiveness of the res vendita, for the purpose for which it 
has been sold or for which it is commonly used.”257 Defects are latent when they are not 
visible or discoverable on an inspection of the res vendita.258 These types of defects are also 
referred to as aedilitian defects,259 and include defects that do not necessarily constitute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  Schneider	  NO	  v	  AA	  2010	  5	  SA	  203	  (WCC).	  
254	  Stainer	  and	  others	  v	  Palmer-­‐Pilgrim	  1982	  4	  SA	  205	  (O).	  
255	  See	  5	  2	  1	  below.	  
256	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  278.	  
257	  Holmdene	  Brickworks	   (Pty)	   Ltd	  v	  Roberts	  Construction	  Co	  Ltd	   1977	  3	  SA	  670	   (A)	  683H.	  Also	   see	   the	  definitions	   in	  DF	  
Mostert,	  DJ	  Joubert	  &	  G	  Viljoen	  Die	  Koopkontrak	  (1972)	  185;	  F	  du	  Bois	  (ed)	  Wille’s	  Principles	  of	  South	  African	  Law	  9th	  ed	  
(2007)	   897;	   GRJ	   Hackwill	   (ed)	  MacKeurtan’s	   Sale	   of	   Goods	   in	   South	   Africa	   5th	   ed	   (1984)	   134;	   JW	  Wessels	   The	   Law	   of	  
Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  2nd	  ed	  (1951)	  para	  4590.	  
258	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	  
259	  Du	  Bois	  Wille’s	  Principles	  897.	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physical defects in the res vendita.260 It is in these situations that an automatic duty of 
disclosure arises on the part of the seller, who is bound to disclose any latent defects to the 
purchaser. Significantly, it does not matter whether he knows about the defect or not.261 This 
duty to disclose includes the seller’s duty to assume responsibility for any defects in the 
merx,262 and extends only to those defects which are present at the time of the sale.263 If such 
disclosure does not take place, the purchaser may avoid the contract, and elect to use one of 
a number of available remedies.264 
 
It is suggested that the basis of this duty to disclose latent defects is that the hidden nature of 
the defects places the prospective buyer “into a position of dependency on the seller’s 
candour…creating the typical relationship from which a duty of disclosure springs...”265 
 
The current position in our law is that “a seller is obliged to disclose all material latent defects 
which unfit or partially unfit the res vendita for the purpose for which it was intended to be 
used.”266 This rule requiring that the seller disclose any latent defect in the res vendita on the 
part of the seller is clearly aimed at protecting the buyer, and it has been stated that this is 
derived from the rule in Roman-Dutch law which said respondeat venditor, as opposed to the 
general rule of caveat emptor applied in contracts of sale.267 It has been suggested that the 
reason for imposing such a duty of disclosure on the seller is that the defect is not 
discoverable by ordinary inspection, which means that the buyer is dependent on the seller’s 
honesty. This dependence creates  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260	  The	  best	   example	  of	   this	   is	   seen	   in	  Glaston	  House	   (Pty)	   Ltd	   v	   Inag	   (Pty)	   Ltd	   1977	  2	   SA	  846	   (A),	  where	   the	  historical	  
monument	  status	  of	  a	  statue	  on	  the	  property	  was	  held	  to	  constitute	  a	  defect.	  	  
261	  Hutchison	  &	  Pretorius	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  134	  (“In	  terms	  of	  the	  aedilitian	  edict,	  (the	  seller)	   is	   liable	  for	  such	  defects	  
even	  if	   ignorant	  of	  their	  existence,	  but	  knowledge	  transforms	  silence	  into	  fraud	  and	  thus	  widens	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  or	  her	  
liability	  –	  at	  any	  rate,	  where	  the	  knowledge	  is	  deliberately	  withheld	  to	  induce	  the	  sale”);	  	  G	  Bradfield	  &	  K	  Lehmann	  (eds)	  
Principles	   of	   the	   Law	  of	   Sale	   and	   Lease	   (2010)	   33	   (“The	   ‘warranty’	   arises	   from	   the	  mere	   fact	   of	   the	   sale	   and	   does	   not	  
depend	   on	   the	   seller’s	   knowledge	   or	   ignorance	   of	   the	   defect.	   The	   seller’s	   state	   of	   mind	   is	   therefore	   relevant	   only	   in	  
respect	  of	  the	  extent,	  not	  the	  existence,	  of	  its	  liability”).	  
262	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  32.	  
263	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  33.	  
264WA	   Hunter	   Introduction	   to	   Roman	   Law	   9th	   ed	   (1955)	   117;	   Du	   Bois	  Wille’s	   Principles	   897.	   The	   appropriate	   remedies	  
available	  to	  the	  buyer	  would	  depend	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  defect,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  particular	  
matter.	  These	  remedies	  will	  be	  discussed	  fully	  below.	  
265	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	  This	  places	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  parties,	  which	  has	  been	  identified	  above	  
as	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose,	  
266	  Crawley	  v	  Frank	  Pepper	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1970	  1	  SA	  29	  (N).	  Also	  see	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189,	  which	  states	  that	  “a	  latent	  defect	  
of	  which	  the	  would-­‐be	  seller	  has	  knowledge	  falls	  into	  the	  class	  of	  information	  disclosure	  of	  which	  is	  always	  obligatory.”	  
267	  Zulman	  &	  Kairinos	  Norman’s	  Law	  of	  Purchase	  and	  Sale	  163.	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“the typical relationship from which a duty of disclosure springs: the recurrent 
expectation of the parties negotiating a sale that such disclosure will be made comes 
to be reflected in a positive duty of disclosure operative in every sale as a rule of law, 
the transgression of which in itself amounts to fraud.”268 
 
This duty of the seller to disclose latent defects in the res vendita is also referred to in some 
texts as the seller’s implied warranty against latent defects.269 The seller is presumed to 
warrant or guarantee that at the time of sale, the res vendita is free from all latent defects.270 
This “implied warranty” against latent defects is based on the principle in our law that 
“everyone selling an article is bound…to supply a good article without defect, unless there are 
circumstances to show that an inferior article was agreed upon.”271  
 
This classification of the seller’s duty to disclose latent defects as an implied warranty has 
been criticised for being misleading.272 This is due to the fact that the remedies awarded for 
non-disclosure of a latent defect, namely the redhibitory actions, were special remedies, 
unlike those that would be claimed for breach of warranty in the normal course of events.273 
Also, other implied warranties arise either “as an inference of fact from the circumstances of 
the particular case; or it may arise as a result of a generalization or rule of law applicable to 
the kind of business carried on by the seller.”274 The seller’s duty to disclose latent defects in 
the res vendita does not arise in either of these ways, and was initially imposed by law in the 
form of the aedilitian edicts.275 For this reason, it must be accepted that the concealment of 
aedilitian defects must be approached differently to other types of warranties.276 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	  “The	  very	  fact	  that	  (the	  defect)	  is	  latent,	  not	  discoverable	  by	  ordinary	  inspection,	  thrusts	  the	  
buyer	  into	  a	  position	  of	  dependency	  on	  the	  seller’s	  candour,	  thereby	  creating	  the	  typical	  relationship	  from	  which	  a	  duty	  of	  
disclosure	  springs.”	  This	  formulation	  appears	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  ‘involuntary	  reliance’	  between	  the	  parties,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
elements	   that	   courts	   look	   for	   when	   determining	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   duty	   to	   disclose.	   The	   potential	   use	   of	   involuntary	  
reliance	  as	  a	  test	  for	  determining	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose	  in	  cases	  other	  than	  the	  recognised	  exceptions	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  final	  
chapter	  of	  this	  work.	  
269	  Zulman	  &	  Kairinos	  Norman’s	  Law	  of	  Purchase	  and	  Sale	  163;	  Hall	  Maasdorp’s	  Institutes	  of	  South	  African	  Law	  117.	  This	  
approach	  is	  criticised	  in	  JC	  De	  Wet	  &	  AH	  van	  Wyk	  Die	  Suid-­‐Afrikaanse	  Kontraktereg	  en	  Handelsreg	  5th	  ed	  (1992)	  235-­‐236,	  
and	  further	  discussed	  in	  Crawley	  v	  Frank	  Pepper	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1970	  1	  SA	  29	  (N)	  36C-­‐D.	  
270	  Hall	  Maasdorp’s	  Institutes	  of	  South	  African	  Law	  117.	  
271	  Zulman	  &	  Kairinos	  Norman’s	  Law	  of	  Purchase	  and	  Sale	  163.	  
272	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  197.	  
273	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  198;	  Evan	  and	  Plows	  v	  Willis	  and	  Company	  1923	  CPD	  496.	  
274	  Hackett	  v	  G	  &	  G	  Radio	  and	  Refrigerator	  Corporation	  1949	  3	  SA	  664	  (AD)	  692.	  
275	  “It	  is	  this	  positive	  edictal	  duty	  imposed	  by	  law	  on	  all	  sellers	  which	  distinguishes	  silence	  in	  respect	  of	  redhibitory	  defects	  
in	  the	  thing	  sold	  from	  silence	  in	  respect	  of	  other	  material	  matters	  as	  to	  which	  the	  law	  imposes	  no	  general	  duty	  to	  speak.”	  
Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  198.	  
276	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  199.	  Millner	  relies	  on	  the	  decisions	  in	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O)	  and	  Van	  
der	  Merwe	  v	  Culhane	  1952	  3	  SA	  42	  (T)	  as	  authority	  for	  this	  statement.	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As previously stated, one of the duties of the seller in modern South African law is a duty to 
disclose and assume responsibility for all latent defects in the object of sale which render the 
object unfit for its intended purpose. 277  It must be noted that this responsibility exists 
irrespective of the seller’s knowledge or ignorance of the defect,278 which is the same position 
as that in Roman law. If the seller breaches this duty of disclosure, and the merx later turns 
out to be defective, then the buyer will have certain remedies at his disposal. 
 
3 4 2 Remedies available to the purchaser when the duty of disclosure is breached 
 
These remedies are the actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti minoris,279 which function 
alternatively to each other. Another possible remedy is a claim for damages, which can be 
instituted separately or alongside one of the aedilitian actions. 
 
The actio redhibitoria allows the purchaser to rescind the contract, and is aimed at restoring 
the parties to the financial positions they occupied prior to contract conclusion.280 The actio 
redhibitoria will only be available where the undisclosed defect is of a material nature, which 
is determined objectively, using the test of the reasonable man.281 The enquiry will be whether 
a reasonable person having knowledge of the defect would have entered into the contract. If 
not, then the defect is material, and the purchaser would be entitled to rescind the contract.282   
In the event that the latent defect is not material, or where the purchaser has decided to keep 
the property despite the presence of a material defect, the purchaser may claim a reduction of 
the purchase price using the actio quanti minoris.283 A defect is not material if it only renders 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277	  This	   rule	   is	   derived	   from	   the	  position	   in	  Roman	   law	  and	  Roman-­‐Dutch	   law,	  most	   importantly	  Voet	   21.1.1.2;	  Grotius	  
3.15.7;	  Van	  Leeuwen	  vol	  2	  145	  and	  has	  been	  discussed	  at	  3	  3	  1.	  The	  judiciary	  have	  accepted	  this	  rule,	  and	  have	  applied	  it	  
in	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  including	  Knight	  v	  Trollip	  1948	  3	  SA	  1009	  (D)	  1012-­‐13;	  Crawley	  v	  Frank	  Pepper	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1970	  1	  SA	  29	  
(N)	  36B-­‐C;	  Wastie	  v	  Security	  Motors	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1972	  2	  SA	  129	  (C);	  Waller	  And	  Another	  v	  Pienaar	  And	  Another	  2004	  6	  SA	  303	  
(C).	  Also	  see	  Zulman	  &	  Kairinos	  Norman’s	  Law	  of	  Purchase	  and	  Sale	  163.	  
278	  PMA	  Hunt	  “General	  principles	  of	  contract”	  (1961)	  ASSAL	  90	  105;	  Hackwill	  MacKeurtan’s	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  138-­‐139.	  “The	  
liability	  which	  is	  imported	  by	  law	  into	  the	  contract	  arises	  from	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  the	  sale.”	  This	  point	  is	  confirmed	  in	  D	  &	  H	  
Piping	  Systems	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  Trans	  Hex	  Group	  Ltd	  And	  Another	  2006	  3	  SA	  593	  (SCA).	  
279	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  35.	  
280	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  35;	  Mostert	  et	  al	  Die	  Koopkontrak	  210;	  AJ	  Kerr	  The	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  
3rd	  ed	  (2004)	  113.	  
281	  Bloemfontein	  Market	  Garage	  (Edms)	  Bpk	  v	  Pieterse	  1991	  2	  SA	  208	  (O).	  
282	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  35.	  
283	  Bradfield	   &	   Lehmann	   Law	   of	   Sale	   and	   Lease	   37;	   Hackwill	   MacKeurtan’s	   Sale	   of	   Goods	   155;	   Mostert	   et	   al	   Die	  
Koopkontrak	  218.	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the res vendita partially unfit for the purpose for which it was bought.284 If successful with this 
remedy, the purchaser will be able to claim the difference between the purchase price and the 
true value of the defective property.285 
 
The purchaser may also be able to claim damages in delict. This would be possible if the 
seller knew or should have known that there was a defect in the res and kept silent in order to 
induce the purchaser to contract. As it is a delictual claim, fault is required. The role of fault 
when claiming delictual damages based on non-disclosure, specifically the possibility of 
grounding such a claim on negligent non-disclosure will be discussed at length in the 
following chapter on residual cases.286 The amount awarded is determined with reference to 
placing the purchaser in the financial position that he would have been in had the seller not 
acted culpably.287 The seller could also potentially be held liable for physical injury suffered by 
the purchaser as a result of the defect if the injury was reasonably foreseeable and the seller 
had a duty to take reasonable care in inspecting the property. 
 
From this discussion it is clear that the seller’s duty to disclose latent defects is very broad in 
scope, although this may be attributed to the fact that the defects are not easily discoverable 
by the buyer, who would then rely on the seller’s disclosure in order to make an informed 
decision. This increased reliance by the buyer on the seller’s candour seems similar to the 
fiduciary relationships, where one party is more than usually dependent on the other’s 
disclosure, and lacks sufficient information to adequately protect their own interests. This 
reliance between the parties is a common thread in the exceptional situations discussed in 
this chapter, and the possibility of using it as a test for a duty of disclosure in other situations 
will be explored later in this discussion together with other possible standards. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  37.	  
285	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  37;	  SA	  Oil	  and	  Fat	  Industries	  Ltd	  v	  Park	  Rynie	  Whaling	  Co	  Ltd	  1916	  AD	  400;	  
Scheepers	  v	  Handley	  1960	  3	  SA	  54	  (A);	  Grosvenor	  Motors	  (Border)	  Ltd	  v	  Visser	  1971	  3	  SA	  213	  (E).	  
286	  See	  especially	  4	  2	  5;	  4	  2	  6	  and	  the	  articles	  by	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189	  and	  AJ	  Kerr	  “Negligent	  non-­‐disclosure:	  the	  duty	  to	  
call	  to	  mind	  and	  disclose”	  (1979)	  96	  SALJ	  17	  19.	  
287	  Bradfield	  &	  Lehmann	  Law	  of	  Sale	  and	  Lease	  39;	  De	  Wet	  &	  Van	  Wyk	  Kontraktereg	  345;	  Glaston	  House	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  Inag	  
(Pty)	  Ltd	  1977	  2	  SA	  846	  (A).	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3 5 Statutory duties of disclosure 
 
Apart from the common law instances discussed above, duties of disclosure can also be 
found in legislation. These statutory duties will be explored here, with the aim of identifying 
principles that the legislature used to determine which circumstances would demand the 
recognition of a duty to disclose. 
 
3 5 1 National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
 
There are a number of mandatory duties of disclosure that the National Credit Act imposes on 
credit providers.288 These duties, which arise in every stage of the contracting process, are 
aimed at protecting consumers and enabling them to make informed decisions when involved 
in credit transactions. For purposes of this work the focus will be on the pre-contractual duties 
to disclose. These duties are contained in Chapter 5 of the Act.  
 
The Act contains a number of measures aimed at creating a more informed consumer. It is 
suggested by Stoop that the provisions regarding disclosure are also intended as an indirect 
means of preventing over-indebtedness in South African consumers.289 
 
Sections 74 to 77 of the Act regulate marketing practices. Section 76(4)(a)-(c) specifically 
regulates the content of credit advertisements. The section reads as follows: 
 
76 (4) An advertisement of the availability of credit, or of goods or services to be 
purchased on credit- 
(a) must comply with this section; 
(b) must contain any statement required by regulation; 
(c) must not- 
(i) advertise a form of credit that is unlawful; 
(ii) be misleading, fraudulent or deceptive; or 
(iii) contain any statement prohibited by regulation; and 
(d) may contain a statement of comparative credit costs to the extent permitted 
by any applicable law or industry code of conduct, but any such statement must- 
(i) show costs for each alternative being compared; 
(ii) show rates of interest and all other costs of credit for each alternative; 
(iii) be set out in the prescribed manner and form; and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288	  JW	  Scholtz	  Guide	  to	  the	  National	  Credit	  Act	  (2008)	  6-­‐16.	  
289	  PN	  Stoop	  “Disclosure	  as	  an	  indirect	  measure	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  over-­‐indebtedness”	  (2008)	  41	  De	  Jure	  352.	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(iv) be accompanied by the prescribed cautions or warnings concerning 
the use of such comparative statements.  
 
This section requires that advertisements “must contain any statement required by 
legislation”, and also creates a prescribed form for certain information to be disclosed to 
consumers. According to Stoop, “it is thus clear that these marketing provisions aim at 
disclosing the total cost, charges and add-ons to credit.” 290  This section also prohibits 
misleading advertising. The extent of this disclosure is an important step towards addressing 
the imbalance of power previously seen between credit providers and consumers, and fits in 
with the aim of empowering the consumer to make more responsible decisions. 291 
Advertisements which omit information regarding actual costs and interest rates may be 
detrimental to the consumer. The omission of this type of information is potentially misleading 
in that the consumer would then contract without being appraised of all the relevant facts, and 
could then find themselves bound to onerous provisions. To avoid this, and to empower the 
consumer, the Act has incorporated section 76 and section 92, which expressly state the type 
of information to be disclosed as well as the form in which such disclosure must take place.  
 
Section 92 of the Act provides for pre-contractual quotations in proposed credit agreements. 
The section reads as follows: 
 
92. Pre-agreement disclosure. – (1) A credit provider must not enter into a small 
credit agreement unless the credit provider has given the consumer a pre-agreement 
statement and quotation in the prescribed form. 
(2) A credit provider must not enter into an intermediate or large credit agreement 
unless the credit provider has given the consumer – 
  (a) a pre-agreement statement –  
   (i) in the form of the proposed agreement; or 
(ii) in another form addressing all matters required in terms of section 93; 
and 
(b) a quotation in the prescribed form, setting out the principal debt, the 
proposed distribution of that amount, the interest rate and other credit costs, the 
total cost of the proposed agreement, and the basis of any costs that may be 
assessed under section 121(3) if the consumer rescinds the contract. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290	  Stoop	  (2008)	  De	  Jure	  352.	  
291	  These	  provisions	  fit	  into	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  consumer	  protection,	  and	  the	  spirit	  of	  promoting	  the	  consumer’s	  interests	  is	  
continued	   in	   the	   Consumer	   Protection	   Act	   68	   of	   2008,	   which	  was	   introduced	   after	   the	   National	   Credit	   Act	   (see	   3	   5	   4	  
below).	   The	   Consumer	   Protection	   Act’s	   duties	   of	   disclosure	   will	   also	   be	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   4,	   which	   deals	   with	   the	  
general	  approach	  to	  duties	  of	  disclosure	  in	  South	  African	  law.	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(3) Subject only to subsection (4), sections 81 and 101(1)(d)(ii), for a period of five 
business days after the date on which a quotation is presented in terms of subsection 
(2)(b) – 
(a) with respect to a small agreement, the credit provider must, at the request of 
the consumer, enter into the contemplated credit agreement at or below the 
interest rate or credit cost quoted, subject only to sections 81 and 101(1)(d)(ii); 
(b) with respect to an intermediate or large agreement, the credit provider must, 
at the request of the consumer, enter into the contemplated credit agreement at 
an interest rate or credit cost that – 
 (i) is at or below the interest rate or credit cost quoted; or 
(ii) is higher than the interest rate or credit cost quoted by a margin no 
greater than the difference between the respective prevailing bank rates 
on the date of the quote, and the date the agreement is made. 
(4) If credit is extended for the purchase of an item with limited availability, the credit 
provider may state that the quotation provided in terms of this section is subject to the 
continued availability of the item during the period contemplated in subsection (3). 
(5) The Minister may prescribe different forms to be used in terms of this section in 
respect of – 
  (a) developmental credit agreements; and 
  (b) other credit agreements. 
(6) A statement that is required by this section to be delivered to a consumer may be 
transmitted to a consumer in a paper form or in a printed electronic form. 
(7) This section does not apply to any offer, proposal, pre-approval statement or similar 
arrangement in terms of which a credit provider merely indicates to a prospective 
consumer a willingness to consider an application to enter into a hypothetical future 
credit agreement generally or up to a specified maximum value. 
 
From this we see that credit providers are bound to supply consumers with pre-agreement 
disclosure statements prior to the conclusion of a credit agreement. The content and format of 
these statements are set out clearly in the quoted section. 
 
According to Stoop, “under the new policy on consumer credit, standardised disclosure of 
information and costs, in contracts and sales and marketing material, is required.”292 This 
section provides for such disclosure to take place in the form of pre-agreement quotations. 
The Act makes such pre-agreement quotations mandatory before entering into any kind of 
credit agreement.293 As is apparent from section 92(1)-(2), the content of the quotation is 
quite extensive, and binds the credit provider for five business days. It has been argued that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292	  Stoop	  (2008)	  De	  Jure	  352.	  This	  suggestion	  is	  supported	  by	  JM	  Otto	  in	  The	  National	  Credit	  Act	  Explained	  2nd	  ed	  (2010)	  44,	  
where	  he	  says	  that	  the	  quotations	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  section	  “are	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  option	  created	  by	  statute	  with	  the	  
prospective	  consumer	  as	  the	  option	  holder.”	  
293	  “A	  credit	  provider	  must	  not	  enter	  into	  a	  small	  credit	  agreement	  unless	  the	  credit	  provider	  has	  given	  the	  consumer	  a	  pre-­‐
agreement	  statement	  and	  quotation	  in	  the	  prescribed	  form.”	  (Own	  emphasis)	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this section essentially creates an option, which the prospective consumer can then choose to 
accept or ignore.294  
 
The disclosure requirements serve to promote openness and equip consumers to make 
informed choices regarding credit agreements.295 Also, the requirement that quotations be 
provided to consumers prior to them entering into credit agreements stimulates competition 
between credit providers, which would result in more fairly priced products being made 
available to the consumers. The aims of the disclosure measures in the National Credit Act 
are thus to empower consumers, and ensure that credit providers do not withhold important 
information in order to gain the “upper hand” in credit relationships. Although the elements of 
materiality and knowledge are not expressly mentioned in this Act’s disclosure provisions, the 
focus is on the information of the reliant party, providing them with all of the relevant facts in 
order to place the parties to a credit agreement on a more equal footing. 
 
3 5 2 Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 
In terms of the Companies Act, the fiduciary duties of company directors296 are “mandatory, 
prescriptive and unalterable, and apply to all companies.”297 As we have seen in 3 3 above, 
these duties have mainly been developed by the judiciary, and are thus changeable in order 
to reflect the times that they operate in. The codification of the fiduciary duties of company 
directors are also not static, and must thus allow for the development of company law in 
future. The phrase “partially codified” has been used to describe the setting down of these 
common law duties in statute. These statutory duties do not constitute a numerus clausus of 
directors’ duties.298  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294	  Stoop	  (2008)	  De	  Jure	  352.	  	  
295	  According	   to	   Otto	   (The	   National	   Credit	   Act	   Explained	   44):	   “(t)he	   quotation	   gives	   the	   consumer	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
consider	  his	  intended	  agreement	  and	  to	  shop	  around	  for	  better	  or	  cheaper	  credit.”	  
296	  The	  common	  law	  fiduciary	  duties	  of	  company	  directors	  was	  briefly	  discussed	  at	  3	  3	  above.	  	  
297	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  461.	  
298	  A	  criticism	  of	  the	  codification	  of	  these	  duties	  is	  that	  “The	  statutory	  statement	  of	  directors’	  conduct	  cannot	  be	  properly	  
understood	  without	  knowledge	  of	  the	  common	  law.	  It	  regrettably	  provides	  arcane	  rather	  than	  clear	  and	  simple	  guidelines	  
that	  are	  easily	  intelligible	  and	  informative	  to	  company	  directors	  and	  other	  users	  of	  company	  law	  (as	  was	  intended).	  More	  
than	  before,	   it	   is	  now	  going	  to	  be	  difficult	   to	  get	   the	   legal	  profession	  to	  agree	  not	  only	  on	  what	   the	  directors’	   fiduciary	  
duties	  are,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  exact	  contours	  of	  these	  duties.”	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  462.	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It has been stated that the overarching fiduciary duty of directors at common law is the duty to 
act in good faith and in the best interests of the company, and all other duties flow from 
this.299 This duty of good faith and promoting the companies’ best interests is codified in the 
Act,300 and forms the basis of the directors’ duty to disclose various types of information to 
different stakeholders in the company. Company directors have a number of duties of 
disclosure determined by statute, all of which are tied to the “core duty of a fiduciary”, which is 
identified as being the duty to avoid a conflict of interest.301 The provisions explored in this 
section set out the situations where company directors are bound to disclose certain 
information prior to contracting in order to avoid the conclusion of contracts which are 
prejudicial to one of the parties.  
 
3 5 2 1  The duty to communicate information to the company 
 
This duty is contained in section 76(2)(b) of the Act, which states that: 
 
      76. (2) A director of a company must— 
 (b) communicate to the board at the earliest practicable opportunity any 
information that comes to the director’s attention, unless the director— 
(i) reasonably believes that the information is— 
(aa) immaterial to the company; or 
(bb) generally available to the public, or known to the other directors; or 
(ii) is bound not to disclose that information by a legal or ethical obligation of 
confidentiality.302 
 
The limitations in s 76(2)(b) are similar to the factors identified in insurance law as being of 
importance in instances where a duty to disclose is recognised, and the elements of 
knowledge and materiality have also been used by the judiciary when dealing with cases of 
non-disclosure that are not considered to be exceptional.303 It is clear that the section only 
imposes a duty to disclose where the information is of a material nature, as immaterial facts 
need not be disclosed. The meaning of the term “material” for purposes of the Act is 
contained in s1, which provides that:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  475;	  Da	  Silva	  v	  CH	  Chemicals	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  2008	  6	  SA	  620	  (SCA)	  627B.	  
300	  s76(3)(a)	  and	  (b).	  
301	  The	   common	   law	   fiduciary	   duties	   of	   company	   directors	   are	   explained	   at	   3	   3	   above,	   and,	   as	   mentioned	   there,	   the	  
Companies	  Act	  partially	  codifies	  these	  duties.	  
302	  Own	  emphasis.	  
303	  3	  2	  2	  above.	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‘‘material’’, when used as an adjective, means significant in the circumstances of a 
particular matter, to a degree that is— 
(a) of consequence in determining the matter; or 
(b) might reasonably affect a person’s judgement or decision-making in the 
matter. 
 
The materiality of facts is thus dependent on the circumstances of the particular case, but it 
can be deduced that the interest in question must not be a trivial one.304 The emphasis placed 
on facts which affect a person’s judgment or decision-making is the basis of this deduction, 
and it could reasonably be argued that only those facts which would influence the directors to 
contract (or to pass up an opportunity to contract) should be disclosed. 
 
3 5 2 2  The disclosure of directors’ personal financial interests 
 
In addition to the disclosure of information which is material to the company and which is 
unknown to stakeholders, company directors are also bound to disclose any interests that 
they might personally have in a contract or proposed contract entered into by the company.305 
This duty is now contained in section 75 of the Act. 
 
75. (5) If a director of a company, other than a company contemplated in subsection 
(2)(b) or (3), has a personal financial interest in respect of a matter to be considered at 
a meeting of the board, or knows that a related person has a personal financial interest 
in the matter, the director— 
(a) must disclose the interest and its general nature before the matter is 
considered at the meeting; 
(b) must disclose to the meeting any material information relating to the matter, 
and known to the director; 
(c) may disclose any observations or pertinent insights relating to the matter if 
requested to do so by the other directors; 
(d) if present at the meeting, must leave the meeting immediately after making 
any disclosure contemplated in paragraph (b) or (c); 
(e) must not take part in the consideration of the matter, except to the extent 
contemplated in paragraphs (b) and (c); 
(f) while absent from the meeting in terms of this subsection— 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304	  This	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  materiality	  in	  insurance	  law,	  which	  states	  that	  material	  facts	  are	  “those	  facts	  
which	  are	  objectively	  and	  reasonably	  related	  to	  a	  decision	  when	  all	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  are	  taken	  into	  account.”	  
(Reinecke	  et	  al	  General	  Principles	  of	  Insurance	  Law	  136);	  see	  3	  2	  2	  above.	  
305	  This	  duty	  was	  contained	  in	  ss	  234	  to	  241	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  61	  of	  1973.	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(i) is to be regarded as being present at the meeting for the purpose of 
determining whether sufficient directors are present to constitute the 
meeting; and 
(ii) is not to be regarded as being present at the meeting for the purpose 
of determining whether a resolution has sufficient support to be adopted; 
and 
(g) must not execute any document on behalf of the company in relation to the 
matter unless specifically requested or directed to do so by the board. 
 
From section 75(5)(a)-(c) we can derive the types of personal information that must be 
disclosed by directors in the event of a potential conflict of interest. First, the director must 
disclose any personal financial interest that he or a related party has in the matter at hand. 
The director must also disclose any material information relating to the matter that he bears 
knowledge of. He may also disclose any other observations or pertinent insights relating to 
the matter. This latter disclosure is entirely discretionary, as evidenced by the use of the word 
‘may’, and is normally only provided upon request. It is stated that section 75(5) becomes 
applicable when a director (or a related person) has a “direct material financial interest in a 
matter to be discussed by the board of directors”.306 Section 75(5) disclosure must obviously 
take place before the company enters into the proposed transaction, as the board will then be 
able to make an informed decision on whether they want to enter into the contract, and on 
what terms they would do so.307  
 
It is also important to note that the directors’ statutory duty is formulated in very general 
terms. It requires that a director disclose the fact that they have an interest, as well as the 
general nature of such interest, but no reference is made to disclosure of the extent thereof. 
This is due to s75(5)(c)’s requirement that any material information relating to the matter be 
disclosed, and not information relating to the interest of the director.308 It is thus uncertain how 
much information directors are expected to provide regarding their interests and it has been 
suggested that:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	   Company	   Law	   517.	   In	   the	   same	   publication	   it	   is	   stated	   that	   “All	   non-­‐pecuniary	   interests	   are	  
excluded	  from	  s75.”	  
307	  This	   was	   the	   rationale	   put	   forward	   in	   the	   UK	   Companies	   Act	   2006,	   section	   182	   of	   which	   contains	   the	   equivalent	  
provision	  to	  our	  s75(5).	  
308	  Own	  emphasis.	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“[p]erhaps the proper approach is that the amount of detail disclosed in each case 
depends in each case on the nature of the contract or matter to be considered at the 
board meeting and the context in which it arises.”309 
 
The wording of the Companies Act, also indicates materiality and knowledge as factors which 
are decisive in establishing liability for non-disclosure, and that the relationship between the 
director and his company is one where the director is bound to negotiate in good faith in order 
to protect the company’s interests. These elements of materiality and knowledge, as well as 
the nature of the relationship are constantly referred to when discussing matters where a duty 
to disclose is always recognised. It is important to note that materiality in this case is 
determined with regard to the circumstances of the matter at hand, and is thus context 
sensitive, unlike the objective determination of materiality in the case of insurance and the 
seller’s liability for latent defects. 
 
3 5 3  Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
 
The unrehabilitated insolvent’s duty of disclosure is contained in statute, and has been 
identified as one of the exceptional circumstances in which non-disclosure will always be 
actionable.310 Provision is made for the insolvent’s disclosure of a number of different types of 
information, found in sections 137(a) and 138(b)-(d) of the Insolvency Act: 
 
137 Obtaining credit during insolvency, offering inducements, etc  
Any person shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding one year-  
(a) if, during the sequestration of his estate, he obtains credit to an amount 
exceeding ten pounds without previously informing the person from whom 
he obtains credit that he is an insolvent, unless he proves that such person 
had knowledge of that fact…311  
 
This extract clearly places a duty on an unrehabilitated insolvent to disclose his insolvent 
status to any protected creditors. It is possible to construe this type of information as material, 
as it would certainly affect the creditors’ judgment and decision to grant credit to the insolvent. 
Also, it is not expressly stated what type of knowledge is required on the part of the creditor. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  Cassiem	  Contemporary	  Company	  Law	  519.	  The	  dictum	  in	  Gray	  v	  New	  Augarita	  Porcupine	  Mines	  Ltd	  (1952)	  3	  DLR	  1	  14	  is	  
cited	  as	  authority	  for	  this	  suggestion.	  
310	  Hutchison	  &	  Pretorius	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  134.	  
311	  Own	  emphasis.	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Did he need to have actual knowledge, or is it sufficient for the insolvent’s status to be 
something that he could reasonably have found out? From the wording of the article, it seems 
that there would have to be actual knowledge, as the insolvent is required to prove the 
creditor’s knowledge of his insolvent status in order to escape liability for non-disclosure 
thereof.  
 
138 Failure to attend meetings of creditors or give certain information 
An insolvent shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding six months- 
(a) ...... 
[Para. (a) deleted by s. 42 of Act 99 of 1965.] 
(b) if he fails, when thereto required in writing by the trustee of his 
estate, to give a true, clear and detailed explanation of his insolvency or fails to 
account correctly and in detail for the excess of his liabilities over his assets; or 
(c) if, at a meeting of the creditors of his estate, when thereto required by the 
trustee or the officer presiding or any creditor or by the agent of any of them, he 
fails to account for or to disclose what has become of any property which was in 
his possession so recently that in the ordinary course he ought to be able to 
account therefor; or 
(d) if he fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (13) of section 
twenty-three. 
 
This section sets out the types of information to be disclosed when the insolvent is specifically 
required to do so. In these cases, he is bound to disclose these matters when required to by 
either the trustees or his creditors. The penalty for staying silent in response to a direct 
question was imprisonment. This section only provides that the listed information be disclosed 
when the insolvent is required to disclose it, which leaves open the possibility that, if he was 
never directly questioned about the information or required to provide it, any non-disclosure 
thereof would not be actionable. 
 
3 5 4  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
 
In addition to the common law writings and jurisprudence on actionable non-disclosure that 
have been discussed above, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 312  are of 
importance when discussing the approach to non-disclosure in South African law. The 
intended scope of this Act is every transaction for the supply and promotion of goods and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  Act”.	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services as well as the goods and services themselves that occurs within South Africa, unless 
such a transaction is exempted by the provisions in section 5 of the Act. A “transaction” is 
defined as an agreement between two or more people for the supply of goods or services for 
consideration.313 A once-off transaction does not fall within the scope of the definition, which 
refers only to transactions in the ordinary course of business. 
 
The introduction of this Act has the potential to alter the general rule against non-disclosure, 
particularly when it comes to contracts of sale, by establishing set standards with which 
vendors’ conduct must comply. Section 3(1)(d) provides that one of the aims of the Act is to 
protect consumers from any unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or otherwise 
improper trade practices, as well as any other deceptive, misleading, unfair and fraudulent 
conduct. This study focuses on the provisions in Part F of the Act, and especially s41, which 
contains the consumer’s right to fair and honest dealing.  
 
3 5 4 1 Section 41 
 
When discussing non-disclosure during the contracting process, s41 of the Act is of particular 
importance. This section contains the consumer’s position regarding fraud, misleading or 
deceptive representations by suppliers. It can be accepted that non-disclosure could under 
certain circumstances amount to a representation. Section 41 reads as follows: 
 
41.   False, misleading or deceptive representations. 
(1)  In relation to the marketing of any goods or services, the supplier must not, by 
words or conduct— 
(a) directly or indirectly express or imply a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation concerning a material fact to a consumer; 
(b) use exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact, or fail to 
disclose a material fact if that failure amounts to a deception; or 
(c) fail to correct an apparent misapprehension on the part of a consumer, 
amounting to a false, misleading or deceptive representation, 
or permit or require any other person to do so on behalf of the supplier. 
 
The italicised parts of s41(1)(b) and (c) are of particular interest. Read together, these 
provisions place clear statutory duties of disclosure on suppliers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313	  s1.	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Section 41 provides a statutory duty to speak that must be adhered to, provided the other 
circumstances are present. The provision of s41(1)(b) contains one of these circumstances, 
mainly that the supplier must not fail to disclose a material fact (own emphasis). The 
qualification of the duty to disclose in this way echoes the judiciary’s requirement that only 
material facts need be disclosed, and there is no duty on the seller to disclose any other 
information not material to the matter. However, we are not told what materiality means in the 
context of the CPA. It may therefore be necessary to have regard to other instruments as well 
as the common law position in order to interpret statutory terms. The common law definition of 
materiality and the definitions found in other legal instruments will be consulted in the 
following chapters, and we will revisit the potential meanings of s41 in light of that discussion.  
 
Section 41 does not expressly indicate what state of mind the non-disclosing party must have. 
In the common law, the judiciary has expressed some support for Millner’s threefold division 
of types of non-disclosure,314 namely active concealment, designed concealment and simple 
non-disclosure. This division may also be instructive in interpreting s41. Active concealment 
involves allowing another party to proceed on an erroneous belief caused by one’s own prior 
action, whereas designed concealment refers to the situation where a party knowingly keeps 
silent about a fact that he knows the other party is ignorant of. Lastly, there is simple non-
disclosure, where a contracting party merely keeps silent without any fraudulent intent.  
 
It appears that s41 can accommodate all three types of non-disclosure. The situation of active 
concealment may be addressed in s41(1)(c), which provides that a supplier, apart from being 
bound to disclose any material facts within their knowledge, has a duty to correct any 
“apparent misapprehension” on the part of the consumer, and that a failure to comply with this 
duty would constitute a false, misleading or deceptive misrepresentation. This section would 
ostensibly have the effect of widening the supplier’s duty to disclose, as it provides that the 
supplier must correct any misapprehension held by the consumer that would amount to a 
deceptive representation, regardless of whether it was the supplier’s individual action that led 
to such misapprehension.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314	  See	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  and	  Another	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	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Section 41(1)(b) states that a supplier must not fail to disclose a material fact if such failure 
would amount to a deception on the part of the consumer. This subsection could 
accommodate both designed and active concealment, where a contracting party keeps silent 
about a material fact in the knowledge that the other party is ignorant thereof. It clearly 
prohibits such concealment in consumer contracts, and the supplier is thus bound by statute 
to disclose material information to the consumer. 
 
There has been debate in South African law as to whether simple non-disclosure should be 
actionable.315 It is also referred to as innocent non-disclosure or mere silence, and concerns 
instances where a contracting party simply keeps silent about certain information, but lacks 
fraudulent intent in doing so. It has been suggested that such non-disclosure should not be 
actionable, as it would not be fair to punish a party for a consequence that they did not intend. 
However, there is uncertainty whether mere silence should be actionable, as, regardless of 
intent, the other contracting party would still have been induced to enter into the contract by a 
misrepresentation, which they would not have done if they had had access to the correct 
information. The question is whether s41 applies to cases of innocent non-disclosure. The 
italicised part of s41(1)(b) above provides that the supplier must not “fail to disclose a material 
fact if that failure amounts to a deception”. The wording of this section, as well as that in 
s41(1)(a) creates a liability for the supplier for any non-disclosure of a material fact if such 
non-disclosure would amount to a misrepresentation. There is no requirement in s41 that the 
supplier must have the intention to mislead the consumer in order for his non-disclosure to be 
actionable. The only requirement created in this section is that the supplier is bound to 
disclose information where the non-disclosure of such information would result in a 
misrepresentation to the consumer. The omission of the requirement of intent in s41 creates 
room for the possibility that suppliers could incur liability for innocent non-disclosure under the 
Act.  
 
In the event that one of these sections is breached, the Act provides a number of remedies for 
the consumer. These remedies are contained in s69, which reads as follows: 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315	  This	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  judgments	  in	  Speight	  v	  Glass	  1961	  1	  SA	  778	  (D)	  and	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	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69  Enforcement of rights by consumer 
 
A person contemplated in section 4 (1) may seek to enforce any right in terms of this 
Act or in terms of a transaction or agreement, or otherwise resolve any dispute with a 
supplier, by- 
(a)   referring the matter directly to the Tribunal, if such a direct referral is 
permitted by this Act in the case of the particular dispute; 
(b)   referring the matter to the applicable ombud with jurisdiction, if the supplier 
is subject to the jurisdiction of any such ombud; 
(c)   if the matter does not concern a supplier contemplated in   
         paragraph (b)- 
(i)   referring the matter to the applicable industry ombud, accredited in 
terms of section 82 (6), if the supplier is subject to any such ombud; or 
(ii)   applying to the consumer court of the province with jurisdiction over 
the matter, if there is such a consumer court, subject to the law 
establishing or governing that consumer court; 
(iii)   referring the matter to another alternative dispute resolution agent 
contemplated in section 70; or 
(iv)   filing a complaint with the Commission in accordance with section 
71; or 
(d)   approaching a court with jurisdiction over the matter, if all other remedies 
available to that person in terms of national legislation have been exhausted. 
 
From this we see that prior to approaching the courts, the consumer must first approach 
certain institutions that could provide alternative protection. This could be because these 
institutions may provide more cost-effective relief, compared to the courts. These legislative 
remedies provided in s69 must be exhausted before the courts can be approached and the 
common law remedies sought.316 
 
Section 52 of the Act specifically outlines the courts’ powers in the event that ss40, 41 and 48 
have been contravened. The section reads as follows: 
 
 Powers of court to ensure fair and just conduct, terms and conditions 
52. (1) If, in any proceedings before a court concerning a transaction or agreement 
between a supplier and consumer, a person alleges that— 
(a) the supplier contravened section 40, 41 or 48; and 
(b) this Act does not otherwise provide a remedy sufficient to correct the 
relevant prohibited conduct, unfairness, injustice or unconscionability, the court, 
after considering the principles, purposes and provisions of this Act, and the 
matters set out in subsection (2), may make an order contemplated in 
subsection (3). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316	  Further	  compare	  T	  Naudé	  “Enforcement	  procedures	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  consumer’s	  right	  to	  fair,	  reasonable	  and	  just	  
contract	  terms	  under	  the	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	  in	  comparative	  perspective”	  2010	  SALJ	  515	  525–528.	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The court is bound to take the provisions of s52(2) into consideration when making an order. 
These provisions include the relationship between the parties and the specific circumstances 
of the matter at hand, as well as the respective bargaining power of the parties. If, after taking 
all of these circumstances into account, the court determines that the transaction or 
agreement was in fact unconscionable or unfair in any way, section 52(3) provides a list of 
possible orders that they could make:  
. 
(3) If the court determines that a transaction or agreement was, in whole or in part, 
unconscionable, unjust, unreasonable or unfair, the court may— 
(a) make a declaration to that effect; and 
(b) make any further order the court considers just and reasonable in the 
circumstances, including, but not limited to, an order— 
(i) to restore money or property to the consumer; 
(ii) to compensate the consumer for losses or expenses relating  
     to— 
(aa) the transaction or agreement; or 
(bb) the proceedings of the court; and 
(iii) requiring the supplier to cease any practice, or alter any practice, 
form or document, as required to avoid a repetition of the supplier’s 
conduct. 
 
It appears that the court still has a discretion to make an award that they consider just and 
reasonable in the circumstances, provided that they give due consideration to the factors 
listed in section 52(2).  
 
3 5 4 2 Non-disclosure and the consumer’s right to fair, just and reasonable terms 
 
Another right contained in the Consumer Protection Act which could find application in the law 
relating to non-disclosure is the consumer’s right to fair, just and reasonable terms and 
conditions. The creation of such a right in legislation assists in achieving one of the aims of 
the Act, which is the protection of consumers against unfair, unjust and otherwise 
unconscionable practices.317 Section 48 reads as follows: 
 
  48. (1) A supplier must not— 
(a) offer to supply, supply, or enter into an agreement to supply, any goods or 
services— 
(i) at a price that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust; or 	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  s3(1)(d).	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(ii) on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust; 
(b) market any goods or services, or negotiate, enter into or administer a 
transaction or an agreement for the supply of any goods or services, in a 
manner that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust; or 
(c) require a consumer, or other person to whom any goods or services are 
supplied at the direction of the consumer— 
(i) to waive any rights; 
(ii) assume any obligation; or 
(iii) waive any liability of the supplier, 
on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or impose any such terms as a 
condition of entering into a transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a transaction or agreement, a term 
or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a notice to which a term or condition is 
purportedly subject, is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if— … 
(c) the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive representation, as 
contemplated in section 41 or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of 
the supplier, to the detriment of the consumer; or 
(d) the transaction or agreement was subject to a term or condition, or a notice 
to a consumer contemplated in section 49 (1), and— 
(i) the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or 
unconscionable; or 
(ii) the fact, nature and effect of that term, condition or notice was not 
drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner that satisfied the 
applicable requirements of section 49. 
 
Of particular interest in the context of non-disclosure is s48(2)(c). This section (italicised 
above) provides that a contractual term is unfair, unreasonable and unjust if a consumer has 
relied to his detriment on a false, misleading or deceptive representation or statement of 
opinion made by a supplier. It has been established in the discussion on s41 above that non-
disclosure could constitute a representation under the requisite circumstances, such as where 
the information in question is material to the contract. From a reading of s48(2)(c), it appears 
that the consumer, in the event that a contract is concluded as a result of a misrepresentation 
by non-disclosure, would also be able to rely on this section as a means of challenging the 
contract. The inclusion of s48 provides the consumer with another ground for relief when 
faced with a contract concluded by misrepresentation. It is unclear why the legislature felt the 
need to include the reference to s41 in s48 at all. Any contravention of this section would also 
give rise to the remedies set out in ss69 and 52 of the Act, as the consumer can use s69 to 
enforce any right contained in the Act, and s52 specifically provides that the court can grant 
relief when ss40, 41 and 48 are contravened. 
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3 6 Conclusion 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, each of the instances discussed is an exception to 
the general rule against recognising duties of disclosure between contracting parties. 
However, after discussing some of these recognised exceptions, “the question is whether, 
outside these special cases, or perhaps incorporating them, a general test can be 
propounded for deciding whether in any particular case silence amounts to a 
misrepresentation.”318 
 
Keeping this question in mind while exploring the exceptions mentioned above, it is apparent 
that many situations contain comparable elements which necessitate the recognition of a duty 
to disclose. Would it be possible, or advisable, to attempt to use these elements with a view to 
formulating a general test for establishing a duty to disclose? In this regard it appears that 
there are certain recurring elements in some of the exceptional cases discussed above. In 
essence, they can be described as materiality, knowledge and the nature of the relationship 
between the parties.  
 
The element of materiality has different meanings in different contexts. In terms of insurance 
law, material facts are described as those facts “which are objectively and reasonably related 
to a decision when all the circumstances of the case are taken into account. It poses the 
question not whether the reasonable person would have disclosed the fact in question, but 
whether the reasonable person would have considered that fact reasonably relevant to the 
risk and its assessment by an insurer.” 319  This objective test for materiality based on 
reasonableness is also applied in the case of the seller’s liability for latent defects.320 The 
statutory definitions of materiality are somewhat different, and it appears that materiality is 
largely reliant on the specific circumstances of any given case. The Companies Act 71 of 
2008 provides a definition of materiality which confirms this,321 and states that the facts must 
be of consequence in determining the matter and have the potential to reasonably affect 
parties’ judgment or decision-making skills.322 Although the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  278.	  
319	  Reinecke	  et	  al	  General	  Principles	  of	  Insurance	  Law	  136	  
320	  Bloemfontein	  Market	  Garage	  (Edms)	  Bpk	  v	  Pieterse	  1991	  2	  SA	  208	  (O).	  
321	  s1	  Companies	  Act	  71	  of	  2008.	  
322	  See	  discussion	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  at	  3	  5	  2	  above.	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2008 expressly provides for non-disclosure of a material fact, no definition of materiality is 
provided, and it has yet to be seen how this will be interpreted in practice.  
 
Knowledge is another factor present in these exceptional cases which could be a useful 
indicator of a duty to disclose in residual cases. In insurance law, the insured party only has a 
duty to disclose those facts which are within his private knowledge and which the insurer has 
no way of knowing.323  This limitation of duties of disclosure to instances where one party has 
private knowledge is also seen in statute, as the Companies Act 71 of 2008 only provides for 
disclosure where the information to be disclosed is not already known to the other directors or 
easily ascertainable.324 
 
In addition to the knowledge and materiality considerations, the nature of the relationship 
between the parties also seems to play a large role when determining the existence of a duty 
to disclose. This is especially seen in the discussion of fiduciary relationships.325 The reason 
for imposing a duty of disclosure between contracting parties in this instance is the imbalance 
of power between them. This imbalance creates a strong dependence by one party on the 
other for the disclosure of information. This dependence is also seen in the instance of the 
seller’s liability for latent defects, where the hidden nature of the flaw creates a reliance on the 
seller’s candour. Legislation is also affected by this relationship of dependence. The 
relationship between a director and his company as well as that between a credit provider or 
supplier and a consumer is of such a nature that one party is always in a weaker position than 
the other, and the provisions of the National Credit Act, Companies Act and Consumer 
Protection Act are all aimed at addressing this imbalance.  
 
The emphasis placed on materiality, knowledge and the nature of the relationship between 
the parties in these specific cases suggests that these features may be an integral part of 
recognising the duty to disclose in any given situation and could thus be of assistance to us 
when approaching instances of non-disclosure which fall outside the recognised exceptions. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323	  See	  3	  2	  2	  above.	  
324	  See	  3	  5	  2	  above.	  
325	  3	  3	  above.	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CHAPTER 4: MISREPRESENTATION BY NON-DISCLOSURE IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW: 
THE RESIDUAL GENERAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
 
4 1 Introduction: the general rule 
 
As established in the preceding chapter,326 the general rule in South African law is that there 
is no inherent duty on a contracting party to disclose any information concerning the 
contractual terms that he has within his exclusive knowledge.327 This is the same point of 
departure in many other modern jurisdictions.328 However, it is also accepted that a non-
disclosure would be actionable “when the circumstances are such that frank disclosure is 
clearly called for – or as it has frequently been said, when there is a duty to disclose.”329 Due 
to the sometimes serious disadvantages caused to contracting parties by a lack of disclosure 
during contracting, the courts have acknowledged the existence of misrepresentation by non-
disclosure as a possible cause of action, and have stipulated that there is indeed a duty to 
speak in certain residual circumstances not covered by the special cases dealt with in the 
previous chapter.330 This has largely been done on a case by case basis, and the problem 
exists that there is currently no unified standard in South African law by which we can identify 
the situations giving rise to such a duty to disclose.  
 
In the conclusions of the preceding chapter it was argued that it may be possible to identify 
elements common to some of the exceptions which would be instructive in determining when 
indicate the need for imposing a duty to disclose should arise in other circumstances. The 
purpose of this chapter is first to examine the development of and current position regarding 
the general rule and the exceptional recognition of a duty to disclose. The focus will primarily 
be on the modern case law. Thereafter, in the light of discussion of these cases, as well as 
the conclusions drawn in the preceding chapter, it will be investigated whether certain general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326	  3	  1	  above.	  
327	  JW	  Wessels	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  2nd	  ed	  (1951)	  329;	  AJ	  Kerr	  The	  Principles	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Contract	  6th	  ed	  
(2002)	  279;	  SW	  Van	  der	  Merwe,	  LF	  Van	  Huyssteen,	  MFB	  Reinecke	  &	  GF	  Lubbe	  Contract:	  General	  Principles	  4th	  ed	  (2012);	  D	  
Hutchison	  &	  CJ	  Pretorius	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  (2009).	  	  
328	  E	  Peel	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  12th	  ed	  (2007)	  424;	  R	  Zimmermann	  &	  S	  Whittaker	   (eds)	  Good	  Faith	   in	  European	  Contract	  
Law	  (2000)	  656;	  J	  Cartwright	  Misrepresentation,	  Mistake	  and	  Non-­‐disclosure	  (2007)	  535.	  
329	  Kerr	  Principles	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Contract	  279;	  Gollach	  &	  Gomperts	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  Universal	  Mills	  &	  Produce	  Co	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  and	  
others	  1978	  1	  SA	  914	  (A).	  
330	  Hoffmann	  v	  Moni’s	  Wineries	  Ltd	  1948	  2	  SA	  163	  (C);	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C);	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  
1955	  2	  SA	  622	   (O);	  Speight	   v	  Glass	  1961	  1	  SA	  778	   (D);	  Pretorius	   v	  Natal	   South	  Sea	   Investment	  Trust	   Ltd	   (under	   judicial	  
management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W);	  McCann	  v	  Goodall	  Group	  Operations	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C).	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standards can be identified which would indicate or determine when a duty to disclose arises 
between the parties. 
 
The uncertain nature of the treatment of non-disclosure as a form of misrepresentation has 
led to a proliferation of case law on the topic,331 with judges providing their own opinions 
regarding the circumstances in which a contracting party has a duty to disclose. In order to 
establish and evaluate the courts’ approach to this issue, the relevant cases will be discussed 
in detail. 
 
4 2 Judicial approach to duties of disclosure  
 
As established in the previous two chapters, the roots of the South African legal position 
regarding non-disclosure can be found in Roman law and Roman-Dutch law. But there has 
also been an English law influence,332 which has been important in the development of the 
South African legal approach to issues of non-disclosure. 
 
It is unclear to what extent the Roman and Roman-Dutch legal position specifically regarding 
non-disclosure was incorporated into South African law. However, there are indications that 
the Cape courts supported the Roman and Roman-Dutch approach to the broader issue of 
fraud,333 and recognised Labeo’s by now familiar definition that it involves “(a)n artifice, 
deception, or machination, employed for the purpose of circumventing, duping or cheating 
another”.334 Cases involving non-disclosure could potentially have been dealt with in the 
scope of this definition. 
 
As Lubbe has indicated, during the 19th century, the court increasingly made use of English 
law principles in order to expand on Labeo’s approach to fraud.335 However, contrary to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331	  See	   inter	  alia,	  Hoffmann	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  Moni’s	  Wineries	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  SA	  163	  (C);	  Knight	  v	  Trollip	  1948	  3	  SA	  1009	  (D);	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  
1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C);	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O);	  Speight	  v	  Glass	  1961	  1	  SA	  778	  (D);	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  
South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W);	  McCann	  v	  Goodall	  Group	  Operations	  (Pty)	  
Ltd	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C).	  	  
332	  This	  is	  especially	  evident	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  South	  African	  law	  of	  insurance,	  and	  the	  classification	  of	  contracts	  
uberrimae	  fidei,	  discussed	  at	  3	  2	  above.	  
333	  Tait	  v	  Wicht	  (1890)	  7	  SC	  158	  166.	  
334	  D	  4.3.1.2	  
335	  G	  Lubbe	  “Voidable	  contracts”	  in	  R	  Zimmermann	  &	  D	  Visser	  (eds)	  Southern	  Cross:	  Civil	  Law	  and	  Common	  Law	  in	  South	  
Africa	   (1996)	  264	  267.	  The	  English	   law	   influence	   is	  described	  as	  follows:	  “Fundamentally,	   relief	  came	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	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position in Cape law,336 and rather confusingly, some Griqualand West judgments appeared 
to be moving towards recognising that rescission could be granted on grounds of negligence, 
or a contracting party’s failure to act in accordance with “acceptable practice”, which is a 
concept derived from English law.337 This confusion about applying the principles of English 
law, the desire to incorporate these principles and the reluctance to abandon the Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law rules already received at the Cape led to uncertainty in South African 
courts regarding the correct treatment of fraud.338 This uncertainty has continued into our 
modern law. 
 
Perhaps because of the difficulty of crystallising these various rules and principles into one 
which could be more generally applied, courts have adopted the general rule that non-
disclosure is not actionable per se339 and exceptional circumstances need to be present in 
order to make it so.340 In addressing this issue, courts have adopted various approaches, and 
have relied strongly on the position in English law in deciding under which circumstances non-
disclosure would be actionable. 341  In keeping with this position, which favours a strict 
approach to cases of non-disclosure, South African courts have traditionally been reluctant to 
hold parties liable for misrepresentation by non-disclosure. A few of the key judgments will 
now be discussed to identify the primary sources relied upon by the courts, and to follow their 
reasoning when faced with residual cases of non-disclosure.342  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instances	   of	   misrepresentation,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   untrue	   statements	   of	   fact	   as	   opposed	   to	   mere	   statements	   of	   opinion,	  
whether	  made	  expressly	  or	  by	  conduct,	  provided	  that	  such	  statements	  emanated	  from	  the	  other	  contracting	  party	  or	  his	  
authorized	  representative.”	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  For	  an	  elaboration	  of	  these	  principles	  see	  Adamanta	  Diamond	  Mining	  Co	  
Ltd	  v	  Wege	  (1883)	  2	  HCG	  172;	  Atlas	  Diamond	  Mining	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Poole	  (1882)	  1	  HCG	  20;	  Commissioners	  of	  the	  Municipality	  of	  
Cape	  Town	  v	  Truter	  (1866)	  1	  Roscoe	  412;	  Tait	  v	  Wicht	  (1890)	  7	  SC	  158.	  
336	  Confirmed	  in	  Tait	  v	  Wicht	  (1890)	  7	  SC	  158.	  See	  further	  the	  discussion	  in	  Lubbe	  “Voidable	  contracts”	  in	  Southern	  Cross	  
268-­‐270,	   where	   it	   is	   mentioned	   that	   this	   decision	   was	   made	   with	   reference	   to	   English	   law,	   with	   the	   court	   especially	  
referring	  to	  the	  decision	  in	  Derry	  v	  Peek	  (1889)	  14	  App	  Cas	  337.	  	  
337	  Atlas	  Diamond	  Mining	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Poole	  (1882)	  1	  HCG	  20	  referred	  to	  English	  cases,	  namely	  Reese	  River	  Silver	  Mining	  Co	  v	  
Smith	  (1869)	  LR	  4	  HL	  64;	  Peeke	  v	  Gurney	  (1873)	  LR	  6	  HL	  377;	  Smith	  v	  Chadwick	  (1882)	  20	  ChD	  27.	  
338	  Lubbe	  “Voidable	  contracts”	  in	  Southern	  Cross	  268-­‐270.	  	  
339	  See	  3	  1.	  
340	  These	  exceptional	  circumstances	  are	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  three	  of	  this	  work.	  
341	  Cases	  often	  referenced	  are	  Curtis	  v	  Chemical	  Cleaning	  and	  Dyeing	  Co	  Ltd	  [1951]	  1	  KB	  805;	  Bell	  v	  Lever	  Bros	  [1932]	  AC	  
161,	  and	  reliance	  is	  often	  placed	  on	  G	  Spencer-­‐Bower	  The	  Law	  Relating	  to	  Actionable	  Non-­‐disclosure	  (1915).	  	  
342	  Judgments	   specifically	   dealing	   with	   the	   exceptions	   to	   the	   general	   rule	   regarding	   non-­‐disclosure	   were	   explored	   in	  
chapter	  three	  above,	  and	  the	  discussion	  here	  will	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  principles	  applied	  in	  the	  exceptional	  cases.	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4 2 1 Stacy v Sims343 
 
The plaintiff rented property from the defendant under a verbal lease agreement. 
Subsequently, the defendant refused to perform and allow the plaintiff to take possession of 
the property due to the plaintiff being ‘non-European’. The defendant then alleged that his 
failure to perform was due to the existence of a condition in the contract that the property 
would only be leased to a European, and that the plaintiff had misled him into thinking that the 
plaintiff’s wife was European in order for them to live in the area. The plaintiff instituted a 
claim for £100 for the expenses incurred by renting other premises, as well as an amount of 
£500 as further damages, should the defendant fail to perform. 
 
It was held that the defendant had failed to prove the alleged condition. When addressing the 
issue of the alleged concealment, the court looked at whether the plaintiff had a duty to 
disclose any information to the defendant. The point of departure was the following statement: 
 
“A contract of lease is not a contract uberrimae fidei, i.e., a contract in which it is the 
duty of a party voluntarily to disclose to the opposite party anything which he knows 
would affect the mind of the other party in entering into the contract. There are certain 
forms of contract, such as insurance, where it is the duty of a person, the owner of a 
property, for instance, in case of fire insurance, to disclose to the other party any fact 
which may affect the risk, but leases do not fall under those contracts, and if one were 
once to lay down that it was the duty of a prospective tenant to acquaint his landlord 
with any fact which might possibly affect the landlord’s mind, it would be difficult to 
know where one was to stop.”344  
 
This judgment recognises the existence of a category of contracts called uberrimae fidei and 
confirms that there would only be a duty to disclose in contracts of this nature.345  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the concept of uberrimae fidei contracts appears to have 
originated in English law,346 in the context of insurance law. It required the “utmost good faith” 
from contracting parties, and if this was not observed, then it would be grounds for avoiding 
the contract.347 This requirement of the utmost good faith was imported into South African law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  1917	  CPD	  533.	  
344	  535.	  	  
345	  535.	  	  
346	  Discussed	  at	  3	  1.	  	  
347	  The	  modern	  English	  law	  application	  of	  uberrimae	  fidei	  is	  discussed	  at	  2	  2	  2	  3	  above.	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through our law of insurance,348 and it was accepted as a valid legal principle. The reference 
to uberrimae fidei in the extract seems to confirm that it was received into South African law, 
and its application was extended to cases other than insurance, albeit not leases.  
 
The court also addressed the issue of the most appropriate remedy to award in this case. 
Although the plaintiff instituted a claim for damages, which is a delictual remedy, the court’s 
approach was to consider the facts at hand and ask whether the contractual terms could still 
be enforced. In this instance, it was still possible to enforce the contract with minimal 
disruption to the parties, so the court made an order for specific performance. With regard to 
the remedy of damages, the reasoning for not awarding it in this case was that it would be 
difficult to quantify an amount that would serve as the equivalent to performance. No mention 
is made of the different requirements necessary to claim each remedy, or the distinction 
between contractual and delictual claims grounded on non-disclosure. The court strictly 
referred to contract law principles and awarded a contract law remedy. 
 
This judgment is rather brief, and does not make much reference to authority, except for the 
few references to English law. No attention is paid to civil law sources. The judgment serves 
to confirm the reception of the uberrimae fidei concept into our law, and is indicative of the 
early courts’ willingness to refer to English law principles. Unfortunately, the judgment does 
not provide much guidance about what contracts other than insurance would indeed be 
uberrimae fidei, or explore underlying tests or standards for imposing duties to disclose.   
 
4 2 2 Lewak v Sanderson349 
 
Lewak v Sanderson is another of the earlier cases addressing non-disclosure, and like Stacy 
v Sims,350 it relies heavily on English law. However, here, English law is used to supplement 
and expand on the civil law principles, and the case provides an interesting illustration of the 
development of the concept of uberrimae fidei contracts.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348	  See	  3	  2	  2	  above.	  
349	  1925	  CPD	  265.	  
350	  1917	  CPD	  533.	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In an earlier action, the defendant sued the plaintiff for damages for adultery which the plaintiff 
had allegedly committed with the defendant’s wife. After denying that he had committed 
adultery, the plaintiff consented to judgment being taken against him, as he was financially 
unable to defend the suit, and was under the impression that he would be imprisoned if he did 
not consent. Judgment was duly granted. Subsequently, the plaintiff claimed an order setting 
it aside on grounds that his consent was obtained by the defendant’s fraudulent concealment 
of the fact that he himself was living in adultery at the time of instituting the action. 
 
The two important issues in this judgment are the relevance of the defendant’s alleged 
adultery and the impact of his non-disclosure thereof. The court accepted that a person suing 
for damages for adultery must approach the court with clean hands, and cannot claim based 
on adultery if he himself is committing adultery at the time of instituting the claim. This being 
accepted, the court went on to consider to what extent the non-disclosure of these facts 
invalidates the plaintiff’s consent and the subsequent judgment, with reference to Roman law 
and English law principles.351 
 
The court first considered the position in Roman law and found that there is authority for 
recognising that fraud can be committed by representation or concealment.352 This authority 
was found in Hunter,353 who in his work on the civil law states that: 
 
“Dolus occurs chiefly in two forms – either the representation as a fact of something 
that the person making the representation does not believe to be a fact (suggestio 
falsi) or the concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact 
(suppressio veri).”354 
 
This statement is in keeping with the Digest’s rules regarding dolus, which have been 
discussed in chapter two.355 However, after referring to Hunter, the court proceeds to make a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351	  269.	  
352	  269.	  “There	  is	  clear	  authority	  that	  under	  the	  Civil	  Law	  fraud	  might	  be	  committed	  not	  only	  by	  the	  expressio	  falsi	  but	  also	  
by	  the	  suppressio	  veri.”	  	  
353	  WA	  Hunter	  A	  Systematic	  and	  Historical	  Exposition	  of	  Roman	  Law	  in	  the	  Order	  of	  a	  Code	  2nd	  ed	  (1880)	  596.	  
354	  Examples	   of	   each	   of	   these	   are	   found	   in	   the	   Digest.	   See	   D.19.1.21.1;	   D.19.1.41;	   D.19.1.1.1;	   D.19.1.4;	   D.19.1.11.5;	  
D.19.2.19.1;	  D.19.1.13,	  all	  of	  which	  address	  concealment	   in	   the	  context	  of	  sale	  contracts.	   In	  each	  of	   these	   instances,	  as	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  two	  above,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  suppressio	  veri,	  and	  in	  each	  instance,	  the	  concealment	  is	  considered	  
to	  be	  fraudulent.	  
355	  Part	  2	  1	  1	  above	  details	  how	  Roman	  law	  recognised	  both	  representation	  and	  concealment	  as	  dolus,	  see	  especially	  the	  
discussion	  of	  the	  Labeonic	  definition	  of	  dolus.	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curious statement, namely that Roman law required the utmost good faith in all cases of 
contracts where the interests of both parties were being promoted.356 This construction was 
unknown to Roman law and Roman-Dutch law, and it is significant that the court used an 
English law source as authority for this statement. As stated above in the discussion of Stacy 
v Sims, the concept of uberrimae fidei appears to have originated in English law, and it seems 
that the Roman law concept of good faith was developed by the English courts in such a way 
that their legal system now recognises the existence of degrees of good faith. 
 
Taking this extract as authority for the Roman law position despite there being no evidence of 
the recognition of degrees of good faith in the Roman legal system, the court turned to 
English law, saying that “similar principles are to be found”.357  This attempt to mesh the civil 
and common law principles despite their obvious disparity is typical of the way in which mixed 
legal systems develop.358 Although it was required that South African courts administer justice 
according to the law already in use, there were many instances where courts chose to 
implement the common law instead, using various means to do so. One of these means was 
declaring the civil law and common law to be similar with respect to a point of law, and then 
electing to use the common law principle to decide the matter.359 This seems to have been 
the approach followed by the court, who, after an investigation of English law textbooks and 
cases, found that the English law was in line with the Roman law,360 recognising that fraud 
could be committed by means of a representation or a non-disclosure.361 However, it was also 
recognised that it is very difficult to determine which facts must be disclosed in any given 
circumstance, and thus it was submitted that each case must be evaluated on its merits in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356	  270.	  IF	  Redfield	  (ed)	  Story’s	  Commentaries	  on	  Equity	  Jurisprudence	  10th	  ed	  (1870)	  para	  211.	  “In	  regard	  to	  extrinsic	  as	  
well	  as	  to	  intrinsic	  circumstances	  Roman	  Law	  seems	  to	  have	  adopted	  a	  very	  liberal	  doctrine,	  carrying	  out	  to	  a	  considerable	  
extent	   the	   clear	   dictates	   of	   sound	  morals.	   It	   requires	   the	   utmost	   good	   faith	   in	   all	   cases	   of	   contracts,	   involving	  mutual	  
interest:	  and	  it	  therefore	  not	  only	  prohibited	  the	  assertion	  of	  any	  falsehood,	  but	  also	  the	  suppression	  of	  any	  facts	  touching	  
the	  subject-­‐matter	  of	  the	  contract,	  of	  which	  the	  other	  party	  was	  ignorant	  and	  which	  he	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  knowing.”	  
357	  270.	   This	   statement	   seems	  nonsensical,	   as	   there	   is	   no	   reference	   to	  degrees	  of	   good	   faith	   in	   the	  Roman	  authorities,	  
whereas	  the	  English	  law	  draws	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  bonae	  fidei	  and	  uberrimae	  fidei.	  
358	  See	  J	  E	  du	  Plessis	  “Comparative	  law	  and	  the	  study	  of	  mixed	  legal	  systems”	  in	  M	  Reimann	  &	  R	  Zimmermann	  (eds)	  The	  
Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  (2006)	  477	  491.	  
359	  Du	  Plessis	  “Mixed	  legal	  systems”	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  491.	  
360	  This	  conclusion	  was	  reached	  despite	  there	  being	  no	  evidence	  that	  Roman	  law	  recognised	  degrees	  of	  good	  faith.	  
361	  The	  court	  relied	  on	  E	  Fry	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Specific	  Performance	  in	  Contracts	  4th	  ed	  (1903)	  705,	  where	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  “In	  
the	  chapter	  on	  Misrepresentation	   it	  has	  been	  seen	   that	   the	  suggestion	  of	  what	   is	   false	   is	  a	  ground	   for	   refusing	  specific	  
performance	  and	  also	   in	   certain	   cases	   for	   rescinding	   contracts:	   the	   same	   results	   flow	   from	   the	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	   a	   fact	  
which	   is	   material,	   and	   which	   it	   is	   the	   duty	   of	   one	   party	   to	   the	   contract	   to	   disclose	   to	   the	   other,	   or	   from	   the	   act	   of	  
suppression	  and	  concealment	  of	  a	   fact	  which	   is	  material,	  and	  which	   the	  other	  party	  would	  have	  come	   to	  know	  but	   for	  
such	  suppression	  or	  concealment.”	  	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   80	  
order to determine whether parties bear a duty to disclose,362 a position which is echoed in 
later judgments. 
 
The court did not elaborate on the remedy sought. The plaintiff instituted a claim for damages, 
but the court focused on the contractual principle of good faith (indeed uberrimae fidei) in 
deciding this matter. There is thus no clear distinction drawn between the two types of claim 
or what is required to be proven for either, similar to the judgment in Stacy v Sims,363 where 
the court’s main concern was which remedy would be able to be effected with the least 
amount of disruption to the parties. The lack of attention paid to the nature of the claim 
instituted appears to be characteristic of the earlier cases, and it is interesting to note how this 
changes in subsequent judgments. 
 
This judgment differs from Stacy v Sims in that reference was made to both civil law and 
common law sources. One aspect that was carried over from previous judgments was the 
idea that parties to contracts uberrimae fidei (including, but not limited to, insurance contracts) 
always had a duty of disclosure towards each other. This concept was confirmed as correct, 
and the court, in linking it to Roman law, took a further step in establishing it as a part of the 
South African law. 
 
4 2 3 Hoffmann v Moni’s Wineries Limited364 
 
This case raised the issue of non-disclosure in the context of an employment contract. The 
plaintiff was employed by the defendant in terms of a verbal contract of employment, and it 
was contended by the plaintiff that his employment was to continue for at least “one year 
certain”.365 However, the defendant’s managing director terminated the plaintiff’s employment 
approximately six months after the contract was entered into. One of the questions before the 
court was whether or not the defendant had been justified in terminating the contract, given 
that the plaintiff had failed to disclose that he was an unrehabilitated insolvent and had been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. It was argued that such non-disclosure was a sufficient 
ground for cancellation of the contract of employment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362	  270.	  
363	  1917	  CPD	  533.	  
364	  1948	  2	  SA	  163	  (C).	  
365	  164.	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The point of departure when discussing this matter was determining whether or not the 
plaintiff was under a duty to disclose his status to a potential employer. Specific reference 
was made to contracts uberrimae fidei, which Searle AJ characterised as contracts where 
“there is a duty to disclose all material facts before an agreement is concluded and non-
disclosure is a ground for termination.”366 Immediately following this statement, it was held 
that a contract of service would not fall into the category of contracts uberrimae fidei, and that 
there was no authority for such an assertion.367 Searle AJ confirmed the approach followed in 
Bell v Lever Bros,368 stating that the English law position would be applicable to South African 
law. 369  It was noted, however, that it would be possible, in certain situations, for the 
circumstances during the pre-contractual phase to create an obligation on parties to disclose 
information,370 but that was not seen to be the case here. 
 
It is evident that the court preferred to focus solely on the English law principles,371 and was 
not prepared to include employment contracts as one of the exceptions to the general rule 
against allowing actions for non-disclosure. Provision was made in this judgment for a duty to 
disclose to be created during pre-contractual negotiations, but this was done in general terms, 
giving no specific guidelines as to how one would identify such situations.372 Despite this 
vague acknowledgment, however, this decision was relied upon in subsequent judgments, 
and provides a good example of the early courts’ reluctance to allow actions based on non-
disclosure in residual cases. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366	  168.	  
367	  The	  court	   relied	  on	   the	  position	   in	  English	   law,	  and	  referred	   to	   the	   judgment	   in	  Bell	   v	   Lever	  Bros.	   Ltd	   [1932]	  AC	  161	  
which	  also	  stated	  that	  a	  contract	  of	  service	  did	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  contracts	  uberrimae	  fidei,	  and	  thus	  no	  duty	  of	  
disclosure	  would	  exist.	  
368	  [1932]	  AC	  161.	  
369	  168.	  
370	  168.	   Searle	   AJ	   once	   again	   relies	   on	   English	   law,	   referencing	   G	   Spencer-­‐Bower	   The	   Law	   Relating	   to	   Actionable	   Non-­‐
disclosure	  120.	  
371	  No	   consideration	   is	   given	   to	   principles	   of	   Roman	   or	   Roman-­‐Dutch	   law,	   and	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   bias	   towards	   applying	  
common	  law	  principles	  relating	  to	  non-­‐disclosure,	  a	  by	  now	  familiar	  approach	  evident	  from	  the	  discussions	  at	  4	  2	  1	  and	  4	  
2	  2	  above.	  
372	  168.	  “In	  any	  event	  however,	  although	  the	  circumstances	  occurring	  before	  or	  during	  the	  negotiation	  of	  a	  contract	  can	  
and	  often	  do	  create	  an	  obligation	  to	  disclose	  such	  facts.”	  Authority	  for	  this	  was	  found	  in	  Spencer-­‐Bower	  Actionable	  Non-­‐
disclosure	  120.	  This	   reliance	  on	  English	   law	  principles	   is	   in	  keeping	  with	  the	  approach	  taken	   in	   the	   judgments	  discussed	  
above.	  However,	  the	  court	   is	  wary	  of	  relying	  too	  strongly	  on	  the	  common	  law	  principles,	  and	  primarily	  uses	  Roman	  and	  
Roman-­‐Dutch	   law	  sources	   in	  this	   judgment.	  This	  shows	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  tendency	  to	  favour	  English	   law	  principles,	  
and	  this	  judgment	  provides	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  the	  interplay	  between	  civil	  and	  common	  law	  principles.	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4 2 4 Dibley v Furter373 
 
Although this case would at first appear to be one of the exceptions explored in chapter 
three,374 it is really one of the residual cases. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the return of 
the purchase price of a farm and other movable property. The plaintiff claimed that the 
agreement of sale was rescinded, and duly tendered return of the merx, but also instituted a 
concurrent claim for damages. The basis for these claims was that after the sale agreement 
was concluded the plaintiff discovered that the farm had previously been used as a 
graveyard. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had concealed this information in order to 
induce him to enter into the contract. The court accepted that the plaintiff had been ignorant of 
this use at the time of purchase.375 
 
The plaintiff contended that the graveyard was a latent defect, and that the defendant had 
fraudulently concealed that fact.  The first ground, latent defect, has already been discussed 
in the previous chapter. The focus in this discussion is thus on the ground of fraud, and 
whether the defendant’s conduct in this instance amounted to a fraudulent concealment. 
 
The plaintiff sought to rely on non-disclosure rather than an active misrepresentation as a 
ground for rescission, and it was questioned whether any action was available to him in this 
case. The court recognised that in certain circumstances, contracting parties deliberately 
suppressed facts for the purpose of inducing a contract.376 In approaching this matter, the 
court took the following as their point of departure: 
 
“It must, however, be remembered that mere non-disclosure of the defect does not 
give rise by itself to the action for fraud. The knowledge of the defect must be withheld 
with the object of inducing the other party to enter into the contract or with the object of 
concealing from the other party facts, the knowledge of which would be calculated to 
induce him to refrain from entering into the contract. That the element of dolus is an 
essential for this form of action need not be stressed.”[own emphasis]377 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C).	  
374	  This	  case	  concerns	  a	  contract	  of	  sale	  and	  the	  seller’s	  duty	  to	  speak.	  However,	  as	  stated	  at	  3	  5,	  the	  seller’s	  duty	  to	  speak	  
only	  extends	  to	  latent	  defects	  in	  the	  merx,	  which	  is	  not	  the	  case	  here.	  
375	  78A.	  
376	  85A-­‐C.	  “On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  it	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  contract	  in	  that	  it	  had	  not	  been	  stipulated	  for	  but	  had	  been	  used	  to	  
induce	  the	  bargain,	  then,	  provided	  that	  the	  other	  necessary	  elements	  were	  present,	  it	  could	  found	  an	  action	  for	  rescission	  
on	  the	  ground	  of	  fraud.”	  See	  further	  Voet	  4.3.4	  and	  Naude	  v	  Harrison	  1925	  CPD	  84.	  	  
377	  88B-­‐D.	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This passage confirms that mere non-disclosure would not be sufficient to ground an action 
for fraud. Additional elements must be present. Here, the court emphasises the elements of 
knowledge and purpose or intent. These requirements merit further exploration.  
 
First, the element of knowledge. Whose knowledge is relevant when determining whether a 
non-disclosure is fraudulent? It is not expressly stated that the party accused of acting 
fraudulently had to have exclusive knowledge of the concealed facts. It may be that the 
innocent party could have been able to obtain the relevant facts by taking further steps. 
However, the court does not consider such a possibility. There is only the suggestion that the 
innocent party would not have entered into the contract if he did have such knowledge. 
 
Secondly, the defendant must have had a particular intent or object. In this regard we must 
ask whether he withheld knowledge for the express purpose of inducing the other party in 
some way to enter into a contract. In this way, the “use” of knowledge, so to speak, can be 
indicative of the existence of fraudulent non-disclosure.  
 
Regarding the element of intent, it is further clear that fraudulent action is required, as Van Zyl 
J states that “the element of dolus is an essential for this form of action.”378 This would mean 
that acting deliberately without the intention to defraud the other contracting party would not 
suffice when seeking to claim based on fraud. Recourse is only available in situations where 
the concealment was fraudulent. It is evident that negligent or innocent non-disclosure is not 
regarded as sufficient grounds for rescission. It would seem that the underlying reason for this 
is that duties to disclose should only be imposed if the defendant had the particularly 
reprehensible state of mind associated with fraud. In this instance, the court found that the 
plaintiff was indeed entitled to rescission of the contract, as there was sufficient evidence to 
show that the defendant knew of the existence of the graveyards, knew that the plaintiff had 
no knowledge of the same and had kept quiet with the object of inducing the plaintiff to enter 
into the contract, which the plaintiff would not have done if disclosure had been made. The 
court in effect found that the defendant had acted fraudulently, which entitled the plaintiff to 
rescind the contract. It must be noted that although we are dealing with a contract of sale, the 
court ruled that the graveyard did not constitute a latent defect and thus the matter would not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378	  88C-­‐D.	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be one of the exceptional circumstances discussed above.379 Instead, this is one of the 
residual cases, and one which the court decided in terms of the law of contract, dismissing 
the claim for damages. 
 
In terms of this judgment, the decisive factor in deciding whether to grant rescission was 
whether the party keeping silent did so fraudulently.380 The element of dolus is highlighted. It 
may be questioned why this should be the main factor in determining whether a party is 
entitled to rescission, and whether there are no other considerations which must be taken into 
account. 
 
4 2 5 Cloete v Smithfield Hotel381 
 
The plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract of sale of immoveable property on which a 
hotel was situated, along with its furnishings, required licenses and goodwill. The plaintiff 
sought damages in the amount of £1,500. The action was based on a number of grounds, 
namely fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, innocent 
misrepresentation, fraudulent non-disclosure, negligent non-disclosure, latent defects and the 
existence of an inherent term in the contract that the premises were fully equipped to run a 
hotel business. The court addressed each of these grounds, but for present purposes the 
focus need only be on the grounds of fraudulent non-disclosure and, to a lesser extent, 
negligent non-disclosure.382 
 
With regard to these two grounds, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was aware of 
problems in the merx at all relevant times. The sewerage system of the hotel was dependent 
on a septic tank situated on municipal property. Although the plaintiff was aware that the use 
of this property was at the municipality’s discretion, he was unaware that shortly prior to the 
sale, the municipality had informed the defendant that the septic tank had to be removed. The 
plaintiff further alleged that it was the defendant’s duty to mention these facts, which he 
fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff. In the alternative, the plaintiff alleged that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379	  3	  4.	  
380	  Own	  emphasis.	  
381	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O).	  
382	  According	  to	  MA	  Millner	   in	  his	  commentary	  on	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	   (“Fraudulent	  Non-­‐disclosure”	  (1957)	  74	  SALJ	  
177),	  the	  first	  three	  grounds	  fell	  away	  because	  the	  court	  found	  that	  no	  positive	  representations	  had	  been	  made.	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defendant’s failure to disclose was negligent. The defendant denied having knowledge of the 
facts and that he had a duty to disclose anything to the plaintiff.  
 
The court chose to interpret the plaintiff’s allegation as a statement that the concealment of 
facts was in itself sufficient to constitute either fraud or negligence, independent of any prior 
representation. 383  In order to investigate the validity of this statement, the court first 
considered the familiar English law source, Spencer-Bower’s Actionable Non-disclosure,384 
which sets out what should be alleged and proven by a party in order for them to institute an 
action for rescission based on non-disclosure. According to Spencer-Bower, It must be 
shown: 
 
“(A) That the party charged was under a duty to the party complaining to disclose to 
him the particular fact of which non-disclosure is alleged; 
(B) That the alleged undisclosed fact was a fact at the material date; 
(C) That the party charged did not disclose to the party complaining the alleged 
undisclosed fact at the time when he was under a duty to do so; 
(D) That the party charged had knowledge of the alleged undisclosed fact at the time 
when it was his duty to disclose it; 
(E) That the party complaining had no such knowledge at the above-mentioned 
material date.”385 
 
The first requirement, that there must be a duty on the accused party to disclose certain 
information, is in keeping with the position in South African law that non-disclosure may be 
actionable if “the circumstances are such that frank disclosure is clearly called for – or as it 
has frequently been said, when there is a duty to disclose.”386 The other interesting part of the 
extract is the reference to knowledge in D and E. The requirement that the accused party 
have knowledge of the relevant facts coupled with the requirement that the innocent party be 
lacking that knowledge is reminiscent of the court’s statement regarding knowledge in Dibley 
v Furter.387  From this list, we see that non-disclosure is not automatically actionable in 
situations where there is a duty to disclose. Some further element is needed, previously 
acknowledged as the presence of fraudulent intent on the part of the party charged. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383	  627G.	  
384	  Spencer-­‐Bower	  Actionable	  Non-­‐disclosure	  150.	  
385	  Spencer-­‐Bower	  Actionable	  Non-­‐disclosure	  149-­‐150.	  
386	  Kerr	  Principles	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Contract	  279.	  
387	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C)	  88B-­‐D.	  Discussed	  at	  4	  2	  4	  above.	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Spencer-Bower’s requirements, it seems that knowledge is an important factor to consider 
when determining the mindset of the party charged. 
 
From the previous case discussions, especially the discussion of Dibley v Furter, the crucial 
question was whether non-disclosure needed to be fraudulent in order to be actionable. The 
court in Dibley v Furter viewed fraud as a decisive factor in determining whether to grant a 
remedy for non-disclosure,388 but in Cloete the ground of negligent non-disclosure was also 
alleged. Would it be possible to award a remedy where the party’s conduct fell short of fraud 
but constituted fault in the form of negligence?389   
 
According to Millner: 
 
“In principle, however, if there are cases where fraudulent non-disclosure is actionable 
under the lex Aquilia, one might argue that negligent non-disclosure would be 
actionable too, for culpa as well as dolus grounds an Aquilian action.”390 
 
However, having acknowledged this, he was careful to state that: 
 
“(A)rguments from principle have their limitations, and so gingerly was this question of 
negligent statements handled by the learned judges of appeal that its fragile alter ego, 
negligent concealment or non-disclosure, must tremble before knocking on the door of 
that august forum.”391 
 
This caveat suggests that the judiciary was not ready to allow claims for rescission based on 
negligent non-disclosure at this stage of the development of the law relating to non-disclosure 
and the court in Cloete did not go into detail regarding negligent non-disclosure as a possible 
ground for rescission. The recognition of the possibility of grounding a claim on negligent non-
disclosure, however, opened the door for its use in later judgments.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C)	  88C-­‐D.	  
389	  Millner’s	  response	  to	  the	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  judgment	  ((1957)	  SALJ	  177)	  begins	  with	  the	  recognition	  that	  “(a)fter	  
a	   lengthy	  hibernation,	   the	  question	  of	   fraudulent	   non-­‐disclosure	   has	   in	   recent	   years	   bestirred	   itself	   vigorously.”	  At	   the	  
time	  when	  Cloete	  was	  decided	  and	  Millner	  wrote	  his	  commentary,	  the	  time	  was	  ripe	  for	  the	  role	  of	  fault	  (especially	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  fraud)	  in	  non-­‐disclosure	  cases	  to	  be	  analysed	  further.	  	  
390	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  177.	  
391	  177-­‐188.	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In their exposition of the relevant legal principles the court relied on both English law and 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law.392 Special attention was paid to the position in the latter 
systems and after consideration the court distinguished between two types of cases where 
non-disclosure is an issue. There is non-disclosure of redhibitory defects (giving rise to the 
aedilitian remedies) and other cases where fraud plays a role. In the first instance, the duty to 
disclose is considered to arise from a tacit warranty and in the second, fraud must be proven 
in order to ground an action for rescission on non-disclosure. On the facts, if the first 
approach is followed, then the court would deem the municipality’s revoking the permission to 
use the land to be a latent defect, meaning that non-disclosure thereof would automatically 
ground an action. If the second approach is followed then it must be proved that the seller had 
the intention to defraud the buyer by keeping silent. After considering the facts, the court 
decided that the requisite intent was present.393 
 
The importance of proving fraud when claiming rescission based on a non-disclosure was 
confirmed in this judgment, but the court did not provide any guidelines regarding the 
determining of fraudulent intent. From the judgment itself it appears to be a subjective test, in 
that the court considers the specific facts at hand in order to determine the defendant’s state 
of mind. Later judgments will be explored to see whether a similar approach is followed. 
 
4 2 6 Flaks v Sarne394  
 
This case illustrates the operation of the rules on non-disclosure in relation to third parties. 
The respondents sold a property to a purchaser who could elect to substitute another buyer in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392	  This	   judgment	   is	   another	   example	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   blending	   that	   characterize	   our	   mixed	   legal	   system,	   as	   also	  
illustrated	  in	  Lewak	  v	  Sanderson.	  The	  result	  of	  considering	  both	  systems	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  was	  rather	  confusing,	  and	  in	  the	  
present	  judgment	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  court	  manages	  to	  keep	  the	  principles	  separate.	  
393	  632G-­‐633A.	  “Na	  my	  mening,	  het	  daar	  hier	  'n	  plig	  op	  verweerder	  berus	  om	  aan	  eiser	  die	  feit	  dat	  die	  vergunning	  deur	  die	  
Stadsraad	  teruggetrek	  is,	  te	  openbaar	  in	  terme	  van	  vereiste	  A.	  van	  Spencer	  Bower,	  hierbo	  aangehaal.	  Eerstens	  beskou	  ek	  
die	  terugtrekking	  as	  'n	  verborge	  gebrek	  waarteen	  verweerder	  die	  eiser	  stilswygend	  gewaarborg	  het.	  Tweedens,	  as	  hierdie	  
beskouing	  nie	  geregverdig	  is	  nie,	  en	  as	  die	  bedoeling	  om	  te	  bedrieg	  ook	  deur	  eiser	  bewys	  moet	  word,	  bestaan	  daar	  hier	  
die	  nodige	  gegewens	  waarvolgens	  die	  afleiding	  gedoen	  kan	  word	  dat	  eiser	  met	  verweerder	  onderhandel	  het	   in	  verband	  
met	   'n	   hotel	  met	   'n	   rioolstelsel	  wat	   in	  werking	  was,	   dat	   verweerder	   ook	   redelikerwys	  moes	   afgelei	   het,	   van	  die	   vorige	  
dreigement	  van	  eiser	  om	  die	  verdere	  onderhandelinge	  te	  be-­‐eindig	  omdat	  meubels	  van	  betreklik	  min	  waarde	  nie	   in	  die	  
voorgestelde	  koop	  ingesluit	  sou	  word	  nie,	  dat	  eiser	  seer	  sekerlik	  nie	  met	  die	  koop	  sou	  aangaan	  nie	  indien	  hy	  verneem	  dat	  
die	   gemelde	   voorreg	   teruggetrek	   is,	   en	   dat	   hierdie	  materiële	   feit	   verswyg	   is	  met	   die	   bedoeling	   om	   te	   verseker	   dat	   die	  
ooreenkoms	  gesluit	   sal	  word.	  Vereistes	  B.	  en	  C.	  hierbo	   is	  hier	  vervul,	   terwyl	  vereiste	  D.	   in	  die	  verweerskrif	  erken	  word.	  
Wat	  vereiste	  E.	  betref,	  is	  die	  bevinding	  alreeds	  gemaak	  op	  'n	  oorwig	  van	  waarskynlikhede	  dat	  eiser	  dit	  hier	  bewys	  het.”	  
3941959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T).	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her place, which she duly did. The new buyer later became aware of certain defects in the 
house, which he alleged were present at the time when the original parties concluded the 
contract of sale. He further alleged that the respondents intentionally kept silent about these 
defects with the object of inducing the original buyer to enter into the contract, and that he 
would not have submitted himself as a substitute buyer if he had known about the defects. 
The appellant instituted a claim for damages based on this non-disclosure, which the 
respondents countered, saying that the absence of a valid contract between them meant that 
there was no causal link between the alleged non-disclosure and the appellant’s loss. 
 
The court accepted that if the appellant alleged and proved that there was a fraudulent 
statement, or indeed a fraudulent non-disclosure, and suffered loss as a result, then he could 
institute an action. In response to the respondents’ contention that there was no causal link 
between their actions and the appellant’s loss, given that a valid contract never came into 
being between them, the court stated that it was sufficient for the appellant to prove that the 
loss followed as a direct result of the fraud, which was alleged here.395  
 
This being established, the court proceeded to consider the legal principles applicable to 
fraud by non-disclosure: 
 
“Fraud by non-disclosure is committed when the person charged was under a duty to 
disclose to another and failed to do so. A duty to disclose must exist in relation to the 
person who alleges he has been defrauded and who seeks to recover his loss suffered 
as the result of fraud. There is no such thing as a general duty to all the world to speak 
the truth or to make disclosure. Such a duty arises in relation to particular people in 
particular circumstances.”396 
 
This statement confirms the general rule discussed in the preceding chapter, namely that 
there must be a duty to disclose between parties in order for non-disclosure to be 
actionable.397 However, the enquiry of whether non-disclosure could give rise to an action for 
damages may be divided into two parts. First, it must be questioned whether or not a duty to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395	  “That	  the	  fraud	  may	  have	  induced	  him	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  contract	  which	  by	  law	  was	  void	  and	  that	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  thereof	  
he	  suffered	  loss	  consequent	  on	  the	  void	  contract,	  he	  may	  be	  able	  to	  show	  that	  he	  was	  by	  the	  fraud	  caused	  loss	  because	  he	  
was	  induced	  to	  alter	  his	  position	  to	  his	  prejudice;	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  allowed	  it	  by	  entering	  into	  an	  unenforceable	  contract	  
but	  one	  which	  directly	  caused	  him	  loss	  may	  well	  be	  immaterial.”	  226A-­‐B.	  
396	  226C-­‐D.	  
397	  Echoed	  in	  4	  2	  5	  above,	  where	  Spencer-­‐Bower’s	  requirements	  for	  actionable	  non-­‐disclosure	  include	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
duty	  to	  disclose.	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   89	  
disclose exists. The court in Flaks v Sarne states that such a duty only arises in relation to 
“particular people in particular circumstances.” This may be a reference to the class of 
contracts previously designated uberrimae fidei,398 but, as we have seen there are also other 
instances in which the court has recognised duties of disclosure. The second part of the 
enquiry is whether the failure to comply with the duty as established is fraudulent. From the 
extract it seems that fraud is a necessary requirement in order to claim relief based on non-
disclosure.   
 
In this case, no allegation was made that the respondent owed the appellant any duty of 
disclosure. However, it was alleged that such a duty was owed to the original buyer, and that 
this duty was breached when the respondent failed to disclose.399 Also, in the contract it was 
anticipated that another party could eventually become the purchaser, and it was argued that 
if this had been done validly, it was possible that the duty to disclose could extend to such a 
person, and consequently a breach of the duty could constitute fraud in relation to the 
substitute. Despite acknowledging this as a possibility, the court decided that this was not the 
case in the present instance, since the appellant never validly substituted the original 
purchaser.400 In the context of this case it appears that this was the correct decision, as the 
court did not rule out the possibility of an ‘informal’ substitute claiming damages based on 
fraudulent non-disclosure: 
 
“Even if the substitution were ‘informal’ in the sense that it was adopted or ratified by all 
parties concerned but did not comply with legal requirements for validity, it is possible 
that such a duty could arise vis-à-vis the new party and that a breach of that duty 
would be a fraud on that party.”401 
 
Another difficulty arose in establishing a cause of action for damages based on non-
disclosure. The court considered an important distinction between suing based on contract 
and suing based on delict found in Trotman v Edwick:402  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398	  Explored	  in	  chapter	  three	  above.	  	  
399	  In	  support	  of	  this	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  “one	  of	  the	  circumstances	  which	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  duty	  to	  speak	  the	  truth	  or	  
make	  disclosure	   is	   that	   negotiations	   are	   taking	   place	  between	  parties	   in	   relation	   to	   such	   a	   contract	   as	  was	   here	  made	  
between	  Zygielbaum	  and	  the	  respondents.”226E-­‐F.	  
400	  226H-­‐227A.	  
401	  226F-­‐G.	  
402	  1951	  1	  SA	  443	  (AD).	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“A litigant who sues on a contract sues to have his bargain or its equivalent in money 
or in money and kind. The litigant who sues on delict sues to recover the loss which he 
has sustained because of the wrongful conduct of another, in other words that the 
amount by which his patrimony has been diminished by such conduct should be 
returned to him.”403 
 
The effects of contractual and delictual remedies differ. While contractual remedies are aimed 
at either enforcing contractual provisions or restoring the status quo, delictual remedies are 
aimed at awarding compensation for loss suffered as a result of someone else’s wrongful 
conduct. In this matter, the summons did not allege any patrimonial loss suffered as a result 
of the non-disclosure. The court dismissed the appeal, and therefore found that the 
respondents were not delictually liable. No mention is made of the role of damage or harm 
when claiming for rescission and the court does not specify whether it would be a 
requirement. 
 
This judgment reflects the importance of drawing a clear distinction between instituting a 
claim based on non-disclosure in contract and in delict. This distinction is especially important 
in determining which requirements must be present in order to claim these forms of relief, and 
will be referred to again in later case discussions.  
 
4 2 7 Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd (under judicial management)404 
 
The question before the court was whether an order for rectification of the respondent’s 
member register was to be granted in terms of section 32 of the Companies Act.405 The 
applicants had requested that their names be removed from the member register of the 
respondent. This request was made on two grounds. The first was that there was no binding 
agreement between the parties that the applicants would take shares. If such an agreement 
was proven to exist, the applicants alternatively alleged that they would be entitled to set it 
aside due to being induced to take shares by a wrongful concealment on the part of the 
respondent of an agreement concluded between the respondent and a third party for the sale 
of company property. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403	  449.	  
404	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W).	  
405	  46	  of	  1926.	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The latter ground of wrongful concealment was considered at length by the court, following 
the applicants’ failure to succeed on the first ground. Assuming that the contract to take 
shares was valid, the applicants contended that they were entitled to rescission as a result of 
the failure of the respondents’ directors to disclose the existence of the contract between the 
respondent and Nova Estates. The court referred to authority which stated that rescission 
would only be possible if it could be established that the contract was induced by the 
misrepresentation of a material fact.406 ‘Misrepresentation’ is defined here as “an assertion 
made by one party to the other of some matter or circumstance relating to the proposed 
contract”.407  A ‘material fact’ is described as a fact which would have the “natural and 
probable effect of influencing the mind of the person to whom it is made”.408 On the strength 
of these definitions, the court established that any non-disclosure of a material fact relating to 
the contract would not constitute a misrepresentation unless the party whose conduct was in 
question had a duty to disclose. The element of knowledge is also important, in that the 
person making a misrepresentation must be aware of the relevant information, which must be 
unknown to the other party. 409  This knowledge factor has been identified in previous 
judgments, and here the dual aspects are expressly stated. On the one hand, we have the 
knowledge of the person who keeps silent, and on the other we have the ignorance of the 
other party, and the representor’s knowledge of their ignorance. The emphasis placed on this 
factor raises the question whether a duty of disclosure would arise in a situation where facts 
were publicly available or where the disadvantaged party could readily have obtained the 
information by exercising his best efforts.  
 
On these grounds, it was stated that the applicants had to prove that there was a material fact 
unknown to them but known to the respondent at the time of contracting. They also had to 
prove that the respondents consequently had a duty to inform them of such a fact, and that, 
had they known of it, the applicants would not have entered into the contract to begin with.410 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406	  Wessels	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  329.	  
407	  415H.	  
408	  416A.	  
409	  416A.	  The	  court	  states	  that	  “[t]he	  person	  whose	  conduct	  is	  in	  question	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  particular	  circumstance	  
which	  was	  unknown	   to	   the	  other	  party.”	  This	  element	  of	  knowledge	  as	  an	   indicator	  of	  a	   contracting	  party’s	   fraudulent	  
intent	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  in	  other	  judgments,	  especially	  in	  the	  discussions	  of	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  and	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  
at	  4	  2	  4	  and	  4	  2	  5	  respectively.	  It	  also	  featured	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  exceptional	  circumstances	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  	  
410	  These	  requirements	  echo	  those	  listed	  in	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel,	  which	  the	  court	  derived	  from	  English	  law	  principles.	  
Although	  the	  court	   in	  the	  present	   judgment	  did	  not	  expressly	  adopt	  that	   list,	   the	  similarities	  between	  the	  requirements	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The court had no difficulty in recognising that the information in question was indeed material 
and that the applicants bore no knowledge of it.  
 
Regarding the existence of a duty to disclose the court considered the position in both 
erstwhile Rhodesian law and the South African common law.  
 
As far as South African law is concerned, the court first recognised the existence of contracts 
uberrimae fidei and acknowledged that in these instances, contracting parties would bear a 
duty to disclose inter se. Vieyra J then refers to the by now familiar example of such a 
relationship the case of a contract of sale where the seller has knowledge of a latent defect in 
the merx.411 In these situations, the seller’s failure to disclose the existence of this defect to 
the buyer would always be actionable, regardless of whether or not dolus was present.412  
 
However, the court also acknowledged that the duty to disclose could arise in circumstances 
other than contracts designated uberrimae fidei.413 This was based on Millner’s statement 
that: 
 
“The same relationship, and therefore the same duty of disclosure, can arise in any 
other negotiations which, in the particular case, are characterised by the involuntary 
reliance of the one party on the other for information material to his decision.”414[own 
emphasis] 
 
As we have seen, this consideration of involuntary reliance between the parties was famously 
identified eight years earlier by Millner in his note on the Cloete case.415 This is an important 
development, which raises the question whether involuntary reliance could in future be 
regarded as one of the indicators, or even the indicator of a duty to disclose in contracts that 
do not fall under the recognised exceptions. This question ties in with the observation made in 
the previous chapter that in the exceptional cases where duties to disclose arise, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
seem	   to	   indicate	   that	   some	   of	   the	   English	   law	   principles	   regarding	   non-­‐disclosure	   can	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   South	   African	  
context.	  	  
411	  418C.	  
412	  The	  seller’s	   liability	  for	   latent	  defects	  finds	  its	  roots	   in	  Roman	  law,	  more	  specifically	   in	  D	  18,	  which	  clearly	  states	  that	  
the	  seller	  is	  always	  liable	  for	  latent	  defects.	  
413	  418A.	  
414	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	  
415	  4	  2	  5	  above.	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	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relationship between the parties is at times of crucial importance. To this question we will 
return when considering subsequent developments below. 
 
On the facts, it had to be determined whether the applicants could rescind the contract on 
these grounds. It is not enough to prove that there was a duty to disclose a material fact 
known to the respondents, and that such duty was breached by the respondents. In order to 
succeed with their claim, the applicants also had to prove that they would not have entered 
into the contract were it not for the respondent’s non-disclosure, meaning that the non-
disclosure must have induced the conclusion of the contract. The court had no evidence that 
this was indeed the case, and needed to find a way to determine the applicants’ mindset. 
Vieyra J relied on judgment in Poole and McLennan v Nourse,416  and used a test of 
reasonableness. In such a matter, the court would have to look at all surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether it would be reasonable to suppose that the buyer would 
not have concluded the contract had he had the requisite information. Applying this test, the 
court found that it was reasonable to suppose that the applicants would not have entered into 
the contract had they been informed by the respondent, and they succeeded in their claim. 
 
From this case discussion we can isolate a number of general principles accepted by the 
court when dealing with cases of non-disclosure. There is a general rule, in this case derived 
from the definition of ‘misrepresentation’, that non-disclosure does not automatically constitute 
a misrepresentation.417 It is confirmed that non-disclosure would only be considered to be a 
misrepresentation if there was a duty to disclose a material fact which had the potential to 
influence the mind of the innocent party. This would be determined with reference to the 
individual circumstances of the case. Crucially, as we have seen, the court identified the 
nature of the relationship between the parties, and more specifically the presence of 
‘involuntary reliance’, as an important factor to consider in this regard.  
 
From earlier cases it appears that courts have also considered fraud to be a requirement 
when seeking rescission, and as seen in the preceding section, fraud is always required when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416	  1918	  AD	  404	  412.	  “It	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  the	  purchaser	  to	  say	  'I	  would	  not	  have	  bought	  it	  had	  I	  known'.	  The	  Court	  must	  
find	  that	  under	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  bought.”	  
417	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  position	  in	  Hoffmann	  v	  Moni’s	  Wineries	  Ltd	  1948	  2	  SA	  163	  (C);	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  1955	  2	  SA	  
622	  (O)	  and	  Speight	  v	  Glass	  1961	  1	  SA	  778	  (D).	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instituting a claim for damages based on non-disclosure. In this instance, interestingly, the 
court makes no mention of fraud as a requirement for rescission, simply saying that: 
 
“A person is entitled to set aside a contract if he can establish that he was induced to 
enter into it by reason of a misrepresentation of a material fact: see Wessels Law of 
Contracts, vol. 1 para. 1020, and authorities there cited. It is immaterial for this purpose 
that the misrepresentation was an innocent one: see Sampson v Union and Rhodesia 
Wholesale Limited (In Liq.), 1929 AD 468 at p. 480.”418 
 
The only requirements for rescission identified here are misrepresentation, materiality of the 
information and the inducement of the plaintiff to contract. In addition, the court expressly 
states that, for purposes of rescission, it is “immaterial” that the misrepresentation was 
innocent. This differs greatly from the position in previous cases, the majority of which listed 
fraud as an essential requirement. The court, in making this statement, opens up the 
possibility for allowing a claim for rescission in cases of innocent non-disclosure. Would this 
be advisable, and was this position echoed in any later judgments? Surely the defendant’s 
state of mind would be relevant when imputing liability? 
 
The only reference to the defendant’s state of mind, however, is that they must be aware of 
the information which was unknown to the other party.419 Awareness does not necessarily 
constitute fraud, as one can have knowledge of something without intending to defraud 
another by keeping silent about it. This judgment shows a shift in the way in which the courts 
had traditionally viewed the role of fault in non-disclosure, and in the investigation of later 
cases we will see whether the idea that fault is not a requirement was adopted. 
 
 4 2 8 Meskin NO v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd420 
 
The previous case discussions reveal that two general remedies are available to a party who 
has been disadvantaged by another’s non-disclosure in the contractual context. On the one 
hand, we have a contractual claim for rescission and, on the other hand, a delictual claim for 
damages. In Meskin, the court distinguishes between these remedies and compares the 
contractual and delictual positions regarding non-disclosure and the concept of good faith. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	  415H.	  
419	  416A.	  
420	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W).	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The requirements for these remedies differ, and this judgment is key in setting out the 
distinction.421 
 
The plaintiff, a liquidator of a company, sued the defendants for damages on the company’s 
behalf. The claim was based on the defendants’ alleged failure to disclose the existence of an 
agreement concluded with a third party. The plaintiff alleged that disclosure of this agreement 
would have deterred the company from entering into the envisioned contract, and that it had 
suffered a loss as a result of the non-disclosure.422 The court held that the plaintiff was 
alleging mere non-disclosure and not so-called ‘active concealment’. Jansen J, in keeping 
with earlier judgments such as Dibley v Furter,423 stated that in order for a non-disclosure to 
ground a claim for damages, there must be a duty to disclose, but the existence of such a 
duty is not sufficient. There are other requirements which must be met, most importantly the 
requirement of dolus.424 As such, mere non-disclosure would not give rise to a claim for 
damages, although the court in Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investments suggested that 
innocent non-disclosure could well be a ground for claiming rescission.425 
 
The issue between the parties was thus whether there was a duty on the defendants to 
disclose the fact that they had entered into a contract with a third party. The court’s point of 
departure was that South African law does not recognise a general duty of disclosure 
between parties negotiating with the aim of concluding a contract.426 It was submitted to the 
court that, despite this rule, there could be a duty of disclosure in negotiations other than 
contracts uberrimae fidei.427 Following this, it was suggested that the court adopt the ‘general 
test’ proposed by Millner, namely using the relationship between the parties as an indicator of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421	  An	  overview	  of	  this	  distinction	  was	  provided	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  at	  4	  2	  6	  above.	  
422	  796C.	  
423	  From	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  judgment	  at	  4	  2	  4	  above	  we	  see	  that	  the	  court	  requires	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  ground	  an	  action	  on	  
non-­‐disclosure,	  there	  be	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose	  between	  parties.	  However,	  non-­‐disclosure	  is	  not	  automatically	  fraudulent,	  even	  
if	  the	  defendant	  had	  knowledge	  of	  the	  facts	  unknown	  to	  the	  plaintiff.	  The	  defendant’s	  silence	  must	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  
fraudulent	   intent,	  which,	  would	  appear	   to	  be	  a	  subjective	  enquiry	  by	   the	  court,	  having	   regard	   to	  all	  of	   the	  surrounding	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  particular	  case.	  This	  latter	  approach	  is	  taken	  by	  the	  court	  in	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel.	  
424	  800F.	  
425	  See	  discussion	  at	  4	  2	  7	  above.	  	  
426	  796H.	   The	   court	   cited	  Hoffmann	   v	  Moni’s	  Wineries	   Ltd	   1948	  2	   SA	  163	   (C)	   and	  Speight	   v	  Glass	  1961	  1	   SA	  778	   (D)	   as	  
authority.	  
427	  797B.	  “He	  (plaintiff’s	  counsel)	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  contracts	  uberrimae	  fidei	  were	  not	  unique	  or	  exclusive	  in	  
entailing	  a	  duty	  of	  disclosure.”	  Also	  see	  Iscor	  Pension	  Fund	  v	  Marine	  and	  Trade	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  1961	  1	  SA	  178	  (T).	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the existence of the duty to disclose.428 The court considered various grounds for recognising 
a duty to disclose, but first had to decide which sphere of law governed this specific situation. 
Given that the plaintiff had instituted a claim for damages, the court approached this matter in 
terms of the law of delict, saying: 
 
“It seems to follow that the cause of action sought to be invoked cannot be contractual 
but must be delictual, viz. that the defendants by intentional unlawful conduct induced 
Titanium to act to its patrimonial loss.”429 
 
The “conduct” in this matter was an omission, and the court stated that a prerequisite for 
imposing liability for an omission was that the parties must have had a duty to act.430 In the 
context of delict, the traditional rule is that there is no liability for omissions, but this is subject 
to certain exceptions.431 However, there is the opinion that a duty to act could exist outside of 
these exceptional cases. Such a duty, it is suggested, would be determined by looking at 
standards of reasonableness, the legal convictions of the community and boni mores.432 It is 
acknowledged that non-disclosure could be an omission giving rise to a claim for damages, 
but only if it is accompanied by the other requirements of the lex Aquilia, such as dolus.433 
From this, it is clear that in the law of delict there can never be liability for innocent non-
disclosure, as fraud (dolus) must always be present. It has previously been questioned 
whether a negligent non-disclosure could also give rise to a delictual claim. The possibility 
was suggested by Millner in his article on fraudulent non-disclosure,434 which was written in 
response to the Cloete v Smithfield Hotel judgment. Although the court in the present matter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428	  797C.	  
429	  798F.	  
430	  799D-­‐E.	   “The	   difficulty	   is	   to	   determine	   whether	   in	   a	   particular	   case	   such	   duty	   existed.	   In	   the	   present	   instance	   the	  
problem	   lies	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   delict,	   but	   it	   also	   exists	   in	   other	   spheres	   such	   as	   that	   of	   criminal	   law	   and	   the	   law	   of	  
contracts.”	  
431	  799E-­‐F.	   These	   exceptions	   include	   prior	   conduct,	   control	   of	   dangerous	   things,	   public	   office,	   statute	   and	   a	   special	  
relationship	   between	   the	   parties.	   This	   latter	   ground	   especially	   plays	   a	   role	   when	   discussing	   liability	   for	   non-­‐disclosure	  
between	  parties	  to	  a	  contract.	  
432	  800A-­‐C.	  The	  court	  refers	  to	  Van	  der	  Merwe	  and	  Olivier,	  who	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  “in	  gevalle	  van	  veroorsaking	  deur	  ‘n	  
late,	  die	  kernvraag	  steeds	   is	  of	  die	  gevolg	  wederregtelik	   is.	  Wederregtelik	   is	  die	  gevolg	  van	   ‘n	  bate	  slegs	   indien	  die	  bate	  
onredelik	  is,	  indien	  daar	  met	  ander	  woorde	  ‘n	  plig	  op	  die	  dader	  gerus	  het	  om	  positief	  op	  te	  tree.”	  This	  is	  described	  as	  the	  
broader	  approach	  to	  determining	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose.	  	  
433	  800D.	  The	  court	  references	  McKerron,	  who	  says	  that	  “mere	  non-­‐concealment	  or	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  a	  fact	  may	  ground	  
an	  action	  of	  deceit	  where	  a	  duty	  of	  disclosure	  exists.	   Such	  a	  duty	  may	  be	   imposed	  by	   statute,	  or	   it	  may	  arise	  out	  of	   a	  
confidential	  or	  fiduciary	  relationship	  between	  the	  parties.”	  
434	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  177.	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does not acknowledge this likelihood,435 it would theoretically be possible to ground a delictual 
claim for non-disclosure on negligent non-disclosure. 
 
Despite finding that the cause of action cannot be contractual, the court nonetheless 
expressed some views on non-disclosure in contract law and the distinction between the 
contractual and delictual treatment of non-disclosure. When discussing non-disclosure in the 
law of contract, the court accepts that all contracts are bonae fidei436 and thus good faith is a 
criterion by which the parties’ conduct during pre-contractual negotiations should be 
judged.437  
 
However, it is acknowledged that bona fides is a vague concept, and it is difficult to know 
exactly what it entails. One of the difficulties regarding bona fides is that it has an ethical 
basis,438 which is problematic in that ethical considerations differ greatly between individuals 
and communities. The court refers to a famous example we encountered earlier, namely 
Cicero’s narrative of the merchant who shipped grain to a famine-ridden country.439 It will be 
recalled that the question arises whether he is bound to disclose his knowledge of other ships 
bringing in the same cargo at a later date, which would lead to his disadvantage as he would 
have to lower his prices. From the discussion in chapter two, we know that keeping silent in 
this situation might be considered morally wrong. But does this necessarily mean that such 
silence would be legally wrong? Despite Cicero’s strong leaning towards considering silence 
to be wrongful in such a case,440 the court in Meskin cautions against taking a strictly moral 
view of things, as ethics often set an ideal which cannot be practically realised.441 This still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435	  The	  court	  specifically	  refers	  to	  dolus	  as	  a	  requirement	  and	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  culpa.	  
436“Where	   a	   contract	   is	   concluded	   the	   law	   expressly	   invokes	   the	   dictates	   of	   good	   faith,	   and	   conduct	   inconsistent	  with	  
those	  dictates	  may	  in	  appropriate	  circumstances	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  fraud.”	  802A-­‐B.	  
437802A	  provides	  that	  good	  faith	  should	  be	  used	  as	  a	  criterion	  both	  in	  interpreting	  a	  contract	  and	  in	  evaluating	  the	  conduct	  
of	  the	  parties	  “in	  respect	  of	  its	  performance	  and	  its	  antecedent	  negotiation.”	  
438	  802D.	  
439This	  example	  is	  explored	  in	  chapter	  two	  above,	  and	  raises	  the	  question	  as	  to	  when	  somebody’s	  silence	  crosses	  the	  line	  
from	  being	  good	  business	  acumen	  to	  being	  a	  wrongful	  concealment.	  
440“The	  fact	  is	  that	  merely	  holding	  one’s	  peace	  about	  a	  thing	  does	  not	  constitute	  concealment,	  but	  concealment	  consists	  in	  
trying	  for	  your	  own	  profit	  to	  keep	  others	  from	  finding	  out	  something	  you	  know,	  when	  it	  is	  for	  their	  own	  interest	  to	  know	  
it.”	  
441803E.	  “Whatever	  ethics	  might	  prescribe,	  rules	  of	   law	  do	  not	  necessarily	  coincide	  with	  it:	  ethics	  often	  set	  an	  ideal	  that	  
cannot	  be	  realised	  in	  view	  of	  the	  practicalities	  with	  which	  the	  law	  is	  faced.”	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leaves open the question as to when unethical behaviour crosses the line to become unlawful 
behaviour.442 
 
It must be questioned what the effect of relying on bona fides as a criterion for judging parties’ 
conduct would be. Although our law requires bona fides, it must be remembered that it is “a 
concept of variable content in the light of changing mores and circumstances”443 and thus it is 
not possible to assign it a set meaning, as the concept evolves over time. Rather, the court 
suggests that the requirement of bona fides finds application through other legal principles.444 
This important suggestion is explored fully in the discussion of the role of bona fides below.445  
 
The court then briefly refers to English and American authorities despite stating that these 
sources are “of doubtful persuasive value in respect of the problems arising in the instant 
case”.446 This is due to the fact that “fraud bears a wider meaning in the law of contract than 
in the law of delict”447 in English and American law, which would make it difficult for someone 
from another legal system to appreciate which sources would be authoritative on the subject 
of circumstances giving rise to a duty of disclosure.448 
 
The court also challenges the assertion that the duty to disclose in this instance could have 
arisen from a fiduciary relationship between the parties. 449  Although these types of 
relationships usually create a duty of disclosure between contracting parties, no such 
relationship was found to exist in this instance.450 Having rejected this argument, and having 
established that the contractual treatment of non-disclosure has no bearing on the present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442	  Millner	   formulates	   this	   problem	   as	   follows	   in	   his	   article	   at	   (1957)	   SALJ	   189,	   where	   he	   states:	   	   “Where	   silence	   is	  
purposeful,	  how	  shall	  we	  in	  law	  draw	  the	  line	  between	  what	  is	  permissible	  and	  what	  is	  fraudulent?	  In	  the	  last	  resort	  it	  is	  
difficult	   to	   see	   how	   such	   conduct	  may	   be	   tested	   save	   in	   the	   light	   of	   what	   would	   ordinarily	   be	   regarded	   as	   legitimate	  
behaviour	  of	  fair	  dealing	  between	  man	  and	  man,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  nature	  and	  full	  circumstances	  of	  the	  transaction.”	  
The	  court	  links	  this	  test	  of	  Millner’s	  to	  the	  delictual	  standard	  of	  “die	  algemene	  regsgevoel	  van	  die	  gemeenskap”,	  as	  both	  
are	  deemed	  to	  rest	  on	  the	  same	  basis,	  namely	  the	  mores	  of	  today.	  
443	  804D.	  
444804E.	  Examples	  are	  the	  involuntary	  reliance	  test	  proposed	  by	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  177-­‐180,	  and	  the	  delictual	  standard	  of	  
the	  legal	  convictions	  of	  the	  community,	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  bona	  fides	  as	  they	  both	  reflect	  the	  “mores	  of	  to-­‐day”.	  
445	  4	  4	  1.	  
446	  804H.	  
447	  804H.	  
448	  For	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  this,	  see	  804H-­‐807B	  of	  the	  present	  judgment.	  
449	  As	  established	  at	  3	  3	  above,	   fiduciary	   relationships	  are	  exceptional	   situations	   in	  which	  a	  duty	  of	  disclosure	   is	  always	  
recognised.	  
450	  807C.	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matter, the court proceeded to consider the delictual principles applicable in cases of non-
disclosure.451 
 
The “broader approach in delict” mentioned earlier in the judgment took the view that a duty to 
disclose could arise based on the “algemene regsgevoel van die gemeenskap” or boni mores. 
The court seemed to favour this approach, saying that it was consistent with the standard of 
the bonus paterfamilias which underlies the actio legis Aquiliae.452 Despite this, the court is 
wary of stating that South African law recognises every duty flowing from boni mores as a 
legal duty.453 Even if we were to go so far as to assume this to be the case, the limits of boni 
mores would still have to be set. The suggestion is also made that perhaps boni mores in the 
context of non-disclosure do not extend beyond the recognition of a duty of disclosure in 
fiduciary relationships, which, as mentioned above, is already one of the exceptions to the 
rule.454 The court appears to be cautious in extending the scope of boni mores further than 
the expectations of parties in a certain type of contractual relationship, saying that  
 
“[i]t seems, however, most unlikely that the standard could be higher than that 
suggested by Millner in respect of ‘designed concealment’ in contrahendo, with the 
practical yardstick of ‘the involuntary dependence of one party upon the other for 
information material to his decision’.”455 
 
It was this yardstick of involuntary dependence that was eventually relied on in this instance 
to decide whether a duty to disclose in fact existed. 456  Having regard to all of the 
circumstances of the case, the court rejected the assertion that such dependence was 
present in this matter.457  
 
It is clear that this judgment emphasises the importance of certain policy considerations in 
determining the existence of duties of disclosure. In the contractual sphere, the principle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451	  “The	  solution	  to	  the	  present	  problem	  must	  be	  sought	  in	  the	  field	  of	  delict	  other	  than	  in	  contrahendo.”	  807B-­‐C.	  
452	  807F.	  
453	  “It	  is,	  however,	  doubtful	  whether	  our	  law	  has	  reached	  the	  stage	  of	  recognizing	  every	  duty	  flowing	  from	  boni	  mores	  as	  a	  
legal	  duty,	  even	  if	   it	  be	  accepted	  that	  the	  bonus	  paterfamilias	   is	   in	  certain	  respects	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  boni	  mores	  of	  his	  
time	  and	  society.”	  807F-­‐G.	  
454	  807H.	  
455	  808A.	  
456	  “In	  view	  of	  what	  has	  been	  said	  above,	  the	  question	  then	  becomes:	  is	  there	  the	  involuntary	  reliance	  of	  one	  party	  upon	  
the	  other	  for	  information	  material	  to	  his	  decision?”	  808F-­‐G.	  
457	  809A.	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bona fides is identified as a possible criterion for judging parties’ conduct throughout the 
contracting process. The issue is how this principle would be defined, as it is variable and can 
thus not be the sole measure of contracting parties’ behaviour. In terms of the law of delict, 
liability for non-disclosure is treated in much the same way as liability for omissions, which 
only arises when there is a duty to act, or in this case speak. The duty is determined with 
regard to standards of reasonableness and the legal convictions of the community, which are 
influenced by boni mores. In addition to this, in order to succeed with a claim for damages 
based on non-disclosure, the non-disclosure must be accompanied by the requisite dolus and 
contain all of the elements of a delict. 
 
An important issue dealt with in this judgment is the relationship between bona fides and boni 
mores. First, the court makes the statement that our law expressly requires bona fides in 
contrahendo, and points out that the content of this concept is variable.458 The court proceeds 
to say that there is a strong resemblance between bona fides and the general delictual test of 
the legal convictions of the community.459 However, Jansen J cautions that even if we 
assume “both to be correct in their relative spheres, and ultimately to rest on the same basis, 
the mores of to-day, it does not follow that those mores prescribe in all cases the same duty 
of disclosure as in contrahendo.”460 From this, it is clear that in the contractual context, there 
would be other considerations which affect whether a duty of disclosure is recognised. The 
court relies on the writings of De Groot461 and Pufendorf,462 which highlight equality as a 
consideration giving rise to a duty of disclosure. De Groot puts it succinctly, saying that “(i)n 
all contracts nature demands an equality, in so much that the aggrieved person has an action 
against the other, for overreaching him.”463 In the law of contract then, a duty to disclose 
would arise in instances where the disclosure of information is required in order for the parties 
to contract on an equal footing. This consideration is not seen to be relevant in cases of delict, 
and is thus another factor to consider in instances where we seek to establish a duty to 
disclose in the contractual context. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458	  804D.	  
459	  804E.	  
460	  804E-­‐F.	  
461	  De	  Groot	  De	  Jure	  Belli	  ac	  Pacis	  2.12.8.	  
462	  Pufendorf	  De	  Jure	  Naturae	  et	  	  Gentium	  5.3.2	  
463	  De	  Groot	  De	  Jure	  Belli	  ac	  Pacis	  2.12.8.	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4 2 9 Orban v Stead 464 
 
An important case addressing the application of the contractual principles surrounding non-
disclosure is Orban v Stead. The applicant claimed rescission of a contract for the sale of land 
based on fraudulent non-disclosure. It was alleged that the applicant had purchased property 
from the respondent, who failed to inform him that a portion of the property did not belong to 
the respondent. The applicant contended that he would never have purchased the property 
had he known that the whole enclosure did not belong to the respondent, and thus the 
respondent bore a duty to disclose the true boundary line and to prevent the possibility of the 
creation of any misunderstanding on the part of the applicant. The respondent argued that no 
such duty rested on him. 
 
As stated, the cause of action was fraudulent non-disclosure. With regard to the terms of the 
agreement (the property was sold voetstoots), it was accepted that the applicant would have 
to prove fraud in order to rescind the contract.465  
 
In order to do so, the court first had to establish what would constitute fraud in this instance: 
 
“Fraud in relation to a contract consists of a precontractual representation of a false 
fact. This representation must be made with knowledge that it is false and with the 
intention that it be acted on. The representation must be material, which means that it 
is likely to induce a reasonable man to act on it. This representation must be one of the 
causes of the representee concluding the contract. The representee must, of course, 
be ignorant of the falsity of the representation. The representation can be express or 
by conduct. Silence can also amount to a representation. A fraudulent non-disclosure 
takes place when a person is under a duty to disclose to another and fails to do so.”466 
 
Here we find a concise list of what must be proven in order for a representation to be 
fraudulent. The court expressly states that, in the context of contract, a precontractual 
representation of a false fact may constitute fraud. Such representation appears to be a key, 
minimum requirement, and the rest of the requirements all relate to the representation. Once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	  
465	  King	  AJ	  referred	  to	  the	  decision	  in	  Wells	  v	  South	  African	  Aluminite	  Co	  1927	  AD	  69,	  which	  stated	  that	  “[o]n	  grounds	  of	  
public	  policy	  the	  law	  will	  not	  recognise	  an	  undertaking	  by	  which	  one	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  binds	  himself	  to	  condone	  
and	   submit	   to	   the	   fraudulent	   conduct	   of	   the	   other.	   The	   courts	  will	   not	   lend	   themselves	   to	   the	   enforcement	   of	   such	   a	  
stipulation;	  for	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  to	  protect	  and	  encourage	  fraud.”	  
466	  717E-­‐G.	  Own	  emphasis.	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again, the issue of knowledge is raised. The representor must have knowledge of the false 
fact and the representee must be ignorant of it. But knowledge is not enough; there must also 
be the intention that the representation must be acted upon. This is the same requirement 
highlighted in Dibley v Furter467 and Cloete v Smithfield Hotel,468 and is a recurring element 
considered by the court in determining whether to grant rescission based on non-disclosure. 
 
The above extract further requires that the representation (in this case the non-disclosure) 
itself must be material, in that it would induce a reasonable man to act. From this, we see that 
even if one party was influenced to contract by another’s silence, he would still not be able to 
claim relief unless the non-disclosure would have induced a reasonable person to contract. 
Materiality in this context is linked to causation, as the representation is only material if it in 
fact induced a party to contract.  
 
The materiality of the representation itself is a separate enquiry to the materiality of the 
undisclosed facts. However, the type of information concealed is also a relevant concern, as 
silence on inconsequential details would not affect the “innocent” party in any way. The 
knowledge held by the accused party must be of material information, which has previously 
been defined as information which would have the “natural and probable effect of influencing 
the mind of the person to whom it is made”.469 Although the court discusses fraudulent 
representations in this passage, provision is also made for misrepresentation in the form of 
silence, and it is accepted that fraudulent non-disclosure could be a cause of action. This 
being established, it must be asked what would constitute such fraudulent non-disclosure, 
and is there any possibility of grounding an action for rescission on a non-disclosure which is 
not fraudulent? 
 
In addressing these questions, King AJ identified three possible types of non-disclosure,470 
namely active concealment, simple non-disclosure and designed concealment. 471  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  at	  88B-­‐D;	  also	  see	  4	  2	  4	  above.	  
468	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O);	  see	  4	  2	  5	  above.	  	  
469	  Pretorius	  and	  Another	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  416A.	  
470	  In	  each	   instance	  of	  non-­‐disclosure,	   it	  must	  be	  asked	  what	   remedy	   is	  being	  sought,	  as	  simply	   referring	   to	  “actionable	  
non-­‐disclosure”	   can	   create	   confusion	   as	   to	   the	   requirements	   to	   be	   complied	  with	   for	   the	   different	   types	   of	   remedies,	  
either	  contractual	  or	  delictual.	  	  
471717-­‐718.	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distinction is based on Millner’s classification of different types of non-disclosure.472  By 
exploring each of these types we can identify aspects which would possibly lead to the 
recognition of a duty to disclose in each instance. 
 
Active concealment is described as “…allowing the other party to proceed on an erroneous 
belief to which one’s own acts have contributed.”473 It must be acknowledged that in this type 
of non-disclosure we are not dealing with true silence. Rather, we are dealing with a situation 
in which a contracting party’s prior conduct creates a false impression in the mind of the other 
party, which the first contracting party omits to correct. It is argued that active concealment 
amounts to positive misrepresentation, and not non-disclosure, given that there has been a 
prior positive act by the guilty party.474 It has been stated that this type of silence is always 
actionable, as the fraudulent nature of the concealment is apparent.475 
 
There is also simple non-disclosure, which refers to mere silence unaccompanied by any 
intent to deceive another party. This category of non-disclosure is the most problematic, as it 
leads us to question whether action could be taken against somebody who merely kept silent, 
and was lacking the fraudulent intent that characterises cases of active concealment and 
designed concealment. In order to answer this question, the definition of fraud must be 
consulted. As indicated in the previous chapter, the Roman law definition of fraud set out by 
Labeo476 made provision for “…any craft, deceit or contrivance employed with a view to 
circumvent, deceive, ensnare other persons.”477 According to Millner, this definition requires 
that there be deceitfulness on the part of the person who keeps silent in order for their silence 
to be fraudulent.478 In the case of simple non-disclosure, however, the silent party’s silence is 
inadvertent, and it would be unfair to take action against such a person in the same way one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472(1957)	  SALJ	  177-­‐180.	  It	  appears	  that	  Millner	  developed	  this	  distinction	  based	  on	  case	  law	  and	  academic	  writings.	  
473	  F	  Pollock	  Principles	  of	  Contract	  13th	  ed	  (1950)	  451.	  
474	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  180.	  
475	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  180.	  Also	  see	  Trotman	  v	  Edwick	  1951	  1	  SA	  443	  (A);	  JB	  Moyle	  Contract	  of	  Sale	  in	  the	  Civil	  Law	  (1892)	  
59.	  This	  situation	  is	  listed	  as	  an	  exception	  in	  Hutchison	  &	  Pretorius	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  134	  and	  is	  discussed	  as	  such	  
in	  chapter	  3	  above.	  
476	  See	  2	  1	  above	  for	  a	  more	  complete	  discussion.	  
477	  D.4.3.1.2.	  
478	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  194.	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would if he had acted intentionally. From the preceding case discussions, it appears that 
courts are hesitant to impose liability in instances of simple non-disclosure.479  
 
Despite identifying dolus as a necessary element, and acknowledging that simple non-
disclosure “could not rightly be described as fraudulent, lacking as it does the stamp of 
chicanery and deceit”,480 Millner argues that, in such instances, perhaps dolus could be 
inferred if there was knowledge on the part of the seller.481 In making this argument he refers 
to other judgments, and states that there appears to be a “judicial conflict on the issue.”482 
However, Millner supports the distinction drawn in Cloete v Smithfield Hotel483 between non-
disclosure of latent defects and residual cases involving non-disclosure.484 The court was of 
the opinion that it was only in the first class of cases that mere silence on the part of the seller 
would amount to fraud.485 Millner explains this argument as follows: 
 
“The seller who in the face of this duty remains silent may be regarded as declaring not 
that there are no defects, but that he knows of no defects. If he does know of a defect 
at the time of the sale he cannot be heard to say that he was unaware of the positive 
duty of disclosure imposed upon him by the edict and his silence takes on the colour of 
a fraudulent misrepresentation.”486 
 
The seller’s knowledge in this instance is the basis for presuming dolus, and in such cases, it 
is argued, there should be liability for simple non-disclosure.487 
 
Finally there is designed concealment. In such a case it must be established that a 
contracting party purposely kept information from the other party with the intention of inducing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479	  718D-­‐F.	  This	  is	  expressly	  stated	  in	  Dibley	  v	  Furter,	  where	  the	  court	  at	  88B	  says	  that	  “It	  must,	  however,	  be	  remembered	  
that	  mere	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  the	  defect	  does	  not	  give	  rise	  by	  itself	  to	  the	  action	  for	  fraud.”	  See	  further	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  
Hotel	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O)	  and	  its	  discussion	  at	  4	  2	  4	  above.	  
480	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  194.	  
481	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  195.	  Here,	  Millner	  relies	  on	  Curlewis	  J’s	  statement	  in	  Erasmus	  v	  Russell’s	  Executor	  1904	  T.S.	  365	  at	  
376.	  	  
482	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  196.	  
483	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O).	  
484	  “It	  is	  respectfully	  submitted	  that	  the	  distinction	  made	  in	  Cloete’s	  case	  is	  a	  perfectly	  valid	  one	  and	  that	  it	  may	  be	  justified	  
in	  another	  way.	  For	  even	  though	  the	  seller	  is	  not	  deemed	  to	  say	  ‘I	  warrant	  that	  the	  merx	  has	  no	  latent	  defect’,	  yet	  he	  is	  
bound	   to	   disclose	   all	   latent	   defects	   (morbus	   et	   vitia)	   known	   to	   him.	   This	   was	   enjoined	   by	   the	   edict	   on	   all	   sellers	   in	  
imperative	   terms.	   It	   is	   this	   positive	   edictal	   duty	   imposed	   by	   law	   on	   all	   sellers	  which	   distinguishes	   silence	   in	   respect	   of	  
redhibitory	  defects	   in	   the	   thing	   sold	   from	   silence	   in	   respect	   of	   other	  material	  matters	   as	   to	  which	   the	   law	   imposes	  no	  
general	  duty	  to	  speak.”	  (Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  198)	  
485	  632.	  
486	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  199.	  
487	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  200.	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him or her to enter into the contract.488 Designed concealment differs from active concealment 
in that there is no positive action, and there is true silence on the part of the guilty contracting 
party. The difficulty arises in discerning which circumstances of designed concealment would 
amount to fraud.    
 
The court in this matter was of the opinion that, in cases of designed concealment, a duty to 
disclose would arise from the surrounding circumstances of a case.489 In this regard the court 
expressly states that a duty to disclose “also arises where, because of the facts of any case, 
there is an involuntary reliance of the one party on the other for material information.”490  
 
King AJ supports the idea that the relationship between contracting parties can be consulted 
in order to determine whether a duty to disclose arises in any given circumstance, using a 
fiduciary relationship as an example of one that always gives rise to a duty to disclose.491 It 
has been suggested that it is the element of dependence in these relationships that gives rise 
to the duty of disclosure between the parties, as one is necessarily dependenton the other to 
provide him with certain information.492 This dependence of one party on the candour of the 
other can also be described as an involuntary reliance, as the former has no choice but to rely 
on the latter for information.493 In order to prove that there was an involuntary reliance, 
however, it would have to be established that the party relying on another for information had 
no other means of acquiring such information.494 Only then would the other party have a duty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488	  718B-­‐C;	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  180.	  
489	  718B.	  
490	  718C.	  This	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  188:	  “The	  key	  to	  this	  question	  must	  lie	  in	  the	  precise	  relationship	  
between	  the	  parties,	   i.e.	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  relationship	   is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  ordinary	  contemplation	  of	  the	  parties	   is	  or	  
ought	  to	  be	  that	  A	  will	  disclose	  to	  B	  material	  facts	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  which	  he	  knows	  B	  to	  be	  ignorant.”	  
491	  718C.	  This	  exception	   is	  also	  discussed	  at	  3	  3	  above,	  and	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  parties	  has	  been	  raised	   in	   the	  
cases	  of	  Pretorius	  and	  Another	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  and	  
Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W).	  	  
492	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	  
493	  Millner	  looks	  at	  the	  types	  of	  cases	  which	  always	  create	  a	  duty	  of	  disclosure,	  and	  identifies	  contracts	  uberrimae	  fidei	  and	  
fiduciary	  relationships	  as	  examples	  of	  such	  cases.	  He	  suggests	  that	  the	  common	  element	  in	  such	  cases	  is	  the	  element	  of	  
dependence,	  and	  states	  that	  it	  is	  “characteristic	  of	  negotiations	  of	  this	  type	  that	  many	  material	  facts	  are	  accessible	  to	  (one	  
party)	  alone	  so	  that	  the	  other	  party	  is	  obliged	  to	  depend	  on	  him,	  i.e.	  to	  trust	  him	  to	  disclose	  them.	  In	  short,	  a	  relationship	  
of	   involuntary	   dependence	   springs	   into	   being	   in	   these	   circumstances	   which,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   obliges	   the	   one	   to	   repose	  
confidence	  in	  the	  other,	  has	  a	  quality	  comparable	  to	  those	  subsisting	  fiduciary	  relationships	  which	  admittedly	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  
positive	  duty	  of	  disclosure.”	  
494	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  189.	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   106	  
to disclose, as nobody bears the burden of informing another of something that they 
themselves can discover if they exercise the effort to do so.495  
 
In discussing the existence of a duty to disclose, the court in Orban v Stead applied the same 
factors identified in previous case law and the exceptional circumstances identified in chapter 
three above, namely knowledge, materiality of the representation, and the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. The involuntary reliance test proposed by Millner was relied 
upon in this judgment as the proper standard to use when determining the existence of a duty 
to disclose. 
 
4 2 10 Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd496 
 
Although this matter specifically concerned duties of disclosure under the common law as well 
as statutory duties of a company director,497 the court’s discussion of the law relating to 
general requirements for rescission due to misrepresentation is relevant for present purposes. 
In this instance, the respondents sought to avoid a contract concluded between themselves 
and the applicants based on a number of grounds. Two of these grounds are relevant when 
discussing non-disclosure, namely an alleged failure on the part of the applicants to comply 
with a statutory duty of disclosure and the ground of misrepresentation. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, statutory duties of disclosure must always be complied with, in this instance 
the provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. More importantly, the court’s treatment of 
misrepresentation should be focused on, especially the requirements to be proven by a party 
wishing to avoid a contract. It was accepted by the court that: 
 
“The party seeking to avoid a contract on the ground of misrepresentation must prove 
the following elements of his case. 
 
     (a)   That the representation relied upon was made. 
(b)   That it was a representation as to a fact. A promise, prediction, opinion or 
estimate or exercise of discretion is not a representation as to the truth or 
accuracy of its content; it can, however, often be construed as a representation 
that the person making it is of a particular state of mind. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495	  This	   rule	   is	   established	   in	  Speight	   v	  Glass	   	  1961	   1	   SA	   778	   (D),	  where	   it	  was	   decided	   that	   there	  was	   no	   duty	   on	   the	  
respondent	  to	  disclose	  a	  plan	  to	  construct	  a	  public	  road,	  as	  the	  information	  was	  available	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  the	  applicant	  
could	  have	  discovered	  it	  for	  himself.	  
496	  1979	  2	  SA	  116	  (W).	  
497	  Discussed	  at	  3	  3	  and	  3	  4	  2	  above.	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   107	  
(c)   That the representation was false. In relation to an ordinary representation 
of fact, what must be shown is that the fact was not as represented. When a 
prediction, opinion or estimate is relied upon, what must be shown is not merely 
that it was, or turned out to be, erroneous, but that it did not represent the bona 
fide view, at the time when it was expressed, of the person who expressed it. 
(d)   That it was material, in the sense that it was such as would have influenced 
a reasonable man to enter into the contract in issue. 
(e)   That it was intended to induce the person to whom it was made to enter 
into the transaction sought to be avoided… 
(f)   That the representation did induce the contract. That, as I understand it, 
does not mean that the misrepresentation must have been the only inducing 
course of the contract. It suffices if it was one of the operative causes which 
induced the representee to contract as he did.” (own emphasis) 498  
 
This list provides a general context within which all claims for rescission based on 
misrepresentation can be evaluated. More specifically, it lists requirements of materiality, 
intent and inducement. These requirements should presumably also be met if a claim for 
rescission is based on non-disclosure. As we have seen, comparable elements have in the 
past been identified by the judiciary as indications that a party engaged in actionable non-
disclosure.499  
 
As in Orban v Stead, the requirement in (d) above is that the representation must be material. 
In that judgment, the court stated that it would only be where the representation would have 
induced a reasonable person to contract that relief would be available to the wronged party. 
The test for materiality of the representation is thus objective, and linked to the element of 
inducement. In discussing the requirement of inducement, the court is careful to state that this 
“has always been regarded as a necessary element, whether it was fraudulent or innocent 
misrepresentation that was relied upon.”500 From this we see that inducement does not 
necessarily constitute an intention to defraud, and we must consider the state of mind of the 
person who kept silent in order to determine whether they are fraudulent. The mere fact that 
the silence in fact induced the transaction is not sufficient to constitute fraudulent intent on the 
part of the party accused of concealment. There must be something extra which would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498	  1979	  2	  SA	  116	  (W)	  149D-­‐F.	  Note	  that	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  representation	  must	  have	  induced	  the	  contract	  in	  order	  
for	   the	  party	   to	   seek	   redress	  does	  not	   specifically	   provide	   that	   the	   inducement	  must	  have	   led	   to	   a	   valid	   contract.	   This	  
leaves	  room	  for	  the	  view	  of	  the	  court	  in	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T),	  namely	  that	  it	   is	  sufficient	  for	  a	  party	  to	  prove	  
that	  there	  was	  a	  fraudulent	  statement	  (or	  indeed,	  silence)	  which	  induced	  him	  to	  act	  in	  the	  manner	  he	  did.	  	  
499	  These	  requirements	  have	  been	  highlighted	  in	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C),	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  
(O)	  and	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T).	  They	  are	  also	  echoed	  in	  the	  later	  case	  of	  ABSA	  Bank	  Ltd	  v	  Fouche	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  
(SCA).	  
500	  150A.	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constitute a conscious intention to defraud the other party by keeping silent. Although the 
Novick case does not expressly deal with misrepresentation by non-disclosure, the principles 
identified as necessary to claim rescission on the grounds of representation can be applied to 
residual cases of non-disclosure.  
 
4 2 11  Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality501 
 
This is an insurance matter, and is one of the most cited cases in South African law regarding 
the construct of uberrimae fidei contracts. Insurance contracts have traditionally been 
classified as contracts uberrimae fidei, contracts where parties are held to a standard of the 
‘utmost good faith’.502 One of the consequences of imposing the highest good faith on parties 
was that parties to insurance contracts had an absolute duty of disclosure. This judgment 
explores the development of the concept of uberrimae fidei in modern SA law, and effectively 
erases it from our legal system. Although the matter deals specifically with the case of 
insurance, which is an exception, it also has implications when discussing a general residual 
duty of disclosure. 
 
As stated in the preceding chapter and the exploration of Stacy v Sims above,503 we know 
that this term uberrimae fidei originated in English law.504 The court in Mutual and Federal 
traces the term from its English law roots,505 and discusses the reception of the concept of 
uberrimae fidei contracts into South African law.506 The court investigated Roman law and 
Roman-Dutch law authorities in order to see whether they recognised different levels of good 
faith, and came to the following conclusion: 
 
“The Romans were familiar with bona fides and mala fides but they never knew 
uberrima fides as another category of good faith. I have been unable to find any 
Roman-Dutch authority in support of the proposition that a contract of marine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A).	  
502	  See	  3	  2	  above,	  which	  sets	  out	  the	  history	  of	   insurance	  contracts	  as	  well	  as	  their	  classification	  as	  uberrimae	  fidei.	  For	  
further	  examples	  of	  the	  courts’	  treatment	  of	  uberrimae	  fidei	  see	  Stacy	  v	  Sims	  1917	  CPD	  533	  and	  Lewak	  v	  Sanderson	  1925	  
CPD	  265.	  
503	  3	  2	  and	  4	  2	  1	  above.	  
504	  3	  2	  above.	  
505	  431H.	  
506432A.	  “Without	  investigating	  our	  own	  law	  on	  this	  aspect,	  our	  Courts	  have	  under	  influence	  of	  English	  law	  attached	  to	  a	  
contract	  of	  insurance	  the	  label	  uberrimae	  fidei.”	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insurance is a contract uberrimae fidei. On the contrary, it is indisputably a contract 
bonae fidei.”507 
 
The court then had to ask, in the absence of any authority for recognising the construct of 
uberrimae fidei contracts, what the legal basis would be for recognising a duty to disclose 
between contracting parties, especially in the context of insurance law. The court made the 
observation that “the duty of disclosure (in insurance law) is the correlative of a right of 
disclosure which is a legal principle of the law of insurance.”508 The court further stated that 
the duty of disclosure in insurance contracts arises ex lege, not from an implied term or from a 
requirement of bona fides.509  
 
As a result of this, and taking into account the lack of historical authority for recognising the 
concept of uberrimae fidei, the court made the following statement: 
 
“By our law all contracts are bonae fidei. Yet the duty of disclosure is not common to all 
types of contract. It is restricted to those contracts, such as contracts of insurance, 
where it is required ex lege. Moreover, there is no magic in the term uberrima fides. 
There are no degrees of good faith. It is entirely inconceivable that there could be a 
little, more or most (utmost) good faith. The distinction is between good faith or bad 
faith. There is no room for uberrima fides as a third category of faith in our 
law…Uberrima fides is not a juristic term with a precise connotation. It cannot be used 
as a yardstick with a precise legal meaning…In my opinion uberrima fides is an alien, 
vague, useless expression without any particular meaning in law. As I have indicated, it 
cannot be used in our law for the purpose of explaining the juristic basis of the duty to 
disclose a material fact before the conclusion of a contract of insurance. Our law of 
insurance has no need for uberrima fides and the time has come to jettison it.”510 
 
An observation that warrants discussion is the idea that the duty to disclose is not based on 
the principle of utmost good faith, but rather arises ex lege, due to the type of contract in 
question and the legal principles involved in that contract.511 However, this may be interpreted 
to limit the cases where a duty to disclose is recognised to those previously designated 
uberrimae fidei. If this were Joubert JA’s intention, it would leave no room for cases where 
policy considerations would require the recognition of new duties of disclosure. However, if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507	  432B-­‐C.	  
508	  432H.	  
509	  433A.	  
510	  433B-­‐F.	  
511	  432.	  This	  differs	  from	  the	  judgment	  in	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W),	  where	  the	  
court	  relied	  strongly	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  bona	  fides	  as	  a	  criterion	  governing	  the	  conduct	  of	  contracting	  parties	  inter	  se,	  and	  
in	  so	  doing	  indirectly	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose.	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this were not his intention, then it should be asked when such duty could be said to arise ex 
lege outside the established categories. The judgment provides no guidelines for determining 
this, and it would seem that the recognition of a duty to disclose is indeed limited to specific 
categories of contracts.  
 
In terms of insurance law, parties are required to disclose material information. In determining 
what type of information is material, previous judgments have adopted the definition set out in 
Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd,512 which states that material information 
would have the “natural and probable effect of influencing the mind of (a) person”.513 In the 
present judgment, the materiality of facts is determined by considering the circumstances of 
the case objectively, as the reasonable person would.514 The court relies on Roman-Dutch 
authorities and our current law, and uses this test to determine whether the undisclosed 
information would be reasonably relative to the risk in question. If the facts would be regarded 
as such by the “average prudent person” then it would be material, and should thus be 
disclosed. It must be noted that the court relied on cases from the law of delict in setting this 
standard,515 and it is interesting to see how the delictual and contractual principles regarding 
non-disclosure can overlap in certain instances. The overlap of principles can, however, also 
lead to confusion, and it must be remembered that the remedies for each differ in their 
requirements. 
 
4 2 12  McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd516 
 
As seen in the discussion of Meskin above,517 a failure to disclose may ground a contractual 
or delictual action. In McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd518 liability for non-
disclosure was considered in light of a claim for delictual damages. Fault is one of the 
requirements for a delictual claim to be successful. As we have seen, the case law 
traditionally focussed on fault in the form of fraud. Millner in particular doubted whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  416A.	  
513	  416A.	  
514	  435.	  Reasonableness	  was	  also	  recognised	  as	  a	  standard	  by	  which	  to	  determine	  materiality	  of	  the	  representation	  in	  the	  
discussion	  of	  Novick	  v	  Comair	  Holdings	  1979	  2	  SA	  116	  (W)	  at	  4	  2	  10	  above.	  	  
515	  Weber	  v	  Santam	  Versekeringsmaatskappy	  Bpk	  1983	  1	  SA	  381	  (A).	  
516	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C).	  
517	  4	  2	  8.	  
518	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C).	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negligent non-disclosure could be actionable, suggesting that it would be answered some 
time in the future.519 In McCann the court had to consider this question. 
 
The plaintiff sold vehicles to the defendant, and in the course of the sale relied on an alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentation made by the defendant. In terms of this representation, the 
defendant had informed the plaintiff that he was a registered wholesale trader and was thus 
exempt from paying general sales tax when purchasing the vehicles. As a result, the plaintiff 
did not charge the defendant the general sales tax as required by law, but was later held 
liable for the payment thereof by the Receiver of Inland Revenue. The plaintiff then instituted 
a claim for damages against the defendant in order to recover this amount. In the event that a 
fraudulent misrepresentation could not be found, the plaintiff instituted an alternative cause of 
action grounded on negligent misrepresentation.  
 
In the court a quo, it was found that there had been no fraudulent misrepresentation, as it 
could not be proved that the defendant had actively represented himself as a registered 
wholesale trader. Regarding the alternative cause of action, however, the court held that the 
defendant’s past experience as a motor vehicle salesman meant that he must have known 
that registered wholesale traders were exempt from paying general sales tax. The defendant 
must also have known that traders selling to the public had to be registered and hold a 
general sales tax certificate, and that sellers could be penalised for not charging the general 
sales tax to any buyer that was not a registered trader. Taking into account the defendant’s 
experience in the field, and the knowledge that he was expected to have, the court a quo 
found that the defendant was under a duty to disclose that he was not a registered wholesale 
trader. It was held that he had breached this duty by failing to disclose this information to the 
plaintiff, and his omission in this regard would amount to a negligent misrepresentation.  
 
The reasoning of the judge in the court a quo was that there was in essence no difference 
between an express negligent statement and a tacit one. On strength of this, it was suggested 
that someone who omits to say something when circumstances require him to do so acts 
negligently. The present circumstances were deemed to be similar to those in Bayer South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  177-­‐178.	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Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost,520 and would thus comply with the requirements for the lex Aquilia. 
The appeal court criticised this approach on various grounds.521 One of these grounds is that 
there was no actual misstatement made in the present case, as there was in the Bayer 
matter, as we are dealing here with a failure to disclose information. On appeal it was 
acknowledged that a positive misstatement and a non-disclosure can both constitute a 
misrepresentation,522 whether fraudulent or negligent.523 It has been confirmed that, in South 
African law, a negligent misrepresentation can give rise to delictual liability. 524  Having 
established that a misrepresentation can take the form of an omission, it would follow that 
negligent non-disclosure could also lead to delictual liability. In this regard the court in 
McCann referred to an article by Kerr,525 which supported this conclusion.526 Accepting that 
good faith is one of the principles governing pre-contractual negotiations, Kerr sets out his 
reasoning as follows: 
 
“Does good faith require a party to put his mind to problems which, in all the 
circumstances, can fairly be said to present themselves? Would a bonus paterfamilias 
do so? If he would, and the party in question does not, is this not negligence?”527  
 
Recognising the existence of an action based on negligent non-disclosure, it must be asked 
what kind of remedy such an action would give rise to. Kerr favours the view that cancellation 
would be an appropriate remedy, as cancellation is the remedy claimed in cases of negligent 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure is “closely related to misrepresentation”.528 Kerr makes 
no statements about claiming damages, but the court in McCann allowed for this type of 
claim, and set out guidelines for claiming damages based on negligent non-disclosure. 
 
When it comes to establishing liability for this type of non-disclosure, this can only be 
successful if it can be shown that the non-disclosure was wrongful. This is determined by 
establishing whether the defendant has a legal duty to disclose material information to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520	  1991	  4	  SA	  559	  (AD).	  	  
521	  721G-­‐722A.	  
522	  722A.	  
523	  722F.	  
524	  Confirmed	  in	  Administrateur,	  Natal	  v	  Trust	  Bank	  van	  Afrika	  Bpk	  1979	  3	  SA	  824	  (A);	  D	  Hutchison	  'Damages	  for	  negligent	  
misstatements	  made	  in	  a	  contractual	  context'	  (1981)	  98	  SALJ	  500.	  
525	  AJ	  Kerr	  “Negligent	  non-­‐disclosure:	  The	  duty	  to	  call	  to	  mind	  and	  disclose”	  (1979)	  96	  SALJ	  17-­‐23.	  
526	  Kerr	  (1979)	  SALJ	  17-­‐23.	  This	  article	  was	  written	  following	  the	  judgment	  in	  Orban	  v	  Stead,	  and	  explored	  the	  possibility	  of	  
allowing	  an	  action	  based	  on	  negligent	  non-­‐disclosure.	  	  
527	  Kerr	  (1979)	  SALJ	  22.	  
528	  Kerr	  (1979)	  SALJ	  22.	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plaintiff, and consequently fails to do so.529 Establishing the existence of such a duty is 
problematic, as evidenced throughout this work. The question is whether there is any 
similarity in the way this problem is approached in the law of delict as opposed to the contract 
law approach. 
 
The general rule regarding non-disclosure in the law of contract is in line with the position in 
delict, namely that:  
 
“There is no general rule in our law that all material facts must be disclosed and that 
non-disclosure thereby amounts to misrepresentation by silence, but in certain 
circumstances this is undoubtedly the rule.”530 
 
The question, again, is how one would determine which of these circumstances would create 
a duty to disclose. When discussing the existence of a duty to disclose in the law of contract, 
the court adopted the familiar suggestion by Millner that, when dealing with an instance of 
designed concealment, a duty to disclose would arise where there is an:  
 
“Involuntary reliance of the one party on the frank disclosure of certain facts 
necessarily lying within the exclusive knowledge of the other such that, in fair dealing, 
the former’s right to have such information communicated to him would be mutually 
recognised by honest men in the circumstances.”531 
 
As established in the discussion of Orban v Stead,532 Millner emphasises the importance of 
the nature of the relationship between the parties when it comes to determining the existence 
of a duty to disclose. The knowledge element is also included in this “involuntary reliance” 
test, and plays an important role in imposing liability for a non-disclosure. In the situation 
where the facts do not fall within the “exclusive knowledge” of the other party, it is unlikely that 
there would be a duty to disclose. This is due to the fact that nobody is bound to look after the 
interests of another, and if the facts are readily available upon a diligent inspection, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529	  723C.	  More	  recently,	  it	  has	  been	  confirmed	  that	  “our	  law	  now	  firmly	  recognises	  that	  a	  negligent	  misrepresentation	  will	  
give	  rise	  to	  delictual	  liability	  provided	  all	  the	  necessary	  elements	  of	  such	  liability	  are	  satisfied.	  It	  is	  submitted	  on	  behalf	  of	  
Axiam	  that	  there	  can	  in	  law	  be	  a	  misrepresentation	  by	  silence.	  That	  is	  undoubtedly	  so…Silence	  or	  inaction	  as	  such	  cannot	  
constitute	  a	  misrepresentation	  unless	   there	   is	  a	  duty	   to	  speak	  or	  act.”	   (own	  emphasis)	  Axiam	  Holdings	  Ltd	  v	  Deloitte	  &	  
Touche	  2006	  1	  SA	  237	  (SCA)	  para	  15.	  
530	  Christie	   The	   Law	   of	   Contract	   276-­‐277.	   Confirmed	   in	   Speight	   v	   Glass	   1961	   1	   SA	   778	   (D)	   781H;	  Mutual	   and	   Federal	  
Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A)	  433C.	  
531	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  185.	  
532	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	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accessible to both parties, the ‘wronged’ party cannot claim that the other party had a duty to 
inform him of the relevant facts.533  
 
When it comes to determining the existence of a duty to disclose in the context of delict, the 
prevailing opinion is that this should be done with regard to policy considerations, more 
specifically the legal convictions of the community or public interest.534 This confirms the 
judgment of Jansen J in Meskin v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd,535 which used the 
“broad approach” to determine the existence of duties of disclosure. As stated above, the 
legal convictions of the community and boni mores were highlighted by the court in Meskin,536 
in addition to the standard of the bonus paterfamilias.  
 
Returning to the question of negligent non-disclosure, the court isolates certain principles that 
would assist the identification of a situation as one where a non-disclosure was negligent.537  
 
 “(a) A negligent misrepresentation may give rise to delictual liability and to a claim for 
damages, provided the prerequisites for such liability are complied with. 
   (b) A negligent misrepresentation may be constituted by an omission, provided the 
defendant breaches a legal duty, established by policy considerations, to act positively 
in order to prevent the plaintiff's suffering loss. 
   (c) A negligent misrepresentation by way of an omission may occur in the form of a 
non-disclosure where there is a legal duty on the defendant to disclose some or other 
material fact to the plaintiff and he fails to do so. 
   (d) Silence or inaction as such cannot constitute a misrepresentation of any kind 
unless there is a duty to speak or act as aforesaid.”538  
 
The court then provides examples of circumstances which could give rise to a duty to 
disclose, but is careful to point out that the list of situations is not absolute, as there are other 
circumstances in which a duty of disclosure could exist. A duty of disclosure can arise when 
the material fact in issue falls within the exclusive knowledge of one party, and the other is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533	  This	  was	  also	  suggested	  in	  Speight	  v	  Glass	  1961	  1	  SA	  778	  (D),	  and	  is	  confirmed	  in	  this	  judgment.	  	  
534	  J	  Neethling,	  JM	  Potgieter	  &	  PJ	  Visser	  Law	  of	  Delict	  2nd	  ed	  (1994)	  50-­‐51.	  See	  further	  Minister	  van	  Polisie	  v	  Ewels	  1975	  3	  
SA	  590	  (A)	  597A-­‐C;	  Kadir	  v	  Minister	  of	  Law	  and	  Order	  1993	  3	  SA	  737	  (C)	  740F-­‐J;	  Clarke	  v	  Hurst	  NO	  and	  Others	  1992	  4	  SA	  
630	  (D)	  650G-­‐653B	  for	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  these	  policy	  considerations.	  
535	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W).	  
536	  4	  2	  8.	  
537	  These	  principles	  were	  endorsed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  court	  in	  Axiam	  Holdings	  Ltd	  v	  Deloitte	  &	  Touche	  2006	  1	  SA	  237	  
(SCA)	  para	  15-­‐17,	  who	  confirmed	  that	  the	  principles	  used	  by	  the	  court	  in	  McCann	  v	  Goodall	  Group	  Operations	  1995	  2	  SA	  
718	  (C)	  were	  the	  correct	  ones	  to	  use	  in	  determining	  which	  circumstances	  created	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose.	  
538	  726A-­‐D.	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reliant on the frank disclosure thereof. This amounts to the involuntary reliance test proposed 
by Millner. 539  It could also exist where a party has knowledge of certain unusual 
characteristics relating to the proposed contract, and policy considerations require that he 
inform the other party thereof. Another possible situation is in the case where a party has 
previously made a statement or representation to the other which later turns out to be an 
incomplete representation. There would then be a duty on the representor to rectify the 
disclosure, as not doing so could mislead the representee. 
 
From the preceding case discussions, it has become obvious that our judiciary have 
historically been inclined to award remedies in cases where non-disclosure has been 
fraudulent.540 This requirement that silence be fraudulent in order for it to be actionable is also 
seen in Millner’s article,541 where, although it is not expressly stated, the intention in the 
classification of instances of non-disclosure is to highlight which instances should be 
actionable. In this classification, Millner argues that designed concealment should be able to 
ground an action as there is an element of dolus, which is not seen in all instances of mere 
non-disclosure.542 The deciding factor seems to be the presence of fraud. If we accept this, 
then it would appear that the involuntary reliance proposed by Millner for determining a duty 
to disclose should only be applicable in cases of fraudulent non-disclosure. However, it has 
been acknowledged earlier in this discussion that our law also allows for causes of action 
grounded on negligent non-disclosure,543 and thus the court in McCann, in applying the 
involuntary reliance test to this matter extends its application to instances of negligent non-
disclosure.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  185.	  
540	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C)	  88B-­‐D;	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O);	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T)	  
226A-­‐D;	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W);	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W)	  717E-­‐G.	  
541	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  185.	  
542	  	  The	  exception	  is	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  seller	  is	  silent	  regarding	  a	  latent	  defect,	  and	  it	  was	  suggested	  by	  Millner	  that	  the	  
seller’s	  knowledge	  in	  this	  case	  would	  create	  a	  ‘presumed	  dolus’,	  which	  would	  mean	  that	  even	  innocent	  non-­‐disclosure	  in	  
such	  a	  case	  would	  be	  deemed	  fraudulent.	  
543	  There	   is	   not	  much	   authority	   for	   this,	   and	   it	  was	   suggested	   as	   an	   alternative	   cause	   of	   action	   in	   instances	  where	   the	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  do	  not	  quite	  constitute	  fraudulent	  non-­‐disclosure.	  For	  a	  full	  discussion,	  see	  Kerr	  (1979)	  SALJ	  17-­‐
23.	  The	  court	  here	  confirms	  its	  validity	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  action.	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4 2 13  ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche544  
 
This matter is similar to McCann, as it also concerns delictual liability for non-disclosure. The 
respondent entered into a contract with ABSA Bank (the appellant) in terms of which the 
respondent hired a safety deposit box. This contract contained a term which stated that the 
clients bore the risk of anything happening to the contents of the lockers. Sometime after the 
conclusion of the contract, a number of safe deposit boxes were broken into, including the 
respondent’s box. The respondent initially brought a claim against ABSA Bank and was 
successful in the court a quo. However, when the matter went on appeal, the respondent 
accepted that she did not have a cause of action in contract. Alternatively, she sought to claim 
damages on the basis of fraudulent non-disclosure which induced her to enter into the 
contract. If this could not be proved, then she sought to rely on negligent non-disclosure 
which has been confirmed as a legitimate basis for a cause of action.545 
 
The point of departure was that “it is by now settled law that the test for establishing 
wrongfulness in a pre-contractual setting is the same as that applied in the case of a non-
contractual non-disclosure.”546 Reliance is placed on the judgment in Bayer South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Frost,547 which, as we saw above, dealt with a claim in delict. It is asserted by the court 
that in both the contractual and delictual treatment of the duty to disclose, the touchstone for 
establishing such duty is the legal convictions of the community.548 It is interesting to note that 
all of the cases cited as authority for this statement are delictual cases. It may therefore be 
questioned whether this standard really applies across the board, and whether other 
principles may perhaps be more suited for use in the contractual context. 
 
The court does address the principles required when dealing with non-disclosure in the 
contractual sphere, saying that “the policy considerations appertaining to the unlawfulness of 
a failure to speak in a contractual context – a non-disclosure – have been synthesised into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  (SCA).	  
545	  McCann	  v	  Goodall	  Group	  Operations	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C).	  Also	  see	  the	  discussion	  at	  4	  2	  12.	  
546	  Para	  4.	  
547	  1991	  4	  SA	  559	  (A).	  
548	  Para	  4.	  Authority	  for	  this	  is	  cited	  as	  Carmichele	  v	  Minister	  of	  Safety	  and	  Security	  and	  Another	  2001	  1	  SA	  489	  (SCA)	  494E-­‐
F;	  Minister	  of	  Law	  and	  Order	  v	  Kadir	  1995	  1	  SA	  303	  (A)	  317C-­‐318J.	  This	  test	  has	  been	  confirmed	  as	  the	  correct	  one	  to	  use	  
when	  determining	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose	  in	  the	  law	  of	  delict.	  See	  further	  fn	  123	  above.	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general test for liability.”549 The question arises what the court envisions the content of these 
policy considerations to be, and whether they look for the same elements identified in 
previous judgments as indicative of a duty to disclose in the contractual context.  
 
The ‘general test’ referred to by the court appears to have two parts.550 First, a duty to speak 
must be established. This is done in the following way: 
 
“A party is expected to speak when information he has to impart falls within his 
exclusive knowledge (so that in a practical business sense the other party has him as 
his only source) and the information, moreover, is such that the right to have it 
communicated to him ‘would be mutually recognised by honest men in the 
circumstances’ (Pretorius and Another v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd (under 
Judicial management) 1965 (3) SA 410 (W) at 418E-F).”551 
 
We see that the recurring knowledge requirement is relevant in this first part of the test, and is 
thus one of the factors to consider when establishing that there was in fact a duty. It is 
confirmed that the information must be within the exclusive knowledge552 of one party, and 
that the other party must have no other means of obtaining it. In addition to this, the type of 
information concealed is important. Here, the information must be such that the right to be 
informed is “mutually recognised by honest men in the circumstances”. It has previously been 
stated that the type of information concealed must be material, in the sense that it would be 
calculated to induce someone to contract. However, in this judgment, emphasis is placed on 
the behaviour normally expected of honest men in certain circumstances, which would seem 
to be more of a policy consideration.  
 
As established in previous case discussions, it is not sufficient to prove that there was a duty 
to disclose. There are certain elements which have been identified in previous judgments as 
being useful in this instance, most notably that the representation had to be material, and that 
the representation had to induce the defendant to enter into the contract. No definition is 
provided for materiality in this context, but it would presumably be the same as that found in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549	  Para	  5.	  
550	  This	  two-­‐part	  test	  has	  been	  identified	  in	  previous	  judgments,	  namely	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T)	  and	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  
1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	  
551	  180I-­‐181B.	  	  
552	  In	  his	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract,	  Christie	  defines	  exclusive	  knowledge	  as	  “knowledge	  which	  is	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  point	  where	  
its	   inaccessibility	   produces	   an	   involuntary	   reliance	   on	   the	   party	   possessing	   the	   information”.	   This	   definition	   links	   the	  
knowledge	  requirement	  to	  Millner’s	  test	  of	  involuntary	  reliance.	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Orban v Stead, where the representation would have influenced the reasonable person to 
enter into the contract.553 
 
From this judgment we see that, when dealing with cases of non-disclosure, it must first be 
determined whether there was a duty to speak, and it is clear that this duty only arises in 
respect of material facts.554 Further, the representation itself must be material,555 and must 
have induced the party to enter into the contract.556 With regard to inducement, in instances 
where fraudulent misrepresentation is alleged, it must be clear that the defendant intended to 
induce the plaintiff to enter into the contract. It is only where all of these things are proved that 
a party will be able to claim relief based on non-disclosure. 
 
The court in this matter has explored the contractual and delictual principles regarding non-
disclosure and has pointed out some similarities between the two. Recognising that the 
contractual standard of bona fides and the delictual standard of boni mores are both based on 
ethical considerations, specifically the mores of today, the focus when dealing with cases of 
non-disclosure appears to be on the behaviour expected from honest men in the 
circumstances. This reliance on a standard based on what the community views as 
acceptable behaviour seems to suggest that perhaps the distinction between the contractual 
and delictual standards used when imposing duties of disclosure is not that clear, and that, 
effectively, the same test is applied. This suggestion will be explored in the following chapter, 
when the potential standards for determining the existence of duties of disclosure are 
comprehensively discussed.  
 
4 3 Conclusions  
 
The judgments discussed here trace the development of the law relating to non-disclosure in 
South Africa, and many have contributed principles that have helped to shape the law as it 
stands today. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553	  See	  4	  2	  9	  above.	  
554	  Para	  5.	  The	  test	  for	  materiality	  of	  facts	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  
(W)	  416A,	  namely	  that	  the	  facts	  must	  be	  material	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  reasonable	  person.	  	  
555	  Para	  6.	  Also	  see	  the	  discussions	  at	  4	  2	  9	  and	  4	  2	  10	  above.	  
556	  Para	  6.	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Initially, liability for non-disclosure in the context of contract law was essentially limited to 
contracts branded as uberrimae fidei, exemplified by the insurance contract.557 No proper 
provision was made for residual cases, and the reasoning for this was that the type of 
contract designated uberrimae fidei required parties to act with the utmost good faith, which 
meant that a duty to disclose was automatically recognised in these instances. This construct 
was adopted from English law, and the Roman law principles were “bent” to fit in with it, 
leading to considerable confusion about its application in the South African context. 558 
However, in later years, courts recognised that the concept of uberrimae fidei contracts was 
never a part of Roman law, and abolished the application of such a concept in our law.559 
 
As the law developed, the courts started to pay more attention to the types of actions 
available in cases of non-disclosure and the requirements for these remedies.560 The judiciary 
allowed parties to claim rescission in the contractual sphere and damages in terms of the law 
of delict. In each sphere, it has been acknowledged that there can be no question of liability 
for non-disclosure if the parties did not have a duty to disclose inter se.561 However, the way 
in which the duty is established, and the further requirements for relief are not the same. From 
the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that there is still uncertainty about these 
requirements, and this uncertainty has given rise to a number of questions. 
 
One of the main issues to be explored is the relevance of standards like good faith, boni 
mores when deciding to award relief based on non-disclosure. These considerations have 
repeatedly been identified by the judiciary as being of importance in measuring contracting 
parties’ behaviour, and must be investigated to see how they would operate in cases of non-
disclosure, and what role they would play in the respective spheres of contract and delict. 
Such an investigation also entails obtaining more certainty about the specific considerations 
that influence imposing a duty to disclose, especially the exact relationship between the 
parties. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557	  This	   is	   especially	   seen	   in	   earlier	   cases	   such	   as	   Stacy	   v	   Sims	   1917	   CPD	   533;	   Lewak	   v	   Sanderson	   1925	   CPD	   265	   and	  
Hoffman	  v	  Moni’s	  Wineries	  1948	  2	  SA	  163	  (C).	  
558	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  Lewak	  v	  Sanderson	  1925	  CPD	  265	  at	  4	  2	  2	  above.	  
559	  Mutual	  and	  Federal	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A).	  
560	  This	  was	  especially	  evident	  in	  the	  following	  judgments	  made	  during	  the	  1950s:	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C);	  Cloete	  v	  
Smithfield	  Hotel	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O);	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T).	  
561	  See	  discussion	  of	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T)	  at	  4	  2	  6	  above.	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Another issue that requires further attention is the question of materiality and what it would 
mean in different contexts. The materiality of the facts may be distinguished from the 
materiality of the representation itself. This distinction and the role of materiality in cases of 
non-disclosure will also be explored in the following chapter.  
 
Finally, the question of fault has also arisen from the present discussion. As one of the 
elements of a delict, fault is always required when claiming damages for non-disclosure. 
However, it is still uncertain to which extent fault should be required when claiming rescission 
based on non-disclosure, a question which warrants further discussion. 
 
These issues, as well as other relevant considerations, will be investigated in the following 
chapter. I will attempt to draw some conclusions regarding these uncertainties with reference 
to the historical and comparative perspectives explored earlier. 	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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
 
5 1 Introduction: historical background 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the meaning and consequences of 
misrepresentation by non-disclosure in the South African law of contract. As evidenced by the 
discussions in the preceding chapters, non-disclosure has been recognised as a form of 
misrepresentation in our law, and, under the right circumstances, may give rise to remedies 
for the wronged party.  
 
To place the conclusions regarding the modern law and how it may be developed in context, 
the historical background will be recounted briefly. It will be recalled from the discussion in 
chapter two that some of the earliest indications that non-disclosure could constitute a 
misrepresentation and provide a remedy for the representee are found in Roman law. Initially, 
no provision was made for situations where someone was induced to conclude a contract as 
a result of another’s silence. The construction of aliud simulare, aliud agere was followed, 
which only imputes liability for positive acts. However, it was later recognised that there are 
cases where a party’s silence could induce another to act to the latter’s detriment, and that it 
was necessary to regulate these instances in some way.562 It came to be accepted that the 
definition of fraud could be extended to include non-disclosure, and that the actio de dolo 
could be available to those who were disadvantaged as a result of another’s silence. 
Crucially, it further came to be accepted that even if the accused party’s misconduct could 
sometimes fall short of actual deceit or trickery, the exceptio doli could nonetheless be 
awarded, essentially because it was not equitable for the other party to bring an action.563 
Such conduct was deemed to be contrary to the principle of bona fides. The law developed so 
that violating this principle could be a direct ground for challenging a party’s conduct even 
where it was not accompanied by the fraudulent intent traditionally required.564 The exceptio 
doli later became a sort of “catch-all” provision based on the principles of fairness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562	  See	  2	  1	  1	  1.	  	  
563	  R	  Zimmermann	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations:	  Roman	  Foundations	  of	   the	  Civilian	  Tradition	   (1990)	  668.	  Further	   see	  2	  1	  1	  1	  
above.	  
564	  The	  line	  between	  bona	  fides	  and	  dolus	  has	  also	  been	  described	  as	  a	  “strong	  inverse	  relationship”	  in	  S	  Vogenhauer	  &	  J	  
Kleinheisterkamp	  (eds)	  Commentary	  on	  the	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  PICC	  (2009)	  438.	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reasonableness and bona fides, and was used in all cases where a contracting party’s 
conduct constituted bad faith.565  
 
However, in later civil law an important development took place. The notion of a distinction 
between contracts that were subject to good faith and those which were not was abolished, 
which had the implication that there was no more need for a procedural mechanism called the 
exceptio doli. This was already the position in Roman-Dutch law and it is essentially still the 
position in modern South African law, which essentially accords good faith the role of 
underlying principle of the law of contract, but not as the basis for equitable judicial discretions 
to award relief. The role of bona fides in relation to cases of misrepresentation by non-
disclosure will be returned to later in this chapter. 
 
A further important development in the civilian tradition was the continued recognition of non-
disclosure as a form of misrepresentation; from Roman-Dutch law it was later received into 
South African law. This recognition gave rise to an important challenge. Once it was 
acknowledged that non-disclosure could constitute a misrepresentation under the right 
circumstances, the question arose how to determine precisely what these circumstances 
were. Initially, it was thought that the construction that certain contracts were uberrimae fidei, 
which was adopted from English law in the early 20th century, could be the main instrument to 
be used for this purpose. 566  In earlier cases such as Stacy v Sims 567  and Lewak v 
Sanderson,568 the courts were only willing to impose liability for non-disclosure in instances 
where the parties were required to act with the “utmost good faith”. 569  However, this 
construction was rejected in modern South African law,570 on the ground that it never formed 
part of the Roman or Roman-Dutch law.571 As we have seen, rather, despite its civilian-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565	  D	  Hutchison	  “Good	  faith	  in	  the	  South	  African	  law	  of	  contract”	  in	  R	  Brownsword,	  NJ	  Hird	  &	  GG	  Howells	  (eds)	  Good	  Faith	  
in	  Contract:	  Concept	  and	  Context	  (1999)	  213	  216.	  	  
566	  This	  construction	  is	  mentioned	  a	  number	  of	  times	  in	  this	  work,	  firstly	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  modern	  English	  law	  at	  2	  2	  2	  3	  
above,	  then	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  South	  African	  law	  of	  insurance	  at	  3	  1	  and	  3	  2,	  and	  finally	  in	  the	  case	  discussions	  in	  
chapter	  four.	  	  	  
567	  1917	  CPD	  533.	  
568	  1925	  CPD	  265.	  
569	  Discussed	  at	  4	  2	  1	  and	  4	  2	  2	  above.	  
570	  This	  was	  expressly	  done	  in	  the	  by	  now	  familiar	  majority	  judgment	  in	  Mutual	  and	  Federal	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  
Municipality	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A)	  433C-­‐D.	  
571	  According	  to	  Spencer-­‐Bower,	  “The	  Roman	  Law	  distinguishes	  between	  actions	  bonae	  fidei…and	  actions	  which	  are	  not.	  It	  
does	  not	  erect	   into	  a	  third	  and	  superlative	  class,	  with	  a	  special	  name,	  such	  transactions	  and	  relations	  which	  English	   law	  
designates	  uberrimae	  fidei.”	  (The	  Law	  Relating	  to	  Actionable	  Non-­‐disclosure	  (1915)	  149).	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sounding name, it appears to be a purely English law creation, and is still used in English law 
to distinguish the types of contract in which parties can incur liability for non-disclosure.572 
Nonetheless, despite the rejection of the uberrimae fides concept in modern South African 
law, there are still specific instances in which parties always have a duty to disclose, namely 
those contracts previously designated uberrimae fidei.573  
 
Outside of these special cases, the judiciary has also shown a willingness to impose liability 
for non-disclosure.574 However, the difficulty of establishing duties of disclosure in these 
residual cases leads us to ask which factors could be used to establish liability for non-
disclosure. From the case evaluations in the previous chapter, it has emerged that, in reality, 
the enquiry as to whether non-disclosure is actionable is more complicated than simply 
imposing duties of disclosure when dealing with specific contract types. In the development of 
the law relating to non-disclosure, the courts’ focus shifted from the automatic application of a 
test based on uberrimae fides to considering the type of action instituted by parties, and the 
requirements for instituting such actions.575 More specifically, parties could claim relief in the 
form of contractual actions for rescission and restitution, or delictual claims for damages. The 
crucial distinction between these remedies will now be considered in more detail, as the 
requirements for imposing liability differ in each. 
 
5 2  Non-disclosure in contractual context: the standards of ‘involuntary reliance’ 
and ‘good faith’  
 
In terms of the law of contract, rescission is the appropriate remedy to set aside a contract if a 
party has been disadvantaged by another’s silence. As indicated earlier, the party seeking to 
rely on this remedy must cross a number of hurdles.576  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572	  P	  Giliker	   “Formation	  of	   contract	  and	  pre-­‐contractual	   information	   from	  an	  English	  perspective”	   in	  S	  Grundmann	  &	  M	  
Schauer	  (eds)	  The	  Architecture	  of	  European	  Codes	  and	  Contract	  Law	  (2006)	  301	  302.	  	  
573	  Discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  	  
574	  Discussed	  in	  chapter	  four.	  
575	  This	  shift	  is	  most	  clearly	  seen	  in	  the	  judgments	  dating	  from	  the	  early	  1950s,	  and	  is	  explored	  at	  4	  2	  4,	  4	  2	  5	  and	  4	  2	  6	  
above.	  
576	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T)	  at	  4	  2	  6	  above.	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5 2 1  The duty to disclose  
 
First, he must prove that the other party had a duty to disclose the relevant information.577  
 
The first part of the enquiry is how one would establish the existence of a duty to disclose in 
the residual cases. The courts have identified various factors as being instructive in this 
regard. In the light of the preceding chapters, these factors may be summarised as follows. 
 
The consideration referred to most often is the nature of the relationship between the 
parties.578 It has been suggested by the judiciary and academic writers that the important 
matter to consider when looking at the relationship between the contracting parties is whether 
there is an involuntary reliance of one party on the other for the disclosure of specific 
information. 579  As indicated in chapter four, most judgments base their discussion of 
involuntary reliance on a famous article by Millner,580 in which he submits that: 
 
“[t]he key to this question must lie in the precise relationship between the parties, i.e. 
whether that relationship is one in which the ordinary contemplation of the parties is or 
ought to be that A will disclose to B facts of a material kind of which he knows B to be 
ignorant.”581 
 
This submission is derived from a consideration of the situations recognised by law as 
creating a duty of disclosure, specifically when dealing with contracts previously designated 
uberrimae fidei.582 In these contracts the one party is often so reliant on the other that he 
cannot adequately protect his own interests.583 However, this element may also be present in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577	  See	  4	  2	  6	  and	  4	  3	  above.	  
578	  See	  3	  3,	  3	  6,	  4	  2	  7,	  4	  2	  8,	  4	  2	  9	  and	  4	  3	  above.	  This	  factor	  is	  identified	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  
where	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose	  is	  recognised	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  residual	  cases	  	  
579	  (1957)	  SALJ	  177;	  see	  the	  discussions	  at	  4	  2	  8,	  4	  2	  12,	  4	  2	  13	  and	  4	  3	  above.	  This	  construct	  has	  been	  cited	  with	  approval	  
by	  other	  authors	  such	  as	  RH	  Christie	  in	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  6th	  ed	  (2011)	  279.	  It	  was	  also	  confirmed	  in	  case	  
law	  as	  a	  strong	  indicator	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose.	  See	  specifically	  the	  judgments	   in	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  
Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W);	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  
1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W)	  797C;	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W)	  718C.	  
580	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W).	  
581	  Millner	  (1957)	  SALJ	  188.	  
582	  On	   linking	   involuntary	   reliance	   to	   contracts	  uberrimae	   fidei,	   specifically	   insurance	   contracts	   see	   Christie	  The	   Law	   of	  
Contract	  279.	  
583	  Hutchison	   &	   Pretorius	   The	   Law	   of	   Contract	   135.	   The	   same	   element	   has	   been	   identified	   in	   German	   law	   as	   being	  
indicative	  of	  a	  contract	  being	  voidable	  on	  grounds	  of	  fraud,	  and	  is	  explored	  in	  O	  Lando	  Principles	  of	  European	  Contract	  Law	  
Volume	   1	   &	   2	   (1994)	   256.	   Fiduciary	   relationships	   are	   characterised	   by	   this	   type	   of	   reliance,	   where	   the	   one	   party	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residual cases, outside of contracts uberrimae fidei. This signifies that the type of contract is 
not decisive when determining the existence of a duty to disclose, but that the focus should 
rather be on the individual circumstances of the transaction.584  
 
A factor which contributes to creating an involuntary reliance is the requirement that the 
knowledge to be disclosed must be exclusively within the domain of one party. It has been 
suggested that the knowledge in such a case must be “inaccessible to the point where its 
inaccessibility produces an involuntary reliance on the party possessing the information.”585 
 
Another important factor identified by the courts and the legislature when determining the 
existence of a duty to disclose is the requirement of materiality. It has been stated on more 
than one occasion that it is only where the information in question is material that the 
disadvantaged party would be able to claim rescission based on non-disclosure.586 This is 
also apparent from the quote of Millner above, which recognises that the facts to be disclosed 
must be of a “material kind”.  
 
It should be borne in mind, though, that materiality means different things in different contexts. 
In insurance law, materiality is determined by asking whether the reasonable person in the 
position of the insured would have considered the undisclosed information to be reasonably 
relevant to the risk and the assessment thereof by the insurer.587 Although this is very 
specifically tailored to insurance contracts, this objective test of reasonableness is also used 
to determine materiality in sale contracts when dealing with latent defects.588 Relevance is 
usually a strong indicator of materiality, as a fact is only material if it is relevant to the parties’ 
decision to contract. This position is confirmed by legislation,589 and also by the judiciary, who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
necessarily	  depends	  on	  the	  other	  to	  act	  in	  their	  best	  interests.	  In	  these	  types	  of	  relationships,	  a	  duty	  of	  disclosure	  always	  
exists	  between	  parties,	  and	  this	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  rule	  is	  discussed	  fully	  at	  3	  3	  of	  this	  work.	  	  
584	  Hutchison	  &	  Pretorius	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	   135;	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	   (W).	   In	  his	  article	  at	   (1957)	  SALJ	   189,	  
Millner	  appears	  to	  agree	  with	  this,	  as	  he	  states	  that	  the	  same	  type	  of	  relationship	  can	  arise	  in	  other	  situations	  where	  there	  
is	  an	  “involuntary	  reliance	  of	  one	  party	  on	  the	  other	  for	  information	  material	  to	  his	  decision”.	  
585	  Absa	  Bank	  Ltd	  v	  Fouche	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  (SCA)	  181F-­‐G;	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  279.	  
586	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  416A.	  
587	  Discussed	  at	  3	  1	  above.	  
588	  Bloemfontein	  Market	  Garage	  (Edms)	  Bpk	  v	  Pieterse	  1991	  2	  SA	  208	  (O).	  
589	  Section	  1	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  71	  of	  2008	  provides	  a	  definition	  of	  materiality	  which	  states	  that	  facts	  are	  only	  material	  
if	  they	  are	  significant	  in	  the	  circumstances	  of	  a	  particular	  matter,	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  judgment	  or	  decision-­‐making	  
of	  the	  parties	  involved.	  This	  section	  is	  discussed	  fully	  in	  3	  5	  2	  1	  above.	  s92	  of	  the	  National	  Credit	  Act	  34	  of	  2005	  also	  states	  
that	  consumers	  must	  be	  provided	  with	  all	  information	  which	  would	  be	  relevant	  to	  their	  decision	  to	  contract.	  Although	  it	  is	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have defined material information as “information which has the natural and probable effect of 
influencing the mind of the person to whom it is made”.590 The use of materiality as a factor in 
determining whether a party’s failure to disclose is reprehensible is confirmed in case law,591 
and it works together with the requirement of knowledge to indicate whether a party intended 
to defraud another by their non-disclosure.  
 
In the conclusions of the previous chapter, our attention was drawn to the difference between 
the requirement that the duty to disclose must relate to a material fact and the requirement 
that the misrepresentation itself had to be material. 592  The latter requirement will be 
addressed below as a factor which plays a role in inducing the party to contract.593 
 
Thus far, the focus was on specific factors that indicate when a duty to disclose arises. 
 
The important question now arises whether there is any room for resorting to more general 
standards. We may now return to considering the principle of bona fides,594  which, as 
indicated earlier, is one of the underlying principles of modern South African contract law. 
Despite the recognition that bona fides plays a role in all contracts, there has been consistent 
debate about its nature, scope, meaning and function in our law.595 In this regard it is 
significant that the judiciary has largely rejected the idea that good faith is a free-floating 
principle, able to be applied as a test on its own. However, it has been accepted that good 
faith can function as a catalyst for developing specific new common-law rules,596 in this case, 
the general rules relating to when duties to disclose could arise. There is still a minority view 
that good faith should be a separate criterion, and function as the sole test for determining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not	   expressly	   stated	   that	   the	   information	   must	   be	   material,	   it	   can	   be	   deduced	   that	   it	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   disclose	  
information	  which	  would	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  consumer’s	  decision-­‐making.	  Also	  see	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  section	  at	  3	  5	  
2	  1	  above.	  
590	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  416A.	  
591	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W)	  718C;	  McCann	  v	  Goodall	  Group	  Operations	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C)	  726C.	  
592	  See	  4	  3	  above.	  	  
593	  See	  5	  2	  2	  below.	  
594	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W).	  It	  was	  also	  suggested	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  ABSA	  Bank	  
Ltd	  v	  Fouche	   2003	  1	  SA	  176	   (SCA)	  at	  4	  2	  13	  above	   that	   the	  court’s	   identification	  of	   the	  conduct	  of	   “honest	  men	   in	   the	  
circumstances”	  as	  decisive	  in	  establishing	  a	  duty	  to	  disclose	  could	  be	  one	  way	  of	  giving	  effect	  to	  bona	  fides.	  
595	  SW	  Van	  der	  Merwe,	  LF	  Van	  Huyssteen,	  MFB	  Reinecke	  &	  GF	  Lubbe	  Contract:	  General	  Principles	  4th	  ed	  (2012)	  199-­‐200.	  
596	  Afrox	  Healthcare	  Bpk	  v	  Strydom	  2002	  6	  SA	  21	  (SCA);	  Brisley	  v	  Drotsky	  2002	  4	  SA	  1	  (SCA);	  Barkhuizen	  v	  Napier	  2007	  5	  SA	  
323	  (CC);	  Bredenkamp	  v	  Standard	  Bank	  of	  South	  Africa	  Ltd	  2010	  4	  SA	  468	  (SCA).	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whether liability for non-disclosure happens in any given situation.597 It would be difficult to set 
a limit on this test, and its variable nature means that it would find expression in different ways 
depending on the particular circumstances at hand. For this reason, it appears that the view 
of good faith as a ‘catalyst’, or as fulfilling a ‘midwife function’ by facilitating the birth or 
development of new rules is the correct one to adopt. The rules and standards applied by the 
judiciary in residual cases of non-disclosure can therefore be said to be manifestations of this 
principle, without it being possible for a party to rely on the vague assertion that a duty to 
disclose arises merely because good faith demands it.598   
 
At this juncture we can return to the judgement of Jansen J in Meskin v Anglo-American 
Corporation of SA Ltd, and especially to the following statement.599  
 
“It is now accepted that all contracts are bonae fidei (some are even said to be 
uberrimae fidei). This involves good faith (bona fides) as a criterion in interpreting a 
contract (Wessels, op. cit., para. 1976) and in evaluating the conduct of the parties 
both in respect of its performance (Wessels, para. 1997) and its antecedent 
negotiation. Where a contract is concluded the law expressly invokes the dictates of 
good faith, and conduct inconsistent with those dictates may in appropriate 
circumstances be considered to be fraud; but where no contract is concluded, where at 
most there are abortive negotiations for a contract, the good faith that is a concomitant 
of the concluded contract does not become operative. It follows in such a case a duty 
to disclose, if any, must flow from considerations other than contract. In the premises it 
seems that authorities dealing with a duty to disclose in contrahendo are not, strictly 
speaking, appropriate to the present case. The problems in that sphere are, however, 
somewhat analogous and there may be some features throwing light upon the cognate 
question in delict. The answer to the question whether in respect of a concluded 
contract there existed a duty to disclose in contrahendo, is to be found, as pointed out, 
in the dictates of good faith. What this entails has crystallized to some extent, but 
certain aspects may still be considered uncertain. Good faith, as an objective standard, 
must rest largely upon an ethical basis.”600 
 
According to this extract, good faith can function as a separate criterion, and conduct 
inconsistent with the dictates of good faith would be fraudulent. The standard is based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597	  Eerste	  Nasionale	  Bank	  van	  Suidelike	  Afrika	  Bpk	  v	  Saayman	  NO	  1997	  4	  SA	  302	  (SCA).	  
598The	   same	   conclusion	   is	   reached	   in	  modern	   South	  African	   law,	  where	   the	  bona	   fides	   principle	   has	   been	   identified	   as	  
having	   a	   “midwife	   function”,	   finding	   application	   through	   other	   legal	   rules.	   The	   judgments	   in	   Afrox	   Healthcare	   Bpk	   v	  
Strydom	  2002	  6	  SA	  21	  (SCA);	  Brisley	  v	  Drotsky	  2002	  4	  SA	  1	  (SCA);	  Barkhuizen	  v	  Napier	  2007	  5	  SA	  323	  (CC)	  and	  Bredenkamp	  
v	  Standard	  Bank	  of	  South	  Africa	  Ltd	  2010	  4	  SA	  468	  (SCA)	  confirm	  this	  interpretation.	  This	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  M	  Lambiris,	  
“The	  exceptio	  doli	  generalis:	  an	  obituary”	  (1988)	  105	  SALJ	  644-­‐651.	  	  
599	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W).	  See	  4	  2	  8	  above.	  
600	  802A-­‐B	  (own	  emphasis).	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ethical considerations, and the court referenced Cicero’s famous example of the grain 
merchant. In this example, it was questioned whether the merchant, having brought grain to 
sell in a famine-ridden country, would be bound to disclose his knowledge of the imminent 
arrival of other ships bearing the same cargo, which would substantially lower his prices. As 
we recall from the discussion of this example in chapter two, and again in chapter four, Cicero 
considered the merchant’s silence in such a case to be wrongful, as it would be morally wrong 
to keep silent. However the court in Meskin, despite recognising that good faith is based on 
ethical considerations, cautions against relying solely on moral grounds for imposing legal 
liability.601  Later in the judgment, we see that the court ultimately relies on the involuntary 
reliance test proposed by Millner, and uses this test as a way to give effect to the dictates of 
bona fides.602 From this it is clear that, even where good faith is accepted to be the main 
criterion by which contracting parties’ conduct is judged, it can only be applied using more 
concrete criteria. This is also seen in a number of international instruments, where, although 
the main criterion is good faith, a list of other criteria is provided which must be considered 
when applying the good faith criterion. 
 
In the international sphere, we see a marked difference in the way in which duties of 
disclosure are approached in common law and civil law respectively, especially where the 
issue of good faith is concerned. As seen in the overview provided in chapter two, common 
law systems are traditionally resistant to the idea of recognising duties to disclose and of 
imposing liability for non-disclosure between contracting parties.603 The only exception, as we 
have seen, is in the case of contracts uberrimae fidei, in which parties are bound by the 
highest level of good faith.604 At a number of points throughout this work, the construct of 
uberrimae fides has been criticised, and it has been abolished in modern South African 
law.605 By contrast, civil law systems do not recognise varying degrees of good faith,606 and 
rather take the view that good faith and fair dealing are general underlying principles of the 
law of contract which are given effect to through other legal rules.607  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601	  803E.	  
602	  808F-­‐G.	  
603	  See	  2	  2	  2	  above	  for	  a	  full	  discussion.	  
604	  2	  2	  2	  3	  above.	  	  
605	  This	  issue	  has	  been	  discussed	  at	  2	  2	  2	  3,	  3	  1,	  4	  2	  1,	  4	  2	  2	  and	  especially	  the	  discussion	  of	  Mutual	  and	  Federal	  Insurance	  
Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A)	  at	  4	  2	  11	  above.	  	  
606	  See	  Mutual	  and	  Federal	  Insurance	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Oudtshoorn	  Municipality	  1985	  1	  SA	  419	  (A)	  432A.	  
607	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  German	  law	  at	  2	  2	  3	  above.	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This notion that good faith and fair dealing constitute underlying principles of the law of 
contract is echoed in the international instruments governing contract law. The UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) sets these principles as the minimum 
standards of behaviour between contracting parties,608  informing the way in which they 
conduct themselves throughout the contracting process. This formulation is found in Article 
1:7 of the PICC and, as underlying principles, good faith and fair dealing cannot be used as a 
specific test for the liability of contracting parties. Article 1:102 of the Principles of European 
Contract Law (PECL) as well as the more recent Article 49 of the Common European Sales 
Law (CESL) also makes provision for the application of these principles in contract law. As 
part of the section in the PECL dealing with freedom of contract, good faith and fair dealing 
are presented as overarching principles for parties’ conduct to abide by.609 However, these 
principles are not as absolute as the PICC, as parties are given the option of excluding them, 
and are only required to “have regard” to these principles when contracting. It is clear that 
there is a need to determine which legal rules would give effect to the general principles of 
good faith and fair dealing in imposing liability for non-disclosure.  
 
In a commentary on the UNIDROIT principles, it is suggested that  
 
“(t)he ‘reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’ test for imposing a duty to 
disclose can be regarded as a manifestation of the general duty laid down in Art 1.7 
that each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international 
trade.”610 (footnotes omitted) 
 
It is further suggested that the vague nature of the good faith standard requires that specific 
circumstances be identified in which disclosure would be required. In this regard some 
examples of specific circumstances where duties of disclosure would normally be imposed 
have been identified.611 These include relationships of trust and confidentiality, contracts 
uberrimae fidei, and the situation where a party fails to answer a direct question posed to him 
by the other. These examples bear a marked resemblance to some of the specific instances 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608	  2	  2	  4	  1	  above.	  
609	  2	  2	  4	  1	  above.	  
610	  JE	  du	  Plessis	  ‘Article	  3.8’	  in	  S	  Vogenauer	  and	  J	  Kleinheisterkamp	  Commentary	  on	  the	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  
International	  Commercial	  Contracts	  (PICC)	  (2009)	  438.	  	  
611	  Du	  Plessis	  ‘Article	  3.8’	  in	  Vogenauer	  &	  Kleinheisterkamp	  Commentary	  on	  the	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  438.	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recognised in South African law as situations where duties of disclosure are always imposed. 
In these circumstances, it would seem that disclosure is demanded due to “reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing”. 
 
Guidance about the application of a good faith standard is also provided in Article 4:107(3) of 
the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), which provides a list of circumstances 
where good faith and fair dealing would require that duties of disclosure be recognised. The 
article reads as follows: 
 
(3) In determining whether good faith and fair dealing required that a party disclose 
particular information, regard should be had to all the circumstances, including: 
(a) whether the party had special expertise;  
(b) the cost to it of acquiring the relevant information;  
(c) whether the other party could reasonably acquire the information for itself; 
and 
(d) the apparent importance of the information to the other party. 
 
The Common European Sales Law (CESL) specifically provides that, in the case of fraudulent 
non-disclosure, the main standard used when imposing duties of disclosure between 
contracting parties is the standard of good faith and fair dealing.612 Article 49 of the CESL 
addresses fraud, and Article 49(3) sets out some of the circumstances which must be 
considered “in determining whether good faith and fair dealing require a party to disclose 
particular information”. These circumstances include:  
 
(a) whether the party had special expertise; 
(b) the cost to the party of acquiring the relevant information; 
(c) the ease with which the other party could have acquired the information by 
other means; 
(d) the nature of the information; 
(e) the apparent importance of the information to the other party; and 
(f) in contracts between traders good commercial practice in the situation 
concerned. 
 
This list bears clear similarities to the list contained in Article 4:107 of PECL, as virtually 
identical wording is used in four of the circumstances listed here. Two extra provisions are 
included, namely the nature of the information concerned and the importance of good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612	  Article	  49(1)	  Common	  European	  Sales	  Law.	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commercial practice. The nature of the information and the apparent importance thereof is 
identified as the most important consideration when giving effect to the dictates of good 
faith.613 If it is clear that the information in question is essential for the other party’s decision to 
contract, and it is also known to the party with the information that the other is ignorant 
thereof, the argument is that a duty of disclosure should be recognised in such an instance.614 
 
Interestingly, this latter criterion of the nature and importance of the information appears to 
comprise the factors of knowledge and materiality identified in South African law as being 
important in establishing the existence of duties of disclosure. This is also seen in the 
identification of accessibility of information as a relevant consideration, and it would appear 
that where the other party could not reasonably acquire the information and the non-
disclosing party had sole access to it, there would be a duty to disclose. Materiality is evident 
from the fact that the apparent importance of the information is a relevant concern. If the 
information was important to the other party, and was inaccessible to him, then it would stand 
to reason that the party with knowledge of and access to the relevant facts would bear a duty 
to disclose. In this way, concrete expression is given to the seemingly abstract demands of 
good faith. The lists provided in PECL and CESL are by no means exhaustive, but do provide 
some indication of the types of factors used to give effect to principles of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
 
South African law does not expressly identify good faith as the main standard for determining 
the duty to disclose as the international instruments do, but it is clear that, even in the event 
that good faith is recognised as the main criterion, other considerations are still consulted in 
order to give effect to it. This may lead one to conclude that it is doubtful whether it is really 
necessary for South African law to give more express recognition to the standard of good 
faith, as the application of similar considerations by the judiciary gives rise to a similar result.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613	  R	  Schulze	  (ed)	  Common	  European	  Sales	  Law	  (CESL)	  Commentary	  (2012)	  270.	  	  
614	  Schulze	  CESL	  Commentary	  270.	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5 2 2  The representation must be material and must induce the victim to act 
 
It has already been established that a duty of disclosure can only exist in respect of material 
facts,615 and materiality of the facts has been identified in a number of judgments as an 
indicator of a duty to disclose. However, materiality has also been raised as a relevant 
enquiry with regard to the representation itself. The courts have identified that the 
representation (or in this case non-disclosure) itself must be material.616 If the non-disclosure 
is not material, then it appears that the court would not be willing to impose liability.  
 
Materiality in this context is determined with reference to the conduct of the reasonable 
person.617 In other words, was the non-disclosure of such a nature that it would have induced 
the reasonable person to act? It appears that there must be a causal link between the non-
disclosure and the actions of the wronged party. In this way, the requirements of materiality 
and inducement are linked, as, for the non-disclosure to be material, it must have been likely 
to induce the reasonable person to enter into the contract. Although materiality as it relates to 
the facts and materiality of the representation made are seemingly two separate enquiries, it 
is interesting that both are determined with regard to the standard of reasonableness. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the application of the reasonableness test differs 
according to whether we are determining materiality of the facts or materiality of the 
representation itself. 
 
Both of these enquiries are important when imposing liability for non-disclosure. First, we 
must consider whether the facts were material in order to determine whether a duty to 
disclose existed. Once such a duty has been established, it remains to be seen whether a 
subsequent failure to speak would be material, in that it would be likely to induce the 
reasonable person to act. From the judgments discussed in the previous chapter, it appears 
that both of these requirements must be fulfilled in order for a party to successfully rely on 
non-disclosure as grounds for relief.618  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615	  See	  5	  2	  1	  above.	  
616	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W)	  717E-­‐G;	  Novick	  v	  Comair	  Holdings	  1979	  2	  SA	  116	  (W)	  149D-­‐F.	  
617	  See	  4	  2	  9	  and	  4	  2	  10	  above.	  
618	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  non-­‐disclosed	  facts	  be	  material,	  see	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  
Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  and	  the	  evaluation	  thereof	  at	  4	  2	  7	  above.	  For	  a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  representation	  see	  4	  2	  9	  and	  4	  2	  10	  above.	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5 2 3  Fault 
 
It is accepted that a party seeking rescission based on a positive misrepresentation does not 
have to prove that it was made culpably. However, when claiming rescission based on non-
disclosure, the favoured position appears to be that the non-disclosure must be fraudulent or 
negligent. Christie supports this, saying: 
 
“All the authorities on which the doctrine of involuntary reliance is founded treat it in the 
context of fraud as a duty not to conceal material facts. They do not even mention the 
possibility of liability for innocent non-disclosure through ignorance or inadvertence, 
and indeed the concept of innocent misrepresentation by silence, outside the special 
field of insurance, presents the difficulty that the intent to induce the other party to 
enter into the contract cannot exist unless the silence has been deliberate. It would 
seem to follow that involuntary reliance, as a test for deciding whether in any particular 
case silence amounts to a representation, must be confined to cases in which the 
silence has been deliberate.”619 
 
From this it is clear that mere non-disclosure when there was a duty to disclose is not 
sufficient to ground an action for rescission.620 The party who failed to disclose must have 
been either fraudulent or negligent in doing so in order to successfully claim on grounds of 
non-disclosure.621 
 
The court in Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd (under judicial management)622 
admittedly suggested that an action could be grounded on mere or innocent non-disclosure, 
but this was not applied in any subsequent cases. The requirement of fraud when imposing 
liability for non-disclosure is also expressly recognised in some international instruments as a 
necessary requirement to hold a party liable for non-disclosure.623 This latter position appears 
to be the correct one, especially in light of the difficulty identified by Christie,624 namely that it 
cannot be said that someone intended to induce another to contract unless they deliberately 
kept silent. Policy grounds such as fairness must play a role in such a situation, as it would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  279.	  
620	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C)	  88B-­‐D;	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W)	  800F;	  Orban	  
v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W)	  718D-­‐F.	  
621	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  judgments	  in	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C)	  88B-­‐D;	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  
(O);	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T);	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W);	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  
1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	  	  
622	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  
623	  See	  Article	  3.8	  of	  the	  UNIDROIT	  PICC.	  
624	  Christie	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  279.	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unfair to penalise someone for an innocent non-disclosure, given that they lacked the 
necessary intent to defraud another party. Extending the scope of liability for non-disclosure in 
this way could be unduly onerous on the party keeping silent. This being said, it is interesting 
to note that the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 does not appear to require fault.625 In 
terms of the Act, a supplier must not “fail to disclose a material fact if that failure amounts to a 
deception”.626 No mention is made of fault, which leaves open the possibility that suppliers 
can be held liable for innocent non-disclosure. The effect of this provision has yet to be seen, 
but it could possibly lead to the recognition of liability for innocent non-disclosure in other 
types of contract in the future.    
 
As mentioned above, the question of knowledge plays a role in establishing a duty to 
disclose, as an involuntary reliance is created where facts are within the exclusive knowledge 
of one party, and the other necessarily relies on him for such information to be disclosed.627 
Knowledge is also relevant in determining whether the party keeping silent intended to 
defraud the other.628 It must be asked whether the accused had knowledge of the non-
disclosed facts, and also whether the disadvantaged party was truly ignorant of the 
information.629 If there was no way for the latter to discover the information, the facts would 
then be within the exclusive knowledge of the accused. Further, if the accused knew of the 
other party’s ignorance and kept silent regardless of this knowledge, then that may be 
indicative of that party’s intention to defraud the other contracting party by keeping silent.630  
 
5 3  Non-disclosure in delictual context: ‘legal convictions of the community’ and 
‘boni mores’  
 
5 3 1  The disclosure must be wrongful 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625	  See	  3	  5	  4	  above.	  
626	  s41(1)(b).	  
627	  This	   is	   confirmed	   in	   Millner	   (1957)	   SALJ	   189	   and	   ABSA	   Bank	   Ltd	   v	   Fouche	   2003	   1	   SA	   176	   (SCA).	   English	   law	   also	  
recognises	  that	  knowledge	  plays	  a	  role	   in	   imposing	  a	  duty	  of	  disclosure	  as	  such	  a	  duty	  would	  only	  exist	  where	  the	  facts	  
were	  within	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  party	  keeping	  silent.	  The	  judgment	  in	  William	  Sindall	  Plc	  v	  Cambridgeshire	  CC	  [1994]	  1	  
W.L.R.	  1016	  confirms	  this.	  
628	  This	   element	   was	   one	   of	   the	   common	   features	   of	   the	   case	   discussions	   in	   chapter	   four	   above,	   and	   has	   also	   been	  
identified	   in	   English	   law,	   specifically	   in	   the	  writing	   of	   G	   Spencer-­‐Bower	   The	   Law	   Relating	   to	   Actionable	   Non-­‐disclosure	  
(1915).	  
629	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  416A.	  
630	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C)	  at	  4	  2	  4	  above.	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As we have seen in the previous chapter, the general rule is that there is no liability for 
omission, but this rule is subject to certain exceptions, similar to the general rule regarding 
non-disclosure in the law of contract.631  
 
In order to impose liability for an omission in the law of delict, there must be an unlawful 
failure to disclose information.632 Duties of disclosure in the law of delict are determined by 
taking standards of reasonableness, the legal convictions of the community and boni mores 
into consideration.633  
 
This latter criterion of boni mores bears a strong resemblance to the bona fides criterion used 
in contract law when determining the existence of a duty to disclose. Both of these 
considerations have an ethical basis, and reflect the accepted mores and standards of 
behaviour expected by the wider community. It has been cautioned that this does not 
necessarily prescribe the same duties of disclosure in both spheres.634 However, there is also 
the view that the tests for recognising a duty of disclosure in the law of contract and the law of 
delict are essentially the same, as the touchstone for each is the legal convictions of the 
community, and the same types of considerations are used to give effect to the dictates of 
bona fides and boni mores.635 In the ABSA case,636 the court uses the behaviour of “honest 
men in the circumstances” as a measure of determining the existence of a duty to disclose, 
and includes the requirements of knowledge and materiality as factors which would influence 
such behaviour.637  It may be argued that this reliance on ideal standards of behaviour 
between contracting parties is simply another way of giving expression to policy 
considerations and the legal convictions of the community. If so, then there may in truth be no 
difference between the standards applied in the law of contract and the law of delict when 
determining the existence of a duty to disclose, as both standards ultimately rely on the mores 
of today.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631	  See	  4	  2	  8	  above.	  
632	  ABSA	  Bank	  Ltd	  v	  Fouche	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  (SCA)	  para	  5.	  
633	  Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W)	  800A-­‐C.	  
634	  804E-­‐F.	  
635	  ABSA	  Bank	  Ltd	  v	  Fouche	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  (SCA).	  
636	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  (SCA).	  
637	  See	  the	  discussion	  at	  4	  2	  13	  above.	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As we saw in the previous chapter, the court in Meskin v Anglo-American Corporation of SA 
Ltd638 also investigated the meaning of boni mores in the context of non-disclosure. It was 
suggested that boni mores would only require a duty of disclosure in fiduciary relationships, 
where the relationship between the parties is of such a nature that one party is reliant on the 
other for disclosure of information. This caution about extending the scope of boni mores 
beyond the expectation that parties to a specific type of contract would have a duty of 
disclosure is evident from the following statement: 
 
“[i]t seems, however, most unlikely that the standard could be higher than that 
suggested by Millner in respect of ‘designed concealment’ in contrahendo, with the 
practical yardstick of ‘the involuntary dependence of one party upon the other for 
information material to his decision’.”639 
 
From this judgment, it appears that the courts in giving effect to the dictates of boni mores 
also rely on the involuntary reliance construction used in the law of contract as a means of 
determining whether a duty of disclosure exists between contracting parties in any given 
circumstance.640  
 
5 3 2  Other requirements 
 
As in the law of contract, it is not sufficient to establish a duty of disclosure. Something further 
must be proved in order to succeed with a delictual claim for damages based on non-
disclosure. Apart from a material misrepresentation and inducement,641 the party seeking to 
institute such a claim must further prove fault. From a reading of the case discussions in the 
preceding chapter, it is obvious that initially the fault requirement would only be satisfied if 
dolus was present, and the non-disclosure was fraudulent. However, the law has developed 
in such a way that it is now also possible to ground a claim on negligent non-disclosure. 
Following the judgment in Cloete v Smithfield Hotel,642 Millner suggested the possibility of 
basing an action on negligent non-disclosure.643 This suggestion was not applied until the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W)	  
639	  808A.	  
640	  In	  view	  of	  what	  has	  been	  said	  above,	  the	  question	  then	  becomes:	  is	  there	  the	  involuntary	  reliance	  of	  one	  party	  upon	  
the	  other	  for	  information	  material	  to	  his	  decision?”	  808F-­‐G.	  
641	  See	  ABSA	  Bank	  Ltd	  v	  Fouche	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  (SCA)	  para	  6;	  and	  as	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  concepts	  see	  5	  2	  2	  above	  
642	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O).	  
643	  This	  possibility	  was	  also	  acknowledged	  by	  AJ	  Kerr	  in	  his	  commentary	  on	  Orban	  v	  Stead,	  found	  at	  (1979)	  96	  SALJ	  17-­‐23.	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more recent judgments in McCann v Goodall Group Operations644 and ABSA Bank Ltd v 
Fouche,645 in which the courts allowed for the fact that when claiming delictual damages, 
proving that a party’s silence was negligent would satisfy the fault requirement in the form of 
culpa. Ultimately, the position in contract and delict may be regarded as similar, inasmuch 
neither fields award relief in the event of innocent non-disclosure, and negligent non-
disclosure has only rarely been actionable.  
 
5 4  Consumer Protection Act: Section 41 
 
Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 addresses false, misleading or 
deceptive representations in consumer contracts. As discussed in chapter three above,646 s 
41 provides a statutory duty of disclosure, but limits the suppliers’ duty to disclose material 
facts.647 However, no definition of materiality was provided in the Act itself, leaving it open to 
interpretation. The common law meaning of materiality could be useful in this regard. Material 
facts are considered to be those which have the natural consequence of inducing parties to 
enter into a contract.648 This interpretation would be applicable to consumer contracts, as the 
aim of the legislation is to equip the consumer with enough information to allow him to make 
an informed decision when entering into consumer contracts. Also, it would stand to reason 
that only information relevant to the type of contract would need to be disclosed.649  
 
Another issue left open in s 41 is whether it would apply to instances of innocent non-
disclosure. Traditionally, the common law position has been against imposing liability for 
innocent non-disclosure, with the judiciary requiring that either fraud or negligence must be 
proven in order to claim a remedy based on non-disclosure.650 The international instruments 
have taken the same approach, dealing with non-disclosure as a form of fraud.651 Section 41 
seems to allow for the possibility that, under the Act, a supplier could be held liable for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644	  1995	  2	  SA	  718	  (C).	  
645	  2003	  1	  SA	  176	  (SCA).	  
646	  3	  5	  4	  above.	  
647	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  common	  law	  approach;	  see	  Pretorius	  v	  Natal	  South	  Sea	  Investment	  Trust	  Ltd	  (under	  judicial	  
management)	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W)	  416A	  and	  4	  3	  above.	  	  
648	  See	  5	  2	  1	  above.	  
649	  5	  2	  above.	  
650	  Dibley	  v	  Furter	  1951	  4	  SA	  73	  (C)	  88B-­‐D;	  Cloete	  v	  Smithfield	  Hotel	  1955	  2	  SA	  622	  (O);	  Flaks	  v	  Sarne	  1959	  1	  SA	  222	  (T);	  
Meskin	  v	  Anglo-­‐American	  Corporation	  of	  SA	  Ltd	  1968	  4	  SA	  793	  (W);	  Orban	  v	  Stead	  1978	  2	  SA	  713	  (W).	  	  
651	  Article	  3.8	  UNIDROIT	  Principles	  of	  International	  Commercial	  Contracts;	  Article	  49	  Common	  European	  Sales	  Law.	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innocent non-disclosure.652 The Act only states that a supplier must not “fail to disclose a 
material fact if that failure amounts to a deception”.653 It seems that if the consequence of 
non-disclosure is the deception of the consumer, then the consumer would have a remedy 
against the supplier in terms of the Act,654 regardless of the supplier’s state of mind. This 
differs from the general common law position, although it has been suggested in Pretorius v 
Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd (under judicial management)655 that an action could be 
grounded on mere or innocent non-disclosure.656 In this regard, it would seem that the Act 
would be of broader application than the common law, and suppliers could potentially be 
liable for innocent non-disclosure of material facts.  
 
5 5  Summary 
 
It has been enquired throughout this discussion whether difficulties relating to imposing 
liability for non-disclosure may be alleviated by the identification of a single principle or test, 
which could be used in all situations to indicate when disclosure is required. 657  After 
considering the exploration of the development and approach to non-disclosure in South 
African law, it may be concluded that there is in fact no such unifying principle which would be 
applicable to all cases of non-disclosure. Apart from the recognised exceptions where 
disclosure is always required between parties to a contract, the residual instances have been 
dealt with on a case by case basis, with the circumstances of each being considered in order 
to decide whether liability should be imposed.  Historically, there has been some reliance on 
principle of good faith, and in modern law this principle is recognised as a value underlying 
the law of contract, which provides a general standard measuring the conduct of contracting 
parties inter se. But it was argued that these principles cannot be used as separate tests for 
liability in cases of non-disclosure. Ultimately, there is a need for specific standards which are 
always present in instances where liability has been imposed for non-disclosure. In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652	  3	  5	  4	  1	  above.	  
653	  s41(1)(b).	  
654	  The	  consumer	  must	  first	  exhaust	  the	  statutory	  remedies	  (a	  list	  of	  which	  is	  provided	  in	  section	  69	  of	  the	  Act),	  and	  would	  
only	  then	  have	  recourse	  to	  the	  courts	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  52.	  See	  3	  5	  4	  above.	  	  
655	  1965	  3	  SA	  410	  (W).	  
656	  See	  4	  2	  7	  above.	  
657	  Hutchison	  suggests	  that	  “the	  law	  might	  better	  be	  stated	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  unifying	  principle	  spelling	  out	  when	  disclosure	  is	  
required”.	  (“Good	  faith	  in	  contract”	  in	  Good	  Faith	  in	  Contract	  230.)	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regard the case law reveals that there are certain factors which are repeatedly regarded as 
relevant in situations of non-disclosure. As we have seen, these factors were developed 
separately in the context of deciding whether to award contractual claims for rescission and 
restitution, and delictual claims for damages. 
 
It has been established that both when instituting an action in contract and delict it must be 
established whether there is in fact a duty to disclose, and whether certain other requirements 
have been met, especially whether the failure to comply with this duty was either fraudulent or 
negligent. In determining whether the duty exists, an important difference is that the law of 
contract does not resort to general standards such as wrongfulness. However, there are 
notable similarities in the specific factors that courts regard as relevant in this context. These 
factors have the potential to evolve over time, depending on the specific circumstances of 
each case. This ensures that legal development of the law could continuously take into 
account changing values. In this regard it is concluded that the South African common law 
could also benefit from taking cognisance of developments in foreign law, and especially 
provisions on non-disclosure in some model instruments. Furthermore, some of the 
conclusions drawn above could also assist in the application of legislative provisions aimed at 
protecting consumers from non-disclosing suppliers.658 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
658	  See	  5	  4	  above	  on	  s41	  of	  the	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	  68	  of	  2008;	  also	  see	  3	  5	  4	  and	  5	  4	  above.	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